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The concept of ‘the commons’ has been used as a framework to understand resources shared by a community rather than a private entity, and it has also inspired social movements working against 
the enclosure of public goods and resources. One such resource is free 
(libre) and open source software (FLOSS). FLOSS emerged as an alternative 
to proprietary software in the 1980s. However, both the products and 
production processes of FLOSS have become incorporated into capitalist 
production. For example, Red Hat, Inc. is a large publicly traded company 
whose business model relies entirely on free software, and IBM, Intel, 
Cisco, Samsung, Google are some of the largest contributors to Linux, the 
open-source operating system. This book explores the ways in which FLOSS 
has been incorporated into digital capitalism. Just as the commons have 
been used as a motivational frame for radical social movements, it has also 
served the interests of free-marketeers, corporate libertarians, and states 
to expand their reach by dragging the shared resources of social life onto 
digital platforms so they can be integrated into the global capitalist system.
The book concludes by asserting the need for a critical political economic 
understanding of the commons that foregrounds (digital) labour, class 
struggle, and uneven power distribution within the digital commons as well 
as between FLOSS communities and their corporate sponsors.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Open Source Software 
and the Digital Commons
In March of 2012, The Linux Foundation released a report entitled, ‘Linux 
Kernel Development: How Fast it is Going, Who is Doing It, What They are 
Doing, and Who is Sponsoring It’. The kernel is an essential part of an operating 
system that facilitates communication between computer hardware and soft-
ware, and the Linux kernel development project is considered ‘one of the largest 
cooperative software projects ever attempted’ (The Linux Foundation, 2012: 1). 
Aside from a technical overview of how kernel development has changed over 
time, the authors included a curious note in the report’s highlights: Microsoft 
was one of the top 20 contributors to the kernel. This marks the first time that 
Microsoft appeared as a top contributor, but it was not the only corporation in 
the top 20. Other corporate contributors included Intel, IBM, Google, Texas 
Instruments, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, and Samsung, as well as others. The 
Linux operating system is a form of Free (Libre) and Open Source Software, or 
FLOSS, which allows users to freely study, use, copy, modify, adapt, or distrib-
ute the software. Why, then, would major corporations contribute directly to a 
FLOSS project, especially when that project seemingly does not directly con-
tribute to corporate profits? This question becomes even more curious when 
one considers that many of the companies contributing to the kernel not only 
compete with one another in the market for information technology, but that 
companies like Microsoft and Google are direct competitors with Linux in the 
market for operating systems.
Indeed, Steve Ballmer, the Chief Operating Officer of Microsoft, once referred 
to Linux as ‘a cancer that attaches itself in an intellectual property sense to eve-
rything it touches’ (Greene, 2001). Ballmer was referencing the GNU General 
Public License, or GNU GPL, which is the most commonly used free software 
license. The GPL grants users of GPL-protected software the right to study, use, 
copy, modify, or adapt the software as they wish. In addition, users are granted 
the right to redistribute the software, as well as a modified version, and the user 
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may even charge a fee for the modified version, provided that the distributor 
does not place greater restrictions on the rights granted by the GPL. The GPL 
does not preclude corporations from modifying free software or charging a fee 
for their modified versions, but the corporation must still grant free software 
rights to end users. Ballmer’s quote implies that free software is antithetical to 
commercial software companies. If this were the case, then Microsoft and other 
commercial software firms would have no incentive to contribute directly to 
one of the largest open source projects.
Furthermore, consider the fact that Ballmer made his denunciation of Linux 
on 1 June 2001. Merely 27 days later, on 28 June 2001, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice found Microsoft guilty of monopolistic business practices in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act primarily for bundling its Internet 
Explorer web browser with its Microsoft Windows operating system to rap-
idly increase its share of the market for web browsers. However, Microsoft has 
dramatically changed its position on Linux and open source since 2001, as sig-
nified by its inclusion in the top 20 contributors to the Linux kernel in 2012. 
That same year, Microsoft created Microsoft Open Technologies, Inc., a wholly 
owned subsidiary dedicated to facilitating interoperability between Microsoft 
and non-Microsoft technologies, while promoting open standards and open 
source. What changed during this 12-year period that Microsoft would so dra-
matically reposition itself in relation to FLOSS?
Microsoft is not alone. Indeed, corporate involvement in FLOSS has been 
increasing, especially since about 2007–2008. Table 1.1 provides an illustration 
of the companies that contributed to Linux kernel development for versions 
4.8–4.13, which were released in 2017. The annual report for kernel develop-
ment that year identified 225 companies that contributed to the project. While 
the Linux kernel is just one example of a FLOSS project to which corpora-
tions are contributing, other examples exist as well. This begs the question as to 
what motivates these companies to contribute to FLOSS projects. Furthermore, 
in what ways are they contributing to FLOSS projects? How do communities 
of FLOSS developers negotiate corporate involvement in their projects? Do 
communities of FLOSS developers have any recourse for unwanted corporate 
involvement or influence in their projects?
1.1. The Argument and Plan for the Book
The overall purpose of this book is to investigate the seemingly contradictory 
relationship between FLOSS communities and for-profit corporations. Working 
from a critical political economic perspective, I investigate the power dynam-
ics that exist between communities of FLOSS developers and the corporations 
that sponsor FLOSS projects or appropriate the software production of FLOSS 
labourers. After all, FLOSS products and the productive process that make 
those products possible have been widely lauded as revolutionary changes that 
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enable greater degrees of freedom and autonomy on behalf of users and con-
tributors (Benkler, 2006; Raymond, 2000; Stallman, 2002). This project inter-
venes in these debates by tempering these claims. I position technology as a site 
of social struggle, and I contextualise commons-based peer production within 
a broader social context to illustrate how such production intersects with capi-
talist production. I do this by demonstrating how the purportedly revolution-
ary changes brought about by FLOSS and commons-based peer production are 
now becoming incorporated into corporate strategies and corporate structures.
The central argument presented here is that free and open source software 
is dialectically situated between capital and the commons. On the one hand, 
communities of programmers are actively working to create software as digital 
commons that can be accessed, used, adapted by others. By developing soft-
ware iteratively this way, the pace and scale of software production increases. 
This represents a virtuous cycle whereby an association of software program-
mers actively contribute to a community that claims collective ownership over 
FLOSS projects. As such, FLOSS programmers can be framed as commoners 
insofar as they remain committed to ensuring the reproduction and sustainabil-
ity of commons-based software projects over time. On the other hand,  capital 
attempts to capture the value being produced by FLOSS communities. This 
includes harnessing the processes (i.e. the collective labour, or commons-based 
Table 1.1: Top Companies Contributing to the Linux Kernel, Versions 4.8–4.13 













Renesas Electronics 1,680 2.0%
Mellanox 1,649 2.0%
Oracle 1,402 1.7%
Huawei Technologies 1,275 1.5%
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peer production power) involved in FLOSS production as well as commod-
ifying the products (i.e. specific FLOSS projects), which can provide a basis 
upon which to commercially exploit the collaborative production occurring in 
FLOSS communities.
This is not to say that the goals of the free software commoners and capi-
talist firms are always antagonistic. At times they are mutually beneficial, and 
researchers have demonstrated how commercial sponsorship of FLOSS pro-
jects tends to make those projects more likely to attract developers and, there-
fore, ensures the project’s longevity (Santos, Kuk, Kon and Pearson, 2013). 
However, we also have other examples of these relationships breaking down, 
particularly when it concerns the unwanted encroachment of capital upon 
commonly held resources like the digital commons. In these situations, the 
interests of the FLOSS community diverge from those of a commercial sponsor, 
and the relationship becomes antagonistic. The FLOSS community is faced not 
only with the challenge of ensuring that their digital commons remain viable, 
but also with ensuring that the project maintains the sense of community that 
enabled the project to grow in the first place. How, then, to negotiate the rela-
tionship between their digital commons and the unwanted intrusion by capital 
into their projects? There are a variety of factors to consider when attempting 
to negotiate this relationship, and the subsequent chapters provide empirical 
evidence for how these dynamics manifest.
The commons, generally, and the digital commons, more specifically, can be 
understood as an alternative system of value that is emerging from within capital-
ism. At times, circuits of commons value can intersect with capital accumulation 
circuits. Therefore, understanding the relationship between free software and 
capital dialectically is useful for accounting for the contradictions between these 
two forces that operate according to differing logics. Chapter 2 outlines these 
differences more specifically by drawing on theories of capitalism, digital labour, 
and the commons. The purpose is to develop a critical theory of the digital com-
mons by incorporating a critique of capitalism within theories of the commons.
In Chapters 3–5, I provide three detailed case studies that illustrate differ-
ent aspects of the dynamics between FLOSS communities and corporations. I 
separate my discussion of corporate involvement in FLOSS into three thematic 
areas, with each case study providing an exemplary case of these themes. The 
three themes are processes, products, and politics. When considered together, 
these three case studies are indicative of more general tendencies of corporate 
involvement in FLOSS projects. Furthermore, each case study offers a nuanced 
understanding of the complex way these dynamics work, and they allow for a 
detailed unpacking of some of the contradictions inherent in the relationships.
To begin, Chapter 3 focuses on Microsoft’s contentious relationship with 
FLOSS. This relationship is indicative of the ways in which the processes involved 
in FLOSS production effectively ushered in a new era of industrial software 
production. While other companies demonstrated a willingness to cooperate 
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with FLOSS communities, Microsoft’s dominance of the software market for 
personal computing during the 1980s and 1990s makes it an instructive case 
for understanding how software production changed over time. The major his-
torical event here is the antitrust ruling against Microsoft, which marked the 
end of an era in which software production was largely accomplished within a 
single firm that sought to exclude others from accessing its code. Indeed, one of 
the consent decrees in the Microsoft antitrust ruling was that Microsoft provide 
third parties access to its application programming interfaces (APIs). This was 
a radical departure from Microsoft’s earlier practices, whereby the firm rose to 
power by using anticompetitive business practices.
Coinciding with Microsoft’s dominance of the software market and its even-
tual antitrust conviction in the 1990s were other software firms trying to find 
a way to transform FLOSS products into successful commercial products. 
My analysis of Red Hat, Inc. in Chapter 4 is indicative of how FLOSS prod-
ucts get incorporated into a commercial firm’s overall business strategy. Red 
Hat remains the largest and only publicly traded company providing software 
and services that are completely based on free software. As such, Red Hat can-
not rely on traditional copyright protections to exclude others from using the 
underlying source code included in its software. Thus, my analysis of the firm 
explores how Red Hat has been able to create a profitable business based on 
free software.
Finally, the third case study in Chapter 5 focuses on how FLOSS communities 
cope with unwanted corporate influence in their projects. Sun Microsystems 
was an important corporate sponsor of FLOSS projects, but it was acquired by 
the Oracle Corporation, which had different plans for those projects. In that 
chapter, I focus on the diverse destinies of three such projects – the Open-
Solaris operating system, the MySQL relational database management system, 
and the OpenOffice productivity software – and the ways that the communities 
involved in those projects resisted Oracle’s encroachment into their projects. 
In effect, the case study illustrates the politics involved in negotiating bounda-
ries between FLOSS communities and corporations, while also demonstrating 
some of the strategies FLOSS communities can use to protect their projects.
In the remainder of this introduction, I provide more context for under-
standing the significance of FLOSS. This includes historically situating FLOSS 
within a broader discussion of the commons, as well as some of the key his-
torical moments in the development of software, generally, and FLOSS, more 
specifically. In each of these sections, I also offer some notes on the terminol-
ogy used throughout the book, which will hopefully assist in avoiding concep-
tual confusion. Following those sections, I discuss the cultural significance of 
FLOSS. I conclude the chapter with a note on the methodology used for the 
current study. Readers who are already familiar with the history of FLOSS and 
its defining characteristics may wish to skip directly to the next chapter or the 
note on methodology at the end of this chapter.
6 Incorporating the Digital Commons
1.2. Situating Free (Libre) and Open Source Software
Although free software and open source communities are related and, in some 
cases, not mutually exclusive, each of them has distinct characteristics that 
can best be described by reference to the ethos underlying each movement. To 
contextualise the emergence of FLOSS within the evolution of the computing 
and software industries, a brief history of these industries is provided below. 
Following that discussion, I focus on situating two key figures associated with 
FLOSS within their historical context: Richard Stallman and Linus Torvalds. 
These two figures represent free software and open source, respectively.
1.2.1. Historicising Free and Open Source Software
The use of machines for processing information or calculating differences in 
numbers, human beings performed such work. But human calculations were, 
at times, prone to errors. To reduce this uncertainty, Charles Babbage, a phi-
losopher and mathematician working at the University of Cambridge in 1822, 
proposed that it was ‘only by the mechanical fabrication of tables that such 
errors can be rendered impossible’ (Gleick, 2011: 95). Such was the proposi-
tion for Babbage’s Difference Engine, which performed routinised calculations 
mechanically, and was arguably the genesis for modern computers as we know 
them today. Later, Babbage expanded on his idea and planned a new type of 
machine that was capable of being controlled by instructions that could be 
encoded and stored to facilitate operation. The new iteration of the idea was 
called the Analytical Engine, but this still only provided the idea for the hard-
ware or mechanisms necessary for such processes to occur. What was needed 
for this hardware was software.
The idea for software arguably originates with Augusta Ada Byron King, the 
Countess of Lovelace, otherwise known simply as Ada Lovelace. In 1843, she 
developed the idea that Babbage’s Analytical Engine could perform a series of 
operations beyond the mere calculation of numbers. By abstracting from the 
differences between two things, Lovelace posited that the Analytical Engine 
could be programmed to perform operations that relied on symbols and mean-
ings, which, in turn, could be communicated to the machine. Although Love-
lace’s idea was never realised in her lifetime, she is credited with developing the 
idea for software and is known as the first programmer.
While Babbage and Lovelace are credited as pioneers in developing the ideas 
for modern computers and software, the construction of such machines did not 
begin until World War II. Developments in the field of computer science and 
information theory – like Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Alan Turing’s 
idea for a Universal Turing Machine, Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of 
communication, and Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics – provided the intellectual 
inspiration for the development of such machines. Before, during, and after 
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World War II, many of the developments leading to modern computers were 
used for military purposes. Most notable, perhaps, were the German Enigma 
machine that was used to encrypt secret messages and the electromechani-
cal bombes used by the United Kingdom to decipher those messages (Smith, 
2011). However, in 1941, Konrad Zuse, a German electrical engineer, built 
the Z3, which is regarded as the first electro-mechanical, programmable, fully 
automatic digital computer (Zuse, 1993). The first comparable computer in the 
U.S. was developed by John Atanasoff at Iowa State University in 1942 (Cope-
land, 2006). Only one year later, the first fully functioning electronic digital 
computer was put to use by the cryptanalysts working at Bletchley Park in the 
U.K. as part of the Government Code and Cypher School. The Colossus, as the 
new machine was known, was programmed to decipher German communica-
tions during the war. By the end of the war, Bletchley Park had 10 Colossi work-
ing to decode German communications (Copeland, 2006).
Following these initial landmarks, the development of modern computers 
accelerated as many of the early pioneers began working for academic institu-
tions and private companies after the war. In the United States, Grace Hopper, 
who served in the United States Navy Reserves as a member of the Women 
Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES) during World War II, 
was assigned to the Bureau of Ships Computation Project at Harvard Univer-
sity. While there, she worked on the Mark I computer project, which was built 
by IBM in 1944. Later, after she began working for private companies, Hop-
per popularised the idea of machine-independent programming languages. 
This led to the development of the Common Business-Oriented Language 
(COBOL) in 1959. Hopper is also credited with popularising ‘debugging’ as a 
term for removing defective material or code from a program. While Hopper 
may not have invented the term, she popularised it by literally removing a moth 
from a Mark II computer at Harvard University after it had caused the machine 
to short circuit (Deleris, 2006).1
During the 1960s, the creation of microprocessors drastically reduced the 
cost of computing. As a result, communities of hobbyist programmers and 
computer enthusiasts began to experiment with the technology in the follow-
ing years. One notable example was the Homebrew Computer Club, started by 
Gordon French and Fred Moore in 1975 at the Community Computer Center 
in Menlo Park, California. The club provided an open forum for hobbyists to 
trade parts and advice about the construction of personal computers. The goal 
was to make computers more accessible to others. More will be said about this 
specific hobbyist community in Chapter 3, as it played an important role in 
the rise of Microsoft. Aside from these hobbyist communities, the majority of 
computer development occurred within the military, academic institutions, 
and private companies.
Most notable were the initial developments within the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects (DARPA), which was created in 1958, as well as the Artificial 
Intelligence Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which was 
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founded in 1970.2 Programmers working at the time were using a proprietary 
programming language called Unix, the intellectual property rights for which 
were owned by AT&T. One of the programmers working at MIT was Richard 
Stallman, who began working in the lab in 1971. Stallman found that when he 
wanted to work with the Unix programming language outside of officially sanc-
tioned spheres, he was denied access to the code by AT&T. In protest, he posted 
messages to computer-based bulletin boards in 1983 announcing that he was 
developing a Unix-based language that would be available for free so that oth-
ers could use the language however they saw fit. In 1985, Stallman published 
‘The GNU Manifesto’, which outlined the goals of his new project, his reasons 
for developing the project, and what the project was aimed at fighting back 
against.3 The programming language was called ‘GNU’, a recursive acronym 
standing for ‘Gnu’s Not Unix’. Along with the programming language, Stallman 
developed the GNU Public License (GPL), which stipulated that anyone could 
access the source code for free, and that anyone using the GPL agreed to make 
their contributions available under the same conditions. This would ensure that 
computer programmers could freely share their work with one another, thereby 
creating a common form of property that developed in opposition to its propri-
etary and closed counterparts.
Stallman became the figurehead of the movement against proprietary soft-
ware. He viewed access to source code as a fundamental right, which he wanted 
others to believe in as well. He summed up this view in his famous dictum, ‘Free 
as in freedom, not as in free beer’, thus positioning free software as a moral right 
(Stallman, 2002). The free software definition stipulates that ‘users have the 
freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software’ (Free 
Software Foundation, 2012). As the principles of free software grew beyond the 
borders of the U.S., others have tried to reduce the confusion over the English 
term ‘free’ by using the French term libre rather than gratis. Stallman estab-
lished the Free Software Foundation (FSF) to promote his movement against 
proprietary software, and he represents an impassioned counter-cultural figure 
who continues to espouse his free software philosophy.
While Stallman is generally considered to be the figurehead of the free soft-
ware movement, open source software is generally associated with Linus Tor-
valds. In many ways, Torvalds and Stallman have similar stories, but differ on 
philosophical terms. During the 1980s, free software projects were being devel-
oped but generally on a smaller scale. Free software had not yet found a way to 
coordinate efforts on a larger scale. Torvalds wanted to work on kernel develop-
ment for an open-source operating system. Rather than relying on numerous 
programmers all working independently on such a task, Torvalds released the 
source code for his project, which he was calling ‘Linux’, a portmanteau of his 
name, Linus, and the language he was working with, Minix (itself a simplified 
derivative of AT&T’s Unix). Torvalds suggested that anyone who was interested 
in contributing to such a project was encouraged to do so, if they released their 
work back to the community so that others could progressively work toward 
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completing the kernel. The project proved to be successful, and eventually led 
to the creation of the open source operating system, Linux. Coordinating such 
a large-scale programming project was accomplished by asking those working 
on the code to release their work, no matter how small the changes seemed. 
The rationale was that coordinated efforts reduce the amount of redundant 
work, which was summed up in the adage ‘with many eyes, all bugs are shallow’, 
which Eric Raymond refers to as ‘Linus’s Law’ (Raymond, 2000).
Stallman and Torvalds differ with respect to how they view the relationship 
between free software and proprietary software. Whereas Stallman tends to be 
somewhat more confrontational in his opposition to proprietary software, Tor-
valds is less so. Williams (2002) describes a decisive moment at a conference 
in 1996 where Stallman and Torvalds appeared on a discussion panel together. 
Torvalds expressed admiration for the work that Microsoft was doing and 
suggested that free software advocates could work together with companies. 
Such a suggestion was generally seen as taboo since Stallman was perceived 
with esteem by the programming community, and the Free Software Founda-
tion generally took a very adamant stance against proprietary software com-
panies. Powell (2012) frames this distinction between free software and open 
source similarly:
open source software as an industrial process grew out of the culture of 
free software development, but departed from the latter’s political focus 
on the value of sharing and the maintenance of a knowledge commons, 
and instead focused on the efficiency of open source processes for soft-
ware production (692).
This moment at the 1996 conference thus marked a watershed moment in which 
the fervour of the free software movement thawed a bit, as Torvalds came to 
represent a more liberal approach to free software. By ‘liberal’ here, I am refer-
ring to the literal definition rather than a specific political position; the term 
should be understood as something that indicates an openness to new perspec-
tives or behaviours while willing to abandon traditional values. In this regard, 
Linus’s expression of support for the work that Microsoft was doing signalled 
an openness to working with Microsoft (or other commercial firms) simply to 
produce the best software rather than an adherence to the anti- corporate stance 
of Stallman and the Free Software Foundation.
In sum, then, we can understand the free software and open source move-
ments with respect to these differing philosophical positions. Stallman and 
free software advocates tend to make moral claims against supporting pro-
prietary software, while Torvalds and open source tend to be associated with 
a more liberal and inclusive stance. While Stallman and Torvalds have been 
used to illustrate the differences between free software communities and open 
source communities, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive com-
munities, nor should they be seen as representative of the entire free software 
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and open source communities. One of the peculiarities of the free and open 
source software community is that, although the overall community is united 
in their belief that software ought to be free for users to study, modify, adapt, 
or customise, its members will often vehemently defend their preferred free 
software project while deriding others. In a sense, this signals to others where 
their loyalties lie and engenders stronger ties within niche communities that 
exist within the larger FLOSS community. The present project is less con-
cerned with these intra-group fissures than the relationship of the commu-
nity to the corporations that rely on their labour. To that end, the combined 
term ‘Free (Libre) and Open Source Software’ or ‘FLOSS’ is used to refer to the 
overall community.4
1.2.2. The Unseen Ubiquity of Free and Open Source Software
From its beginnings in the 1980s and 1990s, FLOSS has proved to be an effi-
cient and effective way of producing software. Whether we realise it or not, 
most of us rely on FLOSS in our everyday computing, as it provides critical 
infrastructure that enables the Internet to function. As an example of the size 
and scope of some FLOSS projects, consider the Linux kernel, which was 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter. When it was first released in 
1991, the Linux kernel featured approximately 10,000 lines of code. Version 
4.13 of the Linux kernel was released in September 2017 and featured nearly 
25  million lines of code, which was produced by nearly 1,700 developers and 
225 companies (Corbet and Kroah-Hartman, 2017: 11). Furthermore, Linux 
has become widely used as an operating system. For example, Linux (or other 
operating systems derived from Linux) holds 100% market share in the market 
for supercomputer operating systems (Top500.org, 2018a). These computers 
are the most powerful computers in the world, and all of them rely on Linux or 
Linux-based operating systems. This includes the United States Department of 
Energy’s supercomputer at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, which at the time of writing is home to the world’s fastest and most 
powerful supercomputer (Top500.org, 2018b).5 While Linux does not yet have 
a significant share of the personal computing desktop market, the operating 
system has been customised and used within a variety of contexts.
Within the United States, Linux is used for high-level military operations. 
For example, the United States Navy announced that its $3.5 billion warship, 
the USS Zumwalt, which has been described as ‘the most technologically 
advanced surface ship in the world’, will effectively serve as an armed floating 
data centre that features server hardware running various Linux distributions 
and more than 6 million lines of code (Mizokami, 2017, Gallagher, 2013). In 
addition, the International Space Station switched from the Windows operat-
ing system to Debian Linux, according to Keith Chuvala, the Manager of Space 
Operations Computing at NASA, because they wanted to have ‘…an operating 
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system that was stable and reliable – one that would give us in-house control’ 
(Bridgewater, 2013).
Indeed, Linux and Linux-based systems also provide essential components 
for some of the most recognisable technology companies, which was discussed 
briefly at the beginning of this chapter. Despite the fact that I have only selected 
a few companies for detailed examination in the subsequent chapters, one 
could find other similarly intriguing case studies that would exemplify different 
dynamics between corporations and FLOSS communities. As such, it is worth 
mentioning some notable examples here simply to emphasise the ubiquity of 
Linux. Google’s Android operating system, for example, is one of the world’s 
most popular mobile platforms, and it is based on the Linux kernel. However, 
there are certain key components of the Android operating system that remain 
proprietary to Google (see Amadeo, 2018). Aside from Google, other compa-
nies like Canonical rely on Linux for creating customised operating system dis-
tributions. Canonical produces Ubuntu, which is one of the most widely used 
Linux distributions.
Linux has also seen widespread adoption around the world. Some countries 
have developed their own versions of Linux to meet specific needs, and some 
cities have even required that Linux be given preference over other operat-
ing systems. For example, between 1999–2001, four cities and municipalities 
in Brazil – Amparo, Solonópole, Recife, and Ribeirão Pires – passed laws that 
required government agencies to use or give preference to Linux (Tramon-
tano and Trevisan, 2003; Festa, 2001). The decision to switch to free software 
systems was mainly economic, as Brazil reported spending nearly $1 billion 
on software licensing fees to Microsoft between 1999–2004 (Kaste, 2004). By 
switching to free and open source software, Brazil estimated that they could 
save approximately $120 million per year (Kingstone, 2005). Brazil remains one 
of the more progressive countries in its support of free software (see Birkinbine, 
2016a; Schoonmaker, 2018; 2009). Many of the country’s policy measures and 
initiatives related to FLOSS have been driven by communities of activists who 
have been able to intervene in policymaking processes to institute policies that 
seem to contradict the prevailing neoliberal ideology. In an excellent article on 
the subject, Shaw (2011) framed these activists as insurgent experts.
Similar measures to support free software were taken in Kerala, India, as the 
state adopted a policy to remove proprietary software from its educational sys-
tem. According to one estimate, the switch saved the state of Kerala roughly 
$58 million each year (Prakash, 2017). The German city of Munich developed 
its own version of Linux called LiMux (Linux in Munich), which it used as an 
operating system for its 15,000 city council members before announcing a shift 
back to Microsoft in 2017 (Heath, 2017). The National University of Defense 
Technology in China has also developed its own Linux-based operating system 
called Kylin. In addition, the computers used for the One Laptop Per Child 
project, which was founded with the goal of bringing low-cost computers to 
developing countries for educational purposes, featured a free and open source 
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operating system based on Fedora, the free software project sponsored by Red 
Hat, Inc., which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Beyond the increasing use of Linux, open-source principles have been used 
in areas outside of information technology. For example, open source hard-
ware (see Söderberg, 2011) can increase access to physical goods, including 
furniture, musical instruments, construction materials, and wind turbines for 
generating renewable energy. Such projects are particularly attractive to those 
living in developing countries, where access to information, goods, and ser-
vices may be restricted or limited. One of the more ambitious projects in this 
area is the Open Source Ecology project, which offers ‘open source blueprints 
for civilization,’ and includes instructions for building industrial machines with 
recycled or low-cost materials (Open Source Ecology, 2019). While this is just 
one notable example, it demonstrates the optimism and creativity involved in 
applying open source principles to a whole way of living rather than simply 
information technology. However, the core values inherent in these projects do 
not necessarily originate in open source software. Rather, the cultural values of 
openness, sharing, mutual aid, respect, and conviviality are foundational values 
for building a community. When applied on a broader scale, these principles 
hold the promise of a more sustainable future, especially when such principles 
are linked with environmental and ecological preservation practices. But these 
principles only become radical propositions in a system that discourages or 
provides little incentive for valuing them.
Despite the fact that FLOSS communities comprise a socio-technical system 
insofar as their activities are made possible by and exist within a technologi-
cally mediated realm, FLOSS enthusiasts also congregate and cooperate in-
person through a network of Linux User Groups (LUGs) around the world. 
Regular meetings of LUGs are held to promote FLOSS, to assist new users 
with installing FLOSS, to troubleshoot any issues that may arise when using 
FLOSS, or to simply meet other people interested in FLOSS. In this sense, the 
social connections that exist within these groups are mediated by their mutual 
interest in technology. Because members of the FLOSS community are brought 
together by their mutual appreciation of technology, their cultural practices 
depend upon and are supported by interconnected network technologies. As 
more people become connected to the network, the opportunities for addi-
tional participants in these communities grow.
One final point deserves attention here too. It seems like an increasing 
amount of our social lives is spent on the Internet where we work, communicate 
with friends and colleagues, read news, watch movies and television, and listen 
to music, among other activities. When we connect to the Internet and visit 
websites, our requests for information are relayed through a network of inter-
connected servers that facilitate communication between other clients on the 
network. The operating systems running those servers are increasingly FLOSS 
projects like Linux or FreeBSD, but Microsoft also designs server software. 
This provides another example of FLOSS projects competing with proprietary 
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companies like Microsoft. Consequently, and whether we realise it or not, our 
ability to connect to the Internet may depend, in part, on the ability of FLOSS 
projects to work together with proprietary software. This further demonstrates 
the need for understanding the ways in which proprietary software and FLOSS 
projects work together, as well as what happens when these relationships break 
down. Unpacking the dynamics that exist in these relationships can help us 
understand either the enabling or constraining of our ability to connect with 
others online.
What these examples should illustrate is that Linux but also FLOSS more 
generally has become more than just a tool used within the computer hobbyist 
community. Its widespread and increasing adoption across the globe within a 
variety of high-level contexts demonstrates the power of the FLOSS produc-
tion model as well as the effectiveness of its products. As FLOSS continues to 
be used within an increasing variety of contexts, understanding the ways in 
which corporations, governments, non-profit organisations, and other types of 
institutions are involved in FLOSS projects will become increasingly important. 
Therefore, FLOSS provides an important area for research not just because of its 
increasing ubiquity, but also because of the claims that have been made about 
the democratic, egalitarian, and non-market characteristics of its products and 
processes. This is precisely how this project seeks to contribute to such debates.
1.2.3. FLOSS and Hacker Culture
The term ‘hacker’ has taken on negative connotations recently, but the term is 
generally used to describe anyone who ‘tinkers’ with or makes changes to tech-
nology to create something new. Steven Levy (1984) outlined the principles of 
the hacker ethic. Among other elements, Levy claimed that computers can be 
used for creative purposes, hackers ought to be judged by the quality of their 
work rather than any other characteristic (gender, race, ethnicity, etc.), and that 
having the ability to hack is a prerequisite for hacking. This last caveat may 
seem obvious but, in order to perform a hack, a hacker must have access to the 
technology (in this case, the source code). In other words, closed, proprietary 
technologies that do not allow for tinkering may be viewed as unjust.
Indeed, when faced with closed, proprietary, or otherwise secured tech-
nologies, a hacker may attempt to circumvent or remove those restrictions. At 
times, this is done to make a point about information security, but it is also 
done to signal to others that they deserve credit for the sophistication of their 
hack. This signalling motivation is also recognised within open source software 
communities (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005), especially because FLOSS program-
mers are interested in remixing, modifying, adapting, or creating something 
new from a given product. The same signalling motivation has been used to 
understand why programmers contribute to FLOSS projects. Lakhani and Wolf 
(2005) explain that signalling can take place within at least a couple of levels. At 
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the level of the individual, a single hacker may perform a hack to signal his or 
her skills to others. Hackers might also use this type of signalling to communi-
cate their skills to potential employers to secure paid employment. Gaining rec-
ognition within the broader community for performing certain programming 
tasks effectively can translate into increased job opportunities with companies 
looking for specific skills.
However, a different type of signalling takes place between groups of hack-
ers. Groups or collectives may signal their prowess to others by shutting down 
a web site or otherwise disrupting services. Often, this is done in the spirit 
of competition, but can also be explicitly driven by a particular ideology. For 
example, nationally based hacker groups can be found in Syria where a pro-
Syrian government hacking group called the Syrian Electronic Army has waged 
hacking battles against the pro-rebel hackers associated with the Free Syrian 
Army (Fitzpatrick 2012). In these situations, hacker groups strategically target 
the web sites of their opponents to signal the strength of their movement.
Although the signalling appears to be the most prevalent motivation, Weber 
(2004) identifies other motivations as well. In a survey of self- identified hack-
ers, respondents reported their primary motivation for contributing to FLOSS 
development was a desire to challenge oneself and perform creative work. This 
seems to support what Levy (1984) identified as primary tenets of the hacker 
ethic: creativity and aesthetics. Weber (2004) also found additional motiva-
tions reported in the survey, including the belief that all software should be 
free, which echoes the philosophy of Richard Stallman and the Free Software 
Foundation. Weber concludes that motivations are diverse and that the results 
from these surveys need to be properly contextualised. For instance, many con-
tributors to FLOSS development do not disclose their identity or any institu-
tional affiliation. Indeed, a look at the credits file for users contributing to the 
development of the Linux kernel shows that most contributors are listed in the 
‘unknown’ category. This means that a large portion of the FLOSS community 
simply chooses not to self-identify. Therefore, the results of any survey that 
claims to represent the entire FLOSS community must be approached some-
what sceptically.
While signalling and creativity are certainly important factors for under-
standing the motivations of hackers and FLOSS contributors, my own view is 
that the most robust scholarship on the cultural significance of free software 
and FLOSS production comes from Christopher Kelty. Kelty (2008) positions 
free software as a recursive public, which he defines as:
a public that is vitally concerned with the material and practical mainte-
nance and modification of the technical, legal, practical, and conceptual 
means of its own existence as a public; it is a collective independent of 
other forms of constituted power and is capable of speaking to existing 
forms of power through the production of actually existing alternatives 
(Kelty, 2008: 3).
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In other words, in the process of actively contributing to FLOSS projects, FLOSS 
programmers actively create, recreate, or reproduce the infrastructure that ena-
bles their activity to take place. This has conceptual links with other theories 
of the commons that position the commons as a process or a way of becom-
ing (Dyer-Witheford, 2006; Linebaugh, 2008; Singh, 2017). Similarly, Rossiter 
and Zehle (2013) argue the commons are not purely ‘given as a fragile herit-
age to be protected’ against enclosure, but they must be actively constructed. 
FLOSS communities actively produce the digital commons as code, which is 
produced and licensed under intellectual property licenses that permit users to 
use the code and adapt it for their own purposes. These alternative intellectual 
property licenses take many different forms. The original copyleft licence to see 
widespread use was the GNU General Public License.6 Other notable examples 
are the Creative Commons7 licences, which allow varying levels of use for the 
protected property under conditions set by the creator. For example, users may 
make their creation freely available and permit others to use it, if those users 
provide attribution to the original author.
Kelty (2008) furthermore claims that FLOSS programmers ‘do not start with 
ideologies, but instead come to them through their involvement in the practices 
of creating Free Software and its derivatives’ (7–8). Coleman (2004) makes similar 
claims when she refers to the ‘political agnosticism’ of FLOSS. The complex forces 
at play in this agnosticism stem from an outward denial of specific political affilia-
tions even while ‘political denial is culturally orchestrated through a rearticulation 
of free speech principles, a cultural positioning that simultaneously is informed 
by the computing techniques and outwardly expresses and thus constitutes hacker 
values’ (Coleman, 2004: 509). Coleman continues by explaining that the core of 
the moral philosophy espoused by the FLOSS community is a ‘commitment to 
prevent limiting the freedom of others’ (509). This utilitarian ethic of openness is 
what is necessary for FLOSS programmers to continue building state-of-the-art 
computer programs because it is precisely the ability to tinker, adapt, and improve 
upon software that enables innovation to occur within software development.
These principles, as well as the outward denial of a specific political posi-
tion, are, in part, what has enabled the FLOSS community to attract such a 
large community. Of course, this is not to say that all members of the FLOSS 
community reject specifically political ideologies. One needs to look no further 
than Eben Moglen’s (2003) ‘dotCommunist Manifesto’, which offers a polemic 
against the regimes of private property. Indeed, he concludes the manifesto 
with the following seven principles in the struggle for ‘free speech, free knowl-
edge, and free technology’ as well as a concluding note on how this struggle will 
bring about a more just society:
1. Abolition of all forms of private property in ideas.
2. Withdrawal of all exclusive licences, privileges and rights to use 
electromagnetic spectrum. Nullification of all conveyances of per-
manent title to electromagnetic frequencies.
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3. Development of electromagnetic spectrum infrastructure that im-
plements every person’s equal right to communicate.
4. Common social development of computer programs and all other 
forms of software, including genetic information, as public goods.
5. Full respect for freedom of speech, including all forms of technical 
speech.
6. Protection for the integrity of creative works.
7. Free and equal access to all publicly produced information and all ed-
ucational material used in all branches of the public education system.
By these and other means, we commit ourselves to the revolu-
tion that liberates the human mind. In overthrowing the system of 
private property in ideas, we bring into existence a truly just society, 
in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all.
(Moglen, 2003)
Similarly, Dmitry Kleiner’s (2010) Telekomunist Manifesto outlines proposals 
for developing a working class politics online. His proposals for venture com-
munism as well as a copyfarleft licensing regime offer concrete proposals for 
developing alternatives within existing frameworks, but doing so in a way that 
is guided by radical politics. Both of his proposals are aimed at preserving and 
protecting the commonly held property of independent producers from capi-
talist exploitation or co-optation.
It is precisely because the collective productive activity of the FLOSS com-
munity is so valuable for software production that capitalist firms are inter-
ested in harnessing this power. At the same time, this is also the reason that 
critical scholars like Kleiner have sought ways to preserve that value within 
the communities who create such value, even if they offer different propos-
als for how to do so. Taken as a whole, then, this community holds tremen-
dous value for software production. The authors discussed above, particularly 
the work of Kelty (2008) and Coleman (2004; 2013), offer some of the best 
work for understanding the cultural significance of FLOSS as well as the ethics 
underlying the FLOSS community. However, there is still the pressing question 
of what happens when the specific cultural, political, and economic values of 
the FLOSS community intersect with circuits of capital accumulation. This was 
one of the tensions that Kleiner (2010) was trying to address when developing 
his proposals for alternatives. Moreover, in what ways does the FLOSS com-
munity negotiate and justify the dual position of advocating for open knowl-
edge and market success simultaneously? Some of the best work exploring the 
complex set of dynamics at work in this regard has been that of Alison Powell 
(2012; 2016; 2018). In exploring the ways that participants in peer produc-
tion communities negotiate competing moral visions for their projects, Powell 
(2018) argues that participants often engage in ‘operational pragmatics’ that 
are used to justify various design decisions. In doing so, participants collapse 
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distinctions between advocacy for open knowledge and market success even 
if these distinctions seem to be at odds with one another. In effect, both are 
viewed as ‘good’ or virtuous, that function as ‘regimes of justification’ when 
making decisions about design (Powell, 2018: 514).
How, then, can we understand these complex and intertwined ways of nego-
tiating cultural differences both within peer production communities as well as 
their intersection with capital accumulation circuits? Is it possible for peer pro-
duction communities to be exploited by capital if they are willing participants 
in designing products for market success? After all, corporations are keenly 
interested in harnessing the productive power of the FLOSS community. The 
following section discusses one way to theorise the ways in which companies 
relate to FLOSS communities. However, the following chapter will discuss these 
specific dynamics in greater detail by drawing from theories of capitalism, digi-
tal labour, and the commons, while exploring the ways in which exploitation 
occurs when capital and the commons intersect.
1.3. Open Source Business Models
The previous section demonstrates how the specific cultural dynamics at play 
in FLOSS communities have been explored quite effectively by other schol-
ars, including the significance of those dynamics for cultural production more 
broadly. However, the economic arrangements between corporate firms and 
FLOSS communities have been explored comparatively less. This book aims 
to offer some greater descriptive detail as to how these dynamics specifically 
manifest as FLOSS communities and corporations negotiate the boundaries 
between their respective organisations. However, one attempt to develop a 
typology of open source business models is worth mentioning here.
As part of their broader treatment of open source software, Deek and 
McHugh (2008) develop a typology of open source business models. The typol-
ogy contains five different models that have been used in trying to profit from 
FLOSS. Table 1.2 provides an illustration of this typology, providing the types 
of business strategies employed, a description of the strategy, and an example of 
a company or product that is representative of the strategy.
The first business model relies on dual licensing, in which the owner of copy-
righted software provides free and open distributions for non-profit users but 
requires for-profit customers to pay a fee to use the software. The exemplary 
case here is MySQL, which is an open source database management system. 
The company provides a free version of its software under the General Public 
License (GPL), which stipulates that any derivative software using the GPL-
licensed software must also be made available under the same licence. MySQL 
also provides an advanced commercial version of its software to for-profit cor-
porations, which can be customised to the users’ specific needs or integrated 
with that company’s proprietary software.
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Table 1.2: Types of Open Source Business Strategies, adapted from Deek and 
McHugh (2008: 272).
Business Strategy Description Examples
Dual Licensing Owner of copyrighted software 
provides a free and open 
distribution for non-profit 
users but requires for-profit 
customers to pay a fee to use the 
software.
MySQL
Consulting Company assists other 
companies with planning, 
strategy, and implementing 
appropriate open source 
solutions within their business.
Olliance Consulting 
(division of Black 
Duck Software), LQ 
Consulting
Distribution & Services Company provides services 
for non-expert computer users 
by handling the compilation 
of stable, updated, and 
prepackaged software suites that 
are distributed to users (clients).
Red Hat, Canonical
Hybrid open/
proprietary – Vertical 
Development
Using open source as a base 
upon which proprietary 
software can be built.
Google
Hybrid open/
proprietary – Horizontal 
Arrangements
For-profit company becomes 
directly involved in supporting 
open source projects to 
supplement its own business 
operations.
IBM, Microsoft
The second type of business model is one in which a company provides con-
sulting services for FLOSS. Quite simply, companies that adopt this model 
assist other companies with planning, strategy, and implementing appro-
priate open source solutions within their business models. Among other 
things, Black Duck Software provides consulting services through its Olliance 
Consulting division.
The third business model is one in which a company provides FLOSS dis-
tributions and services, and the exemplary company here is Red Hat. Unlike 
MySQL, which owns the copyrights for its software, Red Hat creates and pro-
vides its own distribution of Linux. In addition, Red Hat provides training, edu-
cation, documentation, and support for its Linux distribution. In other words, 
Red Hat provides a service for non-expert computer users by handling the 
compilation of stable, updated, and prepackaged software suites to be distrib-
uted to users. In some ways, then, Red Hat behaves similarly to a proprietary 
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software provider, except that it does not own the intellectual property rights 
for the software it sells and services. Rather, the company sells and provides its 
own Linux distribution, which it can do because of the open licensing model 
of Linux.
Whereas the first three business models are solely related to FLOSS, the 
remaining two rely on a hybrid of both open and proprietary software. The 
fourth model is a hybrid of both proprietary and open software that relies on 
vertical development with FLOSS. Vertical development means using open 
source software as a base upon which proprietary software can be built. One 
of the major corporations that uses this model is Google. In fact, Google does 
not sell its software at all; it develops and maintains its own software in-house, 
while selling services provided by its software to other customers. Of course, 
Google’s search engine is proprietary, but Google uses the Linux core to sup-
port its proprietary search services.
The final model is a hybrid of proprietary and open software, but one in 
which the company relies on horizontal arrangements. This is the business 
model that lies at the heart of this book project. In these relationships, for-
profit corporations become involved in open source projects. Drawing from 
Fogel (2005), Deek and McHugh (2008) claim that the reasons for corporate 
involvement are diverse, but include everything from spreading ‘the burden, 
cost, and risk of software development across multiple enterprises to allowing 
companies to support open source projects that play a supportive or comple-
mentary role to their own commercial products’ (277). IBM is one example of 
this type of business model. For example, IBM’s WebSphere application, which 
enables end-users to create their own applications, was built using the Apache 
web server, which is open source. Thus, by supporting open source projects 
like Apache, IBM is indirectly supporting its own interests. Furthermore, IBM 
directly competes with Microsoft as a platform for applications. Because IBM 
supports Linux, it is not only investing in the reliability of its own products but 
may simultaneously weaken Microsoft’s market position, especially because 
Linux is also a direct competitor of Microsoft.
In sum, then, this section has discussed how FLOSS has been used in differ-
ing ways by drawing on the typology developed by Deek and McHugh (2008). 
The most fruitful area of study for the purposes of this project was the hybrid 
open/proprietary model that relies on horizontal arrangements, although other 
projects are discussed, like MySQL, which represents other types of business 
strategies. The corporations that rely on horizontal arrangements are most 
interesting because of their direct involvement in FLOSS projects. Thus, these 
companies need to maintain a good relationship with the broader FLOSS com-
munity. When the norms of the community are violated by a company, the 
community can abandon a project, which can effectively end commons-based 
production on the project. In this sense, the FLOSS community leverages its 
collective labour power against undue corporate influence in its commons-
based resources. This was the case when the Oracle Corporation acquired Sun 
20 Incorporating the Digital Commons
Microsystems. This case will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. For 
now, however, it is important to note the two different examples of companies 
using hybrid horizontal agreements to two different ends. In the case of IBM, 
the company maintained a relatively stable relationship with the open source 
community. In the other, Oracle overstepped its bounds by violating the norms 
of the community. As more and more corporations become involved in FLOSS 
projects, the relationships that exist between the community and the corpora-
tions that rely on their collective labour power will be subject to changes.
1.4. FLOSS as Digital Commons
The seemingly contradictory relationship between FLOSS communities and 
corporations is further exacerbated by the fact that FLOSS has consistently been 
held up as the primary example of a digital commons. In medieval England, the 
commons referred to a portion of land owned by the lord of the manor, which 
certain tenants had the right to use for their needs. These rights included the 
right to cultivate soil, produce crops, feed livestock, and other activities. The 
concept has since been expanded from this very specific meaning to encompass 
any resource that is owned by a community or a resource that may be accessed 
by a broader community of people.
In tracing the roots of scholarship on the commons, most scholars book-
mark the work of Elinor Ostrom (2005; 1990). The narrative often begins with 
Ostrom’s work, and focuses on how her ideas developed and influenced subse-
quent generations of scholars.
While Ostrom is a towering figure in scholarship on the commons, this sim-
ple narrative tends to obfuscate the broader history and context within which 
Ostrom’s work is situated. Locher (2016) clarifies this history by demonstrating 
how Ostrom’s work can be contextualised within a broader history of scholarly 
debates within economic, political, and anthropological scholarship concerned 
with the best way to achieve development. These debates were concerned with 
the role of the state, the market, and local communities in the project of devel-
opment during the post-World War II period. This scholarship can be linked 
with the United States’ international development projects through its flagship 
institution, USAID, in the 1970s–80s.
Two assumptions in the approach to development dominated this period. 
One was the assumption of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ or the fallacy of col-
lective action, based primarily on the work of Garrett Hardin (1968). Hardin 
argued that the commons were ultimately unsustainable because they were 
at risk of overexploitation as members of the community acted in their self- 
interest to maximise personal gain. Thus, there was a fallacy in the logic of 
collective action; it was simply impossible for communities to govern collective 
resources without overexploiting them. The second assumption was that the 
liberal technocratic state ought to be the central agent in development through 
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economic planning and coordinating large-scale development projects. This 
assumption was driven by the success of the New Deal and the welfare state in 
the post-war period. As such, the model was viewed as the primary means for 
developing countries in the Global South, where traditional practices would 
give way to modernisation to boost economic productivity.
During the 1970s, these assumptions were challenged by development 
anthropology, which analysed ‘adaptive socio-ecological strategies’ used by 
local communities to ensure the survival of ecological resources (Locher 2016, 
313). Often, these decision-making strategies were situated within complex 
systems of customs and social rules that developed from local communities’ 
historical experiences with their broader environment. Challenges to these 
assumptions continued in the 1980s as neoliberal economics emerged as an 
alternative to welfare state capitalism. Informed by rational choice theory, 
which privileged calculating and efficient economic decision-making by profit-
maximising individuals, the goal was to unleash productive capacity in the pri-
vate sector through deregulation and privatisation. Neoliberal doctrine thus 
argued for dismantling state regulation and withdrawing the state from social 
provision. As such, neoliberalism represented not just an economic doctrine 
but also ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action, and 
substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs’ (Treanor, 2005: n.p.).
It was within this context that Ostrom’s scholarship, in collaboration with 
others, sought to illuminate the ways that local communities govern common-
pool resources outside of the binary of either state provision or market rela-
tions. For example, Hess and Ostrom (2007) argued against the tragedy of the 
commons thesis by focusing primarily on two points: first, Hardin assumes 
that the sheep herders are acting according to the principles of neoclassical 
economics and are individually acting in their self-interest rather than allow-
ing for forms of common governance, whereby concessions are made to the 
other sheep herders. Second, Hardin frames the issue within the binary choice 
between socialism and capitalism. However, the framing is fallacious for a 
couple of reasons. The commons under feudalism were owned by a private 
individual and not the state. Furthermore, Ostrom (1990) demonstrates how 
different types of commons can be governed collectively so individual short-
term gains can be compromised for the long-term survival of the common 
resource. In effect, Ostrom (1990) provided some nuance to the way that we 
understand commons, especially because they were often placed in a binary 
opposition that was representative of Cold War-era assumptions about social 
development: either state provision of common property (socialism) or private 
property ownership (capitalism).
Ostrom focused on the diverse ways that different commons are managed 
by those communities that claim some sort of association to the resource. The 
types of common-pool resources governed in this way vary, but the initial focus 
was on natural resources like fisheries, grazing pastures, groundwater basins, 
and irrigation systems. Later, Hess and Ostrom (2007) would expand the study 
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of the commons to non-tangible resources like knowledge and information. 
Table 1.3 illustrates different types of property by providing a simple matrix 
of two factors: rivalry and excludability. Rivalry refers to the extent to which a 
resource is finite or requires reproduction. Highly rivalrous goods tend to be 
finite objects like apples, which need to be planted again to reproduce the crop, 
while low rivalry goods tend to be intangible goods that can be reproduced 
without much additional cost, like ideas, information, or knowledge. Exclud-
ability refers to the extent to which an owner of such goods can exclude others 
from accessing or using that good. Highly excludable goods are protected by 
private property rights, whereas goods with low excludability may be used by 
anyone. Following from these terms, the matrix for rivalry and excludability 
would look something like this:













(language, knowledge, code, free software)
Within this typology, FLOSS is positioned as a knowledge or digital com-
mons. Digitised knowledge – in the form of source code, README files, 
software packages, and the shared documentation required in collaborative 
production – is freely available for anyone to use and at no additional cost for 
reproduction. One of the unique characteristics of free software as digital com-
mons is that it avoids the free-rider problem, whereby someone who consumes 
or uses a resource does not give back to the community. Even if a user of FLOSS 
projects does not have the capability to modify code, that person can still con-
tribute to the community simply by using the software. As an example, con-
sider someone using the Linux-based operating system, Ubuntu. That person 
would not need to pay for Ubuntu or any of the software included with the 
operating system, but the person can still use programs and report any flaws 
or ‘bugs’ they encounter when using the software. These can be reported back 
to the development community so someone within the community can work 
on fixing the issue. Ultimately, the fix to the software can be submitted to the 
project manager for inclusion in a subsequent release of the software, or the 
fix may be distributed as an update to all users. This process is reflective of the 
adage ‘with many eyes, all bugs are shallow’ (Raymond, 2000) which makes it 
possible for the programs and operating system to maintain a high quality over 
time. In effect, the use of free software serves as a form of quality control.
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Thus, free software may be positioned as a digital commons. However, 
there are different approaches for understanding the ontology of the com-
mons. Antonios Broumas (2017a) offers a useful framework for understanding 
these differences when he identifies four different approaches: resource-based, 
 property-based, relational/institutional, and processual. Ostrom’s (1990) 
approach tends to position commons as resources or resource systems that are 
shared by a group of people, which make them susceptible to social dilemmas. 
In  property-based approaches the collective property of the commons is differ-
entiated from private and public property. Institutional/relational approaches 
attempt to account for a ‘wider set of instituted social relationships between 
communities and resources’ (Broumas, 2017a: 1509; see also Dardot and Laval, 
2019). Finally, in a processual approach, ‘commons are defined as fluid systems 
of social relationships and sets of social practices for governing the (re)produc-
tion of, access to, and use of resources’ (Broumas, 2017a: 1509). In the proces-
sual approach, commons are understood as a process or a state of becoming. 
This process has also been summarised by Linebaugh (2008) when he proposed 
the use of commoning as a verb, which will be discussed in greater detail in 
the following chapter. For the time being, however, it is worth noting my own 
understanding of the commons tends to fall more clearly within the proces-
sual or dialectical understanding of the commons. This approach is also nicely 
summarised by Broumas (2017a) when he explains the complex interaction 
that takes place between a producing subject and its interrelationship with an 
external objective environment:
the interaction of subject and object takes the form of a subject/object, 
an entity that preserves certain elements of subject and object, eliminates 
others, and sublates the status of such an entity through the emergence 
of novel properties that did not exist in its generating entities (1510).
In building on this general discussion of how free software and the digital 
commons can be understood through different approaches, the following 
section will outline one of the primary threats to the commons, which is 
enclosure. I offer a clarification of why I have opted for a different term to 
 describe the complex dynamics taking place between FLOSS communities 
and corporations.
1.4.1. Incorporation vs. Enclosure
Within certain approaches to understanding the commons – most notably the 
property-based approach – the commons are generally held in contradistinc-
tion to private property. In other words, once the commons become commodi-
fied or privatised, they cease to be commons and are in the service of capital. 
Even within more recent work on the revolutionary potential of the commons 
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and commoning activities, the commons are positioned as a potential alterna-
tive to capitalism (see Dardot and Laval, 2019). The process by which commons 
become transformed into private property is known as enclosure. Histori-
cally, the enclosure of common land in England took place in varying degrees 
between the 15th century and the 19th century.8 Enclosure took various forms 
throughout this period, including voluntary enclosures, forced enclosure, par-
liamentary legislation, and others. Throughout this process, ownership of com-
mon land was transferred to private owners, who then claimed the right to 
restrict access to the land. This effectively ended the open field system, whereby 
commoners held traditional rights to use open fields for feeding livestock, 
farming, or harvesting from the land. While historians still debate the extent to 
which enclosure exacerbated class divisions and played an integral role in the 
development of capitalism in general, the process nonetheless affected the rela-
tionship between commoners, capitalists, and the commonly held resources 
that once provided a means of subsistence for commoners. Moreover, the 
state played a crucial role in facilitating enclosure through the Enclosure Acts, 
which were passed between the 18th and 19th centuries in England and Wales 
(see Polanyi, 2001).
The enclosure of common land was accomplished by literally erecting fences 
around previously open fields. Enclosure of knowledge commons, however, 
depends on restricting access or prohibiting certain uses of informational 
resources. James Boyle (2003) refers to the process of enclosing the knowl-
edge commons as the Second Enclosure Movement, whereby intellectual 
property rights restrict access to those things which were once considered 
common property.
Similarly, Mark Andrejevic (2007) uses the term ‘digital enclosure’ to refer to 
the process by which two distinct classes are formed online: ‘those who control 
privatised interactive spaces (virtual or otherwise), and those who submit to 
particular forms of monitoring to gain access to goods, services, and conveni-
ences’ (3). In other words, Internet users, as a class, have nothing to sell but their 
data, which serves as a form of value production for Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), which represent a class that controls the means of digital production. 
In this sense, the ISPs can restrict access to their sites unless users agree to the 
Terms of Service (ToS) or End User Licensing Agreement (EULA). These non-
negotiable contracts place restrictions on how users may interact with the site. 
The effect of these agreements is to enclose informational resources, which are 
controlled by ISPs. This type of value capture has also been critiqued in debates 
about digital labour (see Jarrett, 2016; Fuchs, 2015; Scholz, 2013), which will be 
discussed further in the following chapter.
In this book, I use the term ‘incorporation’ rather than ‘enclosure’. The term 
‘enclosure’ implies either a physical barrier or other restriction (i.e. intellec-
tual property rights) placed upon the commons. In effect, the ‘enclosure’ of 
digital commons typically refers to the process of imposing higher degrees of 
excludability on the collective resource. However, as the case studies in this 
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book demonstrate, corporations have developed unique ways of transform-
ing the products and processes of commons-based peer production into com-
mercial offerings without placing restrictions on FLOSS communities’ access 
to their common resources. This is qualitatively different from other forms of 
‘enclosure’ discussed above. For this reason, I have opted for the term ‘incor-
poration’ because I think it more accurately describes what is happening when 
corporations get involved in FLOSS projects, and this will be made clear by 
the case studies provided in subsequent chapters. Incorporation is generally 
defined as the inclusion of something as part of the whole, but it also carries 
the specific legal definition of formally establishing an organisation as a corpo-
ration. In what follows, however, I discuss one more notable contribution for 
understanding the dynamics between FLOSS communities and corporations.
1.4.2. Commons-Based Peer Production
The work of Yochai Benkler (2006) is useful for understanding the broader 
social dynamics at work in communities of peer producers as well as how those 
communities intersect with existing institutions. One of the most notable con-
tributions in this regard is his concept of commons-based peer production and 
its consequences for a broader set of social relationships. Benkler (2006) argues 
that commons-based peer production constitutes a new form of organisation 
that is ‘radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on 
sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected 
individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market 
signals or managerial commands’ (60). Benkler positions social production in 
general and peer production specifically in contradistinction to market-based 
production, arguing that these forms of production constitute a form of non-
market production. While these spheres are not mutually exclusive, Benkler 
argues that diverse forms of non-market production, like FLOSS, have the 
capability to influence market production.
Peer production can challenge market-based production in at least a couple 
of ways. First, peer production can develop products that will compete directly 
with those produced by commercial firms. In this case, the commercial firm 
has a few different options: compete, do nothing, or adopt and adapt. If the 
firm chooses to compete, it will be required to somehow create a better product 
than that offered by the nonmarket rival, although this may come at consider-
able cost to the firm. Alternatively, the firm can do nothing. In this case, the 
firm is basically relying on the belief that its products are superior to the non-
market option and that the non-market option will not gain additional market 
share. This is a risky strategy for the commercial firm. If the non-market option 
does gain an increasing share of the market, the commercial firm, or at least its 
product that directly competes with the peer-produced option, runs the risk of 
becoming obsolete. The third option is to adapt to the changing forces in the 
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market by adopting some of the strategies of the non-market forces. This type 
of strategic reorientation to non-market forces can have the consequence of 
altering the basic structure of an organisation. As Benkler (2006) notes:
As the companies that adopt this strategic reorientation become more 
integrated into the peer-production process itself, the boundary of the 
firm becomes more porous. Participation in the discussions and gov-
ernance of open source development projects creates new ambiguity as 
to where, in relation to what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the firm bound-
ary, the social process is (125).
Altering the firm’s position in relation to peer production, which exists outside 
the firm, arguably offers a higher form of risk for the firm. The firm gives up a 
certain level of control over the production process. The traditional view of a 
firm’s control over its informational resources or, more specifically, knowledge, 
is that knowledge can be viewed as an asset to be managed as an investment 
(Machlup, 1962). However, the peer production process in general is far more 
innovative and efficient than centralised production, including outside the 
realm of software production (Von Hippel, 2005).
Fritz Machlup (1962) was one of the first scholars to propose that knowl-
edge could serve as an economic resource, and his work was one of the first 
to popularise the idea of the information society. However, knowledge and 
information are typically viewed from a supply-side perspective, especially in 
economics literature that treats these factors as investment costs for the firm. 
Arguing from an alternative perspective, Frischmann (2012) suggests that we 
can view knowledge, information, and cultural resources as a form of intel-
lectual infrastructure. Doing so positions these resources as ‘basic inputs into 
a wide variety of productive activities,’ which ‘often produce public and social 
goods that generate spillovers that benefit society as a whole’ (Frischmann 
2012, xii). Such an argument resonates nicely with the arguments in favour of 
promoting commons-based peer production for enabling greater innovation 
(Benkler, 2006; Von Hippel, 2005). By framing knowledge and information as 
an infrastructural component of social development, protecting the knowl-
edge commons becomes crucially important to the survival of commons-based 
peer production.
The concept of the commons is useful for thinking about informational 
resources. Given the increasing interconnectivity between people across vast 
spatial boundaries with the ability to communicate and collaborate in online 
environments, maintaining a base of commonly held resources that can be 
used for peer-production remains a central concern for facilitating more open 
and democratic forms of communication. This is particularly the case because 
the commons are subjected to the threat of enclosure or incorporation, which 
can threaten a community’s rights of access to the commons or the collective 
governance of the commons.
Introduction: Open Source Software and the Digital Commons 27
1.4.3. Summarising Different Approaches to the Commons
The previous sections introduced the commons and commons-based peer pro-
duction. Those sections drew heavily from the work of two scholars: Elinor 
Ostrom and Yochai Benkler. However, these scholars take different approaches 
to their ontological understanding of the commons. Drawing from Broumas’s 
(2017a) framework, I positioned Ostrom’s work as a resource-based ontology of 
the commons. This is because Ostrom began her analysis with the collectively 
governed resource, then examined the ways that communities governed those 
resources. The value of Ostrom’s scholarship, then, was to provide a framework 
for understanding how communities can manage common resources outside 
of market relations or state provision. Rather than offering a prescriptive argu-
ment for how all communities ought to govern common resources, Ostrom’s 
framework accounts for the diverse and varied ways that communities establish 
adaptable institutions of governance for managing complex problems. As such, 
Ostrom’s project builds a ‘bottom-up’ approach for understanding community 
governance as well as the community’s relationship to common-pool resources.
The work of Yochai Benkler (2006) can also be understood within the 
emergence of the commons paradigm, although his approach differs from 
Ostrom. Benkler’s ontological positioning of the commons falls more within 
the  relational/institutional approach, as defined by Broumas (2017a). Such an 
approach abstracts from simply focusing on communities or resources, and 
instead focuses on the social relations and structures that exist between the 
two. In this regard, his work focuses on the broader implications of the digi-
tal commons for economics, politics, and culture. Ultimately, he explores the 
greater degrees of freedom, autonomy, and creativity that are made possible by 
digital technologies, including the ways in which digitally networked practices 
of production would alter the relationship between communities and capital-
ist firms. In this regard, Benkler’s work is also more conducive to a critical or, 
in Broumas’s terms, a processual or dialectical, understanding of the dynamics 
existing between FLOSS communities and corporations.
Broumas (2017b) also offers another framework for differentiating between 
social democratic and critical theories of the intellectual commons that is useful 
in this regard. Although his framework was used to discuss the intellectual com-
mons, the framework may also be mapped onto the digital commons. Accord-
ing to Broumas, social democratic theories of the commons ‘employ political 
economic methodologies to analyse the dynamics that unfold between the 
commons, the market and the state with the aim to propose reconfigurations of 
these relations which will best serve social welfare’ (103). Such theorists argue 
that by making progressive changes to existing structures, we can bring about a 
more just and egalitarian society. As it concerns the digital commons, the goal 
is to build repositories and platforms for commons-based knowledge and peer-
to-peer production that can, in turn, bring about greater degrees of personal 
freedom as well as democratic decision-making (Bauwens 2005; Benkler 2006).
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In the framework visualised in Table 1.4 above, Broumas (2017b) examines 
some of the foundational characteristics of each approach, focusing on episte-
mology, agency, structure, internal/external dynamics, normative criteria, and 
social change. Of particular interest in Table 1.4 is the relationship between 
the external dynamics and social change sections. The section on external 
dynamics in the table represents a large portion of the subsequent chapters, 
in which I explore the relationship between capitalism and the commons. One 
of the pressing questions for FLOSS specifically but for the commons more 
generally is whether these movements are capable of constituting alternatives 
to capitalism. Indeed, some recent scholarship by Massimo De Angelis (2017) 
specifically attempts to frame the commons as an alternative value system that 
is emerging from within capitalism but also one that has the potential to usher 
in a post-capitalist future, and this will be discussed in greater detail in the fol-
lowing chapter.
My goal for the next chapter is to specifically outline the contours of a critical 
political economy of the digital commons. To begin the transition to that task, 
however, the final section of this introduction discusses some of the methodol-
ogy used by critical political economists in general and in this study specifically.
1.5. A Note on Methodology
The following quote from Marx (1845) comes from a section of The German 
Ideology that discusses the essence of historical materialism:





Epistemology Political Economy Critical Political Economy
Agency Social Individuals Social Intellect
Structure Productive Community Community of Struggle
Internal Dynamics Bottom-Up/Top-Down 
Emergence
n/a





Normative Criteria Deontological [reformist] Deontological 
[subversive]
Social Change The Commons as Substitute 
for the Welfare State
The Commons as 
Alternative to Capitalism
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Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empiri-
cally, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of 
the social and political structure with production. The social structure 
and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite 
individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or 
other people’s imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, 
produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material 
limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will (Marx, 
1998, 41).
The quote represents a methodological approach to inquiry that is guided by 
assumptions about how reality can be understood and described. The quote 
also nicely summarises the goals of researchers working within the critical 
political economy of communication – that is, to connect the definite processes 
of material production with broader social and political structures. Most often, 
the inquiries of critical political economists of communication are directed at 
large corporations that hold extensive market power and the ability to influ-
ence the production, distribution, exhibition of, or access to, communication 
resources. In the process of investigation, the aim of critical political econo-
mists is to empirically investigate the material operations of corporations and 
connect those operations to the broader social system. The connections made 
to the social system can be situated within national boundaries while account-
ing for the attendant institutions (religious, legal, cultural, etc.) that encourage 
or discourage certain types of behaviour, but can also be made across those 
boundaries (internationally, regionally, globally).
By making these connections, political economists search for the general ten-
dencies of capitalism rather than seeking to establish absolute laws. This allows 
the inquiry to remain open to the possibility of contradictory factors, while 
also allowing for an account of diverse practices both within and across media 
industries. Indeed, the contradictory factors provide the illuminating moments 
for critical researchers, particularly because they provide opportunity for cri-
tique and resistance. To this end, critical political economists of communication 
have provided important critiques of corporations, especially the ways in which 
they operate in conjunction with the general tendencies of a broader capitalist 
system. As Meehan (1999) notes, ‘critical scholars share an ethical obligation to 
produce knowledge that accurately describes the media and reveals the hidden 
dynamics whereby media corporations attempt to commercialise and control 
expression in service to advertisers and ultimately to capital’ (162).
To search for these ‘hidden dynamics’, the current study employed a critical 
interpretive methodological approach. Maxwell (2003) describes this approach 
as used by Herbert I. Schiller, a pioneering scholar working within the critical 
political economy of communication tradition. When working from a critical 
perspective, one situates research findings within broader bodies of knowledge 
and looks for disjunctures or contradictions arising from within the field of 
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study. These contradictions or disjunctures can provide germane moments for 
research, from which previously accepted understandings can be challenged 
and refined. In this sense, CPEC scholars resist interpreting research findings 
according to their face value or as prima facie evidence. Rather, the research 
findings are brushed against the grain of alternative bodies of knowledge 
to situate the results within a broader set of relationships. Similarly, Mosco 
(2009) describes his epistemological stance as being constitutive. That is, criti-
cal political economy scholars resist causal, linear determinations as well as 
the assumption that units of analysis are fully formed wholes. Instead, criti-
cal political economists favour an epistemological position that is based on 
mutually constitutive processes, which act on one another throughout various 
stages of formation. In this sense, the approach is dialectical in that it consid-
ers both particular and more general phenomena as part of a totality of pro-
cesses. These concerns are carried with the researcher throughout the research 
process, regardless of what type of evidence is being investigated or how it is 
being gathered.
To facilitate this type of investigation, critical political economists use a vari-
ety of methods. However, the selection of method is often driven by the amount 
of access that the researcher has to the subject being studied. When direct access 
to corporations is available, critical political economists rely on research meth-
ods such as interviewing, participant observation, ethnographic methods, and 
other methods that allow for direct observation of the life-processes of definite 
individuals as they operate or produce materially. In turn, these observations 
can be linked with the ‘definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions 
independent of their will’ (Marx 1998: 41). When we do not have direct access 
to corporations, critical political economists rely on documentary evidence 
of corporate operations and the material production taking place within the 
corporation. Most often, this data comes from documents that are produced 
by and about the corporation. To that end, the following section discusses the 
specific methods used in this study.
FLOSS projects depend on extensive and accurate documentation to make 
the development of projects run effectively and efficiently, and these docu-
ments are made publicly available so that other developers can work on the 
project. The source code is one form of documentation, which enables users to 
understand how a project works, but many FLOSS projects also contain credits 
files, licensing disclosures, README files, and other documents that provide 
essential information to users. This information, as well as the information 
found on publicly available discussion lists, was combined with my experiences 
using Linux and attending a variety of different events and meetings focused 
on FLOSS, including local LUG meetings and the Open Source Convention 
(OSCON). The aim of these documentary and first-hand experiences was to 
understand the dynamics between the corporations and the community of 
software developers, specifically how the latter negotiate their relationship with 
those corporations.
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The advantage of researching FLOSS communities is that nearly all FLOSS 
projects have unique forums, bulletin boards, or wikis dedicated to provid-
ing documentation and facilitating communication about the project. These 
sources typically contain repositories of the project itself, but they also offer 
community discussion and historical data about the project’s development. 
This, in turn, can provide documentary evidence of ongoing and past events 
in a way that is open to the public. For example, the Fedora Project, which 
is discussed in Chapter 4, features a wiki that contains extensive documenta-
tion about the project, including news, events, recent changes, user guides, and 
links to various sub-projects associated with the main Fedora Project. Similar 
sources can be found for all the FLOSS projects discussed in this study.
This introductory chapter identified the central concerns of this project by 
highlighting the seemingly contradictory goals of free and open source soft-
ware communities and capitalist firms. Furthermore, I situated FLOSS histori-
cally by discussing some of the foundational moments in both the development 
of software as well as the rise of free software specifically. This discussion also 
included a consideration of FLOSS’s cultural significance. Finally, I outlined 
the specific methodological approach used in the study. Now that the broad 
outlines and contours of the study have been established, the following chap-
ter discusses more specifically the theoretical frameworks used to understand 
the complex relationships between FLOSS communities, their commons-based 
peer production, and capitalist accumulation.
Notes
 1 A photo of the moth that was removed from the machine is available 
from the Naval Historical Center at https://www.history.navy.mil/our-
collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/
NH-96000/NH-96566-KN.html
 2 There is a longer history of computing research at Harvard that traces back 
to the 1930s, including Vannevar Bush’s differential analyzer and Claude 
Shannon’s electronic Boolean algebra. Shannon is also well known within 
the field of communication studies for his landmark, A Mathematical The-
ory of Communication, which was published in 1948. However, research on 
computing at Harvard became specifically focused on artificial intelligence 
in the late 1950s.
 3 The GNU Manifesto is available at http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html 
(last accessed 4 January 2019).
 4 The use of the combined term ‘FLOSS’ is mostly pragmatic, as I am inter-
ested in exploring dynamics between the communities producing a free 
and/or open source software project and those corporations that sponsor 
or otherwise use that software. I’m interested in these dynamics regardless 
of whether those communities identify as free software communities, open 
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source communities, or some combination thereof. In certain places in the 
book, I specify one or the other when a distinction will be important. Oth-
erwise, I use the FLOSS acronym for more general discussion.
 5 The supercomputer at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory is known as Sum-
mit and was built by IBM. When this computer took over the top position 
as the world’s fastest supercomputer in June 2018, it marked the first time 
that a computer in the United States held that position since  November 
2012. In the interim, the top position was held by computers in China.
 6 The text of the GNU General Public License (GPL) can be found at http://
www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last accessed 4 January 2019).
 7 The Creative Commons Licenses can be found at http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/ (last accessed 4 January 2019).
 8 A detailed account of the English enclosures is not provided here, but those 
interested in a more detailed treatment should see Neeson, 1993; Thomp-
son, 1966; and Marx, 1906, especially Chapter 27: ‘Expropriation of the 
Agricultural Population from the Land,’ which is freely available at http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch27.htm.
CHAPTER 2
Toward a Critical Political Economy of 
the Digital Commons
Existing theories of the commons come from differing epistemological stances, 
and they also make very different teleological propositions. Some of the more 
robust theorising of the commons stems from an institutional approach, which 
is most often associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990) whose work 
was discussed in the previous chapter. Such an approach is valuable because 
it illuminates the ways in which communities cooperate to ensure the sustain-
ability of a commons-based resource. This approach is largely descriptive and 
analytical in the way that it understands the commons. However, there is also a 
growing corpus of literature that positions the commons as an emergent value 
system that has the potential to either transform or replace capitalism. This 
approach tends to be more interpretive and prescriptive in understanding the 
commons and their promise for bringing about a post-capitalist future.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a critical political economy of the 
digital commons that incorporates a critique of capitalism. I do so by framing 
the approach to this study within the critical political economy of communica-
tions tradition. Critical political economy allows for a dialectical understand-
ing of the contradictions and tensions between capitalism and the commons. 
To outline these tensions, I begin with a discussion of the political economy of 
communications tradition. Next, I revisit the work of Karl Marx in an effort 
to outline the primary concerns of a critical political economy of the digital 
commons. Specifically, I focus on the nature of commodity production and the 
ways in which labour is exploited under capitalism. Then, I position FLOSS 
within existing debates about digital labour, while also drawing from Marxist–
feminist theories of social reproduction. Following this discussion, I explore 
the ways the commons have been understood as an alternative to capitalism, 
including the ways in which the commons present an alternative circuit of 
value from those of capital circuits of value. As part of this discussion, I focus 
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on some of the growing critical scholarship that attempts to pair a critique of 
capitalism with and within theories of the commons.
Taken together, these approaches to understanding the commons are useful 
both analytically but, perhaps more importantly, also for the ways in which they 
offer proposals for a post-capitalist future. The analytical benefit, specifically as 
it pertains to understanding FLOSS products and processes, is that the com-
mons paradigm can help explain how commons-based peer production and 
non-market production are enmeshed in processes of capitalist production. By 
understanding these processes more concretely, we can learn how FLOSS com-
munities negotiate their relationship with capitalist firms and, when necessary, 
defend their commons-based resources from unwanted influence.
2.1. Political Economy of Communications
At the heart of the political economy of communications tradition is a con-
cern for the ‘social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually 
constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of media resources’ 
(Mosco, 2009: 24). By investigating the contours of these power relations, polit-
ical economy can illuminate the ways in which power manifests itself not just 
as a resource to achieve goals, but also as a form of control that is embedded 
within a broader set of social relations. In other words, the approach allows for 
an understanding of power as both a preventative force (i.e. power over some-
thing else) but also as a potential force (i.e. the power to achieve change). Power 
relations are present throughout the social system; they structure relationships 
and tend to reproduce those structures over time.
To that end, those working within the political economy or, more specifi-
cally, a critical political economy of communications (CPEC), are interested 
in ‘uncover[ing] connections between ownership, corporate structure, finance 
capital, and market structures to show how economics affects technolo-
gies, politics, cultures, and information’ (Meehan, Mosco, and Wasko, 1993: 
347). However, the concerns of those working within the CPEC tradition are 
not only scholarly; rather, they are often concerned with praxis or theoreti-
cally informed practice, whereby scholarly activity is pursued with the goal of 
achieving more just and democratic forms of communication (Mosco, 2009). 
Most often, this is done by exposing the ways in which power is manifested 
within communications industries, whereby the control of informational pro-
duction, distribution, and access or exhibition is concentrated within only a 
handful of corporations. These large, often multinational and trans-industrial 
conglomerates hold oligopolistic power within media markets, which limits the 
possibility for alternative or counter-hegemonic forms of communication to 
take place (see Bagdikian, 2004; Meehan, 2005; Birkinbine, Gómez, and Wasko, 
2017). By limiting the extent of available alternatives, especially by pursuing 
proven formulas for cultural production that generate profit for shareholders, 
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corporations reinforce systems of ideology that, in turn, tend to reinforce insti-
tutions of cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). The CPEC approach is therefore 
rooted in a tradition of critical inquiry, which has roots in the work of Karl 
Marx and his critique of classical political economy.
2.1.1. Marx, Machines, Labour, and Capitalism
By understanding FLOSS production from a critical political economic per-
spective, which takes inspiration from the work of Marx, we can account for 
the ways in which power relations structure the production, distribution, and 
access of informational resources. As was discussed in the Introduction to this 
book, FLOSS can be classified as digital commons with unique technological 
features – mainly, the availability of the source code and the ability to study, 
modify, adapt, or change the program for one’s needs. However, the core value 
of FLOSS lies in the collective labour power of the FLOSS community. In other 
words, the products of FLOSS (i.e. the Linux kernel, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, 
the Fedora Project, LibreOffice, etc.) are not the source of FLOSS value, but the 
processes of FLOSS production (i.e. decentralised and distributed commons-
based peer production). Because FLOSS production allows for highly efficient, 
collaborative, and speedy development, the end products of FLOSS produc-
tion tend to be more secure, adaptable, and progressive because they are under 
constant revision and improvement by members of the FLOSS community. 
From the standpoint of corporations like Microsoft, or Oracle, which rely on 
the sale of proprietary software or services, FLOSS production offers an attrac-
tive option for investment because it decreases in-house labour costs and, in 
effect, outsources the development of core components of software that can 
then be integrated into their proprietary software or services. To understand 
the dynamics at play in cooperative production as well as the processes of com-
modification occurring within FLOSS production, we can revisit the work of 
Karl Marx.
Marx (1906) was not the first to investigate the inner workings of capital-
ism and the source of value within capitalism. However, he represented a shift 
in the study of political economy due to his criticism of previously existing 
political economic thought. His three volumes of Capital offer some of his most 
thoroughly developed arguments about political economy, and some of his key 
arguments can provide a framework for understanding the role of technology 
and technological change within a broader set of social relations. Although 
his analysis was focused on the industrial production of the mid-1800s, this 
background will prove useful for considering the general tendencies of capital-
ist production as well as the ways in which they have changed under digital 
capitalism.
Marx (1906) begins his analysis of capitalism with a discussion of the com-
modity. He explains how life appears to be an endless procession of commodities. 
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The commodity form, however, contains two different values: use value and 
exchange value. Although a commodity may contain two values simultaneously, 
the commodity form is still a product of human labour. That is, the process of 
human labour creates products in the form of commodities. Although different 
types of commodities require different types of labour, what is common to all 
commodities is human labour. The value of commodities, then, is determined 
by the socially necessary labour time required to produce them. These princi-
ples provide the foundation for the labour theory of value.
In early economic configurations, the trading of goods for other goods could 
be expressed in the simple formula: C – C (commodity for commodity trad-
ing), which characterises economies based on barter and trade. For such a trade 
to take place, however, the producers of such goods need to agree on an equiva-
lence in trade (e.g.. ten apples equate to one chair). This form of trading relies 
on the availability of equivalent goods for such a market to operate effectively. 
In such a system, an apple farmer who wanted to trade apples for a chair needs 
certain conditions to be met to obtain the chair. First, a chair needs to be pro-
duced. Second, the chair needs to be available for trade. Third, the person who 
produced the chair would have a need for apples. If these criteria are met, then 
an exchange can occur. To reduce the uncertainty of supply and demand in 
such a situation, the money form (M) was introduced as a universal equivalent 
to which the value of all other commodities can be equated. So instead of trad-
ing ten apples for a chair, the apple farmer can sell the apples for $5. The money 
can then be used to buy a chair when one becomes available. The introduction 
of the money form, then, introduces a new type of market exchange, expressed 
as C – M –C (commodity for money for another commodity).
Capitalism, however, relies on larger scale production and a reinvestment in 
the productive process. In such a system, we can invert the C – M – C circuit to 
be expressed as M – C – M’ , whereby money is invested in the production of 
a commodity with the intention of re-selling it for profit (M’ or, simply, more 
money). This is possible in a system in which an entire class of people do not 
have a commodity to sell other than their labour power. In such a system, a 
division exists between those who own the means of production and those who 
do not. In other words, the owners of the means of production employ others 
who do not own the means of production. The engine of capitalism and the 
beginnings of the exploitation of labour come when the owners of the means 
of production only pay labourers enough to satisfy their demand, for the goal 
is to increase profits. By doing so, those who own the means of production 
continuously reinvest their money into the means of production (buying more 
land, developing technology, etc.). Consequently, those who own the means 
of production extract a certain amount of surplus value from the productive 
process. Thus, society is divided into classes based on ownership of the means 
of production (capital vs. labour).
In perhaps the most important section of Capital, Marx discusses surplus value 
in depth, including the ways in which capital continues to realise surplus value, 
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while labour is subjected to various forms of exploitation. Particularly relevant 
for the current study, however, are Marx’s discussions of co-operative labour and 
the use of machinery. Machinery is just one way in which capital constantly rein-
vents itself to further exploit labour. The focus on machinery is therefore simply 
to frame the discussion of new digital technologies and the ways that they have 
been used by capital and labour alike. Although technological change constantly 
ensures that labour is always at the mercy of capital because labour does not own 
the means of production, the argument presented here is that it is entirely possi-
ble for technologies to be used as tools of resistance against unwanted encroach-
ments by capital. When put into the service of capital, technology can increase 
the efficiency of production and thereby increase corporate profits while further 
alienating labour from the production process. However, technology may be 
used by labour as a broader part of social resistance and social struggle.
Capital constantly seeks ways to increase surplus value, which requires more 
productivity by labour. This can be accomplished in at least two ways: absolute 
surplus labour and relative surplus labour. Absolute surplus labour is used to 
describe a condition in which labour is asked to work beyond the normally 
required working time to increase productivity. For example, workers could 
be asked to work through the weekend as one way of increasing productivity. 
On the other hand, relative surplus labour is realised when machinery supple-
ments or supplants the time normally spent working by labour. In this sense, 
workers can still work the same amount of time, thereby keeping the wages 
owed to them constant, while human labour costs can be supplemented or 
supplanted by investment in a technology that performs the same function as 
human labour. With only limited exceptions, such a machine can be worked 
without the fear of fatigue or the need for sleep. Therefore, production increases 
without the need to pay additional wages to workers. This, then, is the key for 
understanding machinery (i.e. technological change) within the operation of 
capitalism: technology, when put in the service of capital, increases productiv-
ity, exploits labour, and is used for the realisation of greater surplus value.
Continuing this line of argument, Braverman (1974) specifically provided an 
extended discussion of machinery. Braverman’s task was to begin a critical his-
tory of technology, which would account for the specific ways that technology 
has been put in the service of capital to further exploit labour. Braverman dem-
onstrated how technological change has constantly forced labour to learn new 
skills to operate machinery. Furthermore, machinery has been used to supple-
ment and supplant human labour, which drove members of the working class 
out of work and into unemployment. Anyone wishing to become employed 
again was forced to learn how to operate new machinery, which furthered the 
cycle of exploitation. Thus, a vicious cycle of technology development, unem-
ployment, and re-education was implemented to constantly reinvigorate the 
productive process while demanding that labour constantly acquire new skills.
The relationship between capital and the labour process can also be further 
understood with regard to the ways that labour processes are brought under 
38 Incorporating the Digital Commons
capital’s control. Capitalist production is made possible by the unity of the labour 
process with the valorisation process (i.e. the creation and extraction of surplus 
value in the production of commodities). Marx uses the concepts of the formal 
subsumption of labour and the real subsumption of labour. The formal subsump-
tion of labour under capital occurs when the labour process becomes subsumed 
under capital, whereby ‘the capitalist enters the process as its conductor, its director’ 
(Marx, 1864). In other words, the formal subsumption of labour occurs when the 
social relationship between capital and labour transforms; previously independ-
ent producers may become dependent on the capitalist through waged labour, for 
example. Therefore, the introduction of waged labour through becomes the social 
relationship between capital and labour. The real subsumption of labour occurs at 
a larger and more general scale when the wage labour relationship pervades social 
relations, thereby causing transformations within the labour process that can 
extract more relative surplus value. As Marx (1864) notes, ‘just as the production 
of absolute surplus value can be regarded as the material expression of the formal 
subsumption of labour under capital, so the production of relative surplus value 
can be regarded as that of the real subsumption of labour under capital’. These 
concepts (i.e. absolute surplus value, relative surplus value, formal subsumption, 
and real subsumption) will be useful in describing the ways that FLOSS labour 
is exploited by capital, especially given the scale at which FLOSS projects can be 
developed by large numbers of geographically dispersed programmers.
Marx’s analysis offers a useful framework for understanding the relationship 
between capital, labour, value, and machinery. These four factors are all inter-
twined in the relationships that exist between FLOSS programmers, their col-
lective labour power, the software they create, and the corporations that make 
use of their software. The labour theory of value can be used to understand 
why the processes of collaborative production within FLOSS are so valuable for 
corporations. Collaborative production in FLOSS expands the possible labour 
force available to work on a software project to an exponentially greater degree 
than those software projects that are centralised within one firm. With more 
programmers contributing changes to the FLOSS software project, production 
and maintenance of the software can grow more efficiently and rapidly. These 
contributions can take the form of fixing bugs, developing new features, or 
increasing functionality in some other way. Because the labour of FLOSS pro-
grammers contributes to the creation of digital commons, an analysis of their 
labour processes can be understood within the context of theories about com-
munication labour, digital labour, or free labour, albeit with certain distinctions.
2.1.2. Communication Labour, Digital Labour, and Its Social 
Reproduction
A critical understanding of capitalist production, and particularly its conse-
quences for labour, is useful for understanding the ways that information and 
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communication technologies (ICTs) operate today. Political economists of 
communication have called for increased attention to be paid to communica-
tion labourers (McKercher and Mosco, 2007; Mosco, 2006). Communication 
labour encompasses a wide variety of labour, including those who work directly 
in various media industries (i.e. television, film, music, video game, and soft-
ware industries, etc.), but it also includes various types of knowledge work, 
digital labour, and types of free labour (McKercher and Mosco, 2007; Scholz, 
2013; Lazzarato, 1996; Terranova, 2004).
The terms ‘immaterial labour’ and ‘digital labour’ have found increased 
currency in debates about online life. FLOSS labour can be viewed as a form 
of ‘immaterial labour’ insofar as the final products of work are ‘immaterial 
products such as knowledge, information, communication, [or] a relation-
ship’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 108). The term ‘immaterial labour’ was first 
introduced by Lazzarato (1996) and has since been debated by critical schol-
ars.9 Similar debates have occurred within critical scholarship circles about 
the nature of ‘digital labour’ (see Scholz, 2013). The primary concern in these 
debates has been with the nature of work and labour within the information, 
knowledge, and communication industries with a focus on forms of unpaid 
labour occurring online (see Andrejevic, 2007, 2012; Fuchs 2012). In these 
cases, users’ online behaviours are tracked and can be transformed into an 
audience commodity in the same way that Dallas Smythe (1981) identified 
with broadcasting. Whereas Smythe argued that media programs constitute 
a ‘free lunch’ for producing audiences for advertisers, the same occurs online 
where companies and others seek the attention of users while data is collected 
about users’ browsing habits. As most of us spend an increasing amount of 
time online during both work and non-work time, our digital labour – socially 
necessary time spent online – offers a more sophisticated form of the audience 
commodity as browsing data is extracted and transformed into value by ser-
vice providers and other third-party elements (Fuchs, 2011a; McGuigan and 
Manzerolle, 2013; Turow, 2013).
The capture of labour value online is certainly not coincidental. Schil-
ler (1999) frames the emergence of ‘digital capitalism’ within the context of 
neoliberal policy, which viewed digitally networked technologies as a way for 
expanding marketing opportunities across the globe. As such, digital technolo-
gies function merely as another way to expand capital’s reach across time and 
space, while decreasing the amount of time necessary to send and receive infor-
mation about markets. The tendency of capitalism to seek the ‘annihilation of 
space through time’ (Harvey, 1989: 205) is a familiar one, and one in which 
communication technologies are often employed. For example, these tenden-
cies can be traced back to the networking of the world with telegraph cables 
and continues today as fibre optic cables are stretched across oceans, which 
provide the infrastructure for the global Internet (see Winseck and Pike, 2007; 
Winseck, 2017). This infrastructure provides the material basis upon which 
forms of digital labour and massively decentralised collaborative production 
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can occur. This infrastructure is precisely what enables the massively decentral-
ised and collaborative production occurring within FLOSS production.
While FLOSS production might be framed as digital or immaterial labour 
insofar as it is involved in the production of immaterial products like software, 
the exploitation of FLOSS labour occurs at two distinct points in the labour 
process, each of which has  certain qualitative differences. On the one hand, 
FLOSS labour is exploited in a traditional Marxist sense of exploitation when 
FLOSS programmers produce software that becomes commodified by corpora-
tions. In this scenario, many (but not all) FLOSS programmers may be unpaid 
for their labour, meaning that the corporation selling FLOSS programs appro-
priates all surplus value created by the programmers. This type of unwaged 
labour involves the appropriation of surplus value produced by FLOSS labour 
in the process of producing commodities. The processes of commodifying 
FLOSS projects will be explored specifically in the chapter on Red Hat, as it will 
demonstrate how the company transformed free software into a marketable 
commodity that could be customised and sold to clients. On the other hand, 
FLOSS labour is also exploited in ways similar to other forms of digital labour 
like those discussed above. For example, GitHub is the largest host of software 
code in the world and provides one of the primary online platforms for produc-
ing software projects. In the course of producing FLOSS projects, the code for 
those projects may appear on GitHub. While GitHub does not directly sell data 
about its users, its privacy policy does indicate that ‘other third parties, such as 
data brokers, have been known to scrape GitHub and compile data’ about user 
activities on the site. This suggests that any FLOSS production occurring on 
GitHub may potentially be exploited through the appropriation of value cre-
ated by online activities as a form of digital labour.
There is also a compelling question as to whether FLOSS labour is alien-
ated from the products of its labour. Even though FLOSS labourers may make 
small contributions to FLOSS projects based on their unique expertise, there 
is a certain degree of ‘ownership’ – or at least a claim to stewardship of FLOSS 
projects – that is maintained by the community of developers over time. In fact, 
this is what often engenders a sense of community within FLOSS development, 
which is sustained over time by an association of developers who wish to see 
the long-term survival of their project. In this sense, if FLOSS labour can be 
said to be alienated from their production, it is at least qualitatively different to 
more classical forms of industrial production.
Of course, all FLOSS production is also dependent on the ability of FLOSS 
communities to reproduce themselves and their capacity to labour over time. 
Similarly, the object of their labour – the FLOSS project – must be reproduced 
over time, which requires not just the direct maintenance of the software pro-
ject, but also the reproduction of the labour power of FLOSS programmers. 
Capitalism has always relied upon unwaged labour to ensure not only its own 
reproduction, but also the reproduction of the labour power of workers. In this 
sense, the feminist critiques of Marx that emerged in the 1970s (Dalla Costa and 
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James, 1975; Cox and Federici, 1976; Federici, 2012) are particularly valuable 
for understanding FLOSS production because they demonstrate how circuits of 
both capital and commons production are sustained by circuits of social repro-
duction. Moreover, those critiques are also useful for understanding the ways 
in which capital increasingly encroaches on aspects of everyday life.
The relationship between circuits of social reproduction and capital accu-
mulation circuits can be visualised in the following way.10 In Figure 2.1, the top 
line represents a simple illustration of reproduction circuits, and the bottom 
line represents the circuit of capital accumulation. In reproduction, money (M) 
obtained in exchange for labour power (LP) is used to buy commodities (C), 
which need to be processed by additional labour (L*). This process takes place 
outside of formalised working relationships (i.e. waged labour) and enables the 
reproduction of physical and psychological labour power (LP*), which can then 
be sold again to capitalists. Within FLOSS production, the cycle of unwaged 
reproduction can be applied in a couple of ways. First, there is a general process 
of social reproduction whereby FLOSS programmers reproduce their labour 
power over time by purchasing food, clothing, shelter, etc. and all those com-
modities that are required to reproduce the programmer’s labour power. But 
there are also other ways in which the cycle of reproduction can apply to FLOSS 
labour. As I have already explained, a good deal of FLOSS labour is unwaged or 
takes place informally outside traditional forms of waged labour. Some of the 
specific dynamics at play here will be explored in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters, but one form of unwaged labour that could apply here is student 
labour. Money (M) could be expended by a student for additional education 
Figure 2.1: Coupling Between Production and Reproduction Circuits 
(DeAngelis, 2017: 189)
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(C), which may be used to gain additional skills. These additional skills could 
then be used to increase the student’s capacity to labour in the future (LP*).
In sum, FLOSS labour can be understood as a form of digital labour and 
contextualised within the rise of digital capitalism. That said, FLOSS labour has 
certain unique characteristics that make it more conducive, perhaps, to under-
stand FLOSS labour as a more traditional form of labour, which was analysed 
by Marx. In this sense, FLOSS labour can be understood dialectically between 
continuity and change, whereby some of our existing understandings of labour 
in general continue to apply to FLOSS labour but other aspects require further 
elaboration. Primarily, this consideration stems from the question of whether 
FLOSS labour is alienated from the products of its labour in the same way that 
Marx described. After all, the community does maintain a certain degree of 
‘ownership’ of their software insofar as the specific licence applied to the soft-
ware allows them to retain ownership. However, even in these cases we have 
examples of where the wishes of the community were violated by a sponsor-
ing corporation. Furthermore, there is also the question of the wage labour 
relationship between capital and labour within FLOSS communities, as not 
all FLOSS contributors are waged by a sponsoring corporation, but some are. 
This further complicates our understanding of how exploitation operates in 
FLOSS labour. At the very least, we may need to temper existing theories of 
digital labour to account for the qualitatively different ways in which labour is 
exploited by capital, particularly as it concerns the production, maintenance, 
and application of digital technologies.
2.2. Critical Theories of the Digital Commons
The preceding sections established frameworks for comprehending the ways in 
which FLOSS can be understood from a critical political economic perspective, 
including the ways in which FLOSS labour can be exploited by capital.11 This 
section begins to outline the contours of a critical political economy of the digi-
tal commons. The goal of a critical political economy of the digital commons 
would be twofold. First, the project would illuminate the structural dynamics 
and power differentials that exist within commons-based communities, as well 
as the ways in which commons-based movements intersect with capital cir-
cuits. Second, the project would move beyond merely developing an analytical 
framework for understanding these power dynamics by developing a progres-
sive political framework that could serve as a direction forward for a critical 
praxis of the digital commons.
As it concerned the analytical project, the previous chapter discussed dif-
ferent approaches for understanding the digital commons, which was aided 
by the frameworks developed by Broumas (2017a; 2017b). Within that frame-
work, we positioned Ostrom within a resource-based understanding of the 
commons, and Benkler (2006) was most closely associated with the relational/
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institutional approach. Similarly, in Broumas’ (2017b) distinction between 
social democratic theories and critical theories of the intellectual commons, 
Benkler was positioned within the social democratic category. However, Ben-
kler’s work may not be so easily classified; there are times where his approach 
is much more conducive to a processual understanding of the commons. Ben-
kler’s concept of commons-based peer production contains the possibility of 
two useful contributions to a critical political economy. First, he discusses the 
ways in which commons-based peer production can alter our understanding of 
the relationship between communities of production and capitalist firms more 
generally. Second, however, commons-based peer production also focuses 
attention on the active production of the commons, thereby drawing attention 
to the labour processes involved in the creation, maintenance, and stewardship 
of the commons.
The analytical project of a critical political economy of the digital commons 
would build on the processual or dialectical understanding of the digital com-
mons. According to Broumas (2017a), this approach frames the commons as 
‘fluid systems of social relationships and sets of practice for governing the (re)
production of, access to, and use of resources’ (1509). This definition draws 
attention to the social relations that are produced and reproduced alongside 
the relationship to the commons. Linebaugh (2008) frames this active creation 
by using the verb ‘commoning’. In describing the practice of commoning, Line-
baugh outlines four characteristics of commoning:
1) commoning is ‘embedded in a particular ecology with its local husbandry’;
2) it is ‘embedded in a labour process’ that exists in a particular field of praxis;
3) it is collective; and
4) it is ‘independent of the temporality of the law and state’ (44–45).
Commoning is therefore not just about understanding commons as resources 
but about the active pooling of common resources with a deep connection 
to the history, culture, and ecology of the place where they exist. As such, 
commoning is imbued with a complex relationship between subjectivity and 
the objects (i.e. common resources) to which those subjects relate. Broumas 
(2017a) explains that in this type of relationship ‘the community itself is 
constantly reproduced, adapting its governance mechanisms and communal 
relationships in the changing environment within and outside the commons’ 
(1509–1510).
This framework helps us to understand the commons and the complex inter-
play of subjectivity and community that is at work within commons-based 
communities. Massimo De Angelis (2017) has also developed an analytical 
framework for understanding how value is created and circulates within com-
mons-based communities. He outlines this in his presentation of the commons 
circuit of value. This framework is also useful for understanding how commons 
circuits of value intersect with capital accumulation circuits.
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2.2.1. Commons Circuits of Value
By combining systems theory (Luhmann, 1995), cybernetics (Maturana and 
Varela, 1998) and Marxist-feminist political economy (Marx 1906; Dalla Costa 
and James, 1975), De Angelis’s task is to demonstrate how the commons can be 
understood as a system capable of bringing about a social revolution through 
ongoing iterations of commoning activity that are reproduced over time. 
Rather than arguing that such a revolution is imminent, however, he takes an 
epochal approach by focusing on how an emergent alternative value system 
like the commons has the potential to bring about a change in social relations. 
Just as capitalist social relations and subjectivities emerged in the feudal era, De 
Angelis views the commons as a similarly emergent value system responding to 
the excesses and exploitative tendencies of capitalism.
In the analytical portion of this work, De Angelis (2017) attempts to analyse 
the commons in the same way that Marx analysed capitalism. This leads him to 
develop a circuit of commons value, which accounts for the component parts of 
commons value systems. The circuit can be seen in Figure 2.2 below. In the cir-
cuit, an association of people (A) claims collective ownership of their common-
wealth (CW), whether the sources of commonwealth are material, immaterial, 
commodity (C), or non-commodity (NC). This dual relationship between the 
association – as subjects – and their commonwealth – as objects – constitutes 
the commons (Cs). Then, through the activity of commoning (cm), which 
is derived from Linebaugh’s (2008) definition of the term, the commons are 
reproduced over time. Framing the commons this way not only adds to a grow-
ing corpus of scholarship that makes similar claims (Dyer-Witheford, 2006; 
Hardt and Negri, 2009; Ryan, 2013; Gutierrez-Aguilar, 2014; Singh, 2017), but 
it also adds critical weight to commoning practices by demonstrating how 
those activities are capable of bringing about a postcapitalist future. Common-
ing, therefore, includes the reproduction of both the objects that comprise the 
commons as well as subjectivities in which mutual aid, care, trust, and con-
viviality are reproduced over time. For De Angelis, this commons circuit can 
couple with capital circuits through the commodity form. His argument is not 
that these two can and ought to peacefully coexist, but that they do exist.
For example, when commoners must interact with the money form of capi-
tal, they do so only as a medium of exchange to gain access to the materials 
Figure 2.2: The Commons Circuit of Value (De Angelis 2017: 193)
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necessary to reproduce the commons and themselves over time. As this relates 
to the digital commons, a free software contributor or user still needs to have 
access to a computer to code the digital commons or to have access to them. In 
addition, the programmer will also need to have access to food, water, shelter, 
and all those things necessary to reproduce her own capacity to code the digi-
tal commons over time. These goods may be provided by the welfare state or 
one’s family but, in the absence of such provision, one would need to intersect 
with capital circuits to obtain them. However, the extent to which commoners 
engage with capital circuits is left up to the community of commoners and will 
vary depending on the specific needs of the community.
This framework is useful for understanding the ways in which FLOSS com-
munities relate to their digital commons. Various associations of programmers 
contribute to the production and maintenance of FLOSS projects, which are 
reproduced over time through commoning activities. The practice of com-
moning is a form of work that is necessary to sustain the commons over time. 
However, it only becomes a form of digital labour in certain circumstances. 
Braverman (1974), for example, draws a distinction between work and labour 
by explaining that work is a ‘purposive action, guided by intelligence’ that alters 
materials to improve their usefulness (49). But work becomes labour when the 
conception and execution of work are separated. In other words, ideas about 
what work is necessary can be performed by another (Braverman, 1974: 51). It 
is in this relationship that the division of labour occurs, which is foundational 
to capitalist accumulation.
At times, FLOSS communities intersect with capital circuits of accumula-
tion when their projects are either sponsored by a corporation or a corpora-
tion incorporates a FLOSS project into their commercial offerings. As will be 
demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, capital exploits both the subjec-
tive qualities of FLOSS labour (e.g. collaboration, creativity, autonomy, shar-
ing, etc.) as well as the specific objects of FLOSS labour – software that can be 
incorporated into commercial offerings. For example, Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005) demonstrate how capitalism constantly reinvents itself by incorporat-
ing its critiques, whether they are social, aesthetic, political, or economic, into 
something that becomes desirable, which they refer to as the ‘new spirit of 
capitalism.’ However, despite the fact that capital attempts to encroach upon 
the digital commons, FLOSS communities maintain ways of negotiating and 
restricting access to their commonly held resources. This is particularly useful 
when a corporation attempts to transform the commoning activities of FLOSS 
programmers into labour as an input for the corporation. One of the primary 
means for negotiating this relationship between the community and the corpo-
ration is the establishment of ‘boundary organisations’.
The concept of a ‘boundary organisation’ was developed within organi-
sational theory by O’Mahony and Bechky (2008) to refer to an organisation 
that is set up to negotiate and establish boundaries between two parties who 
may have both shared and disparate interests. In effect, the organisation is 
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established to set the terms of the relationship between two parties. Within 
FLOSS communities, for example, the community will want to preserve their 
software project while also attracting other developers to the project. The com-
munity will also want to do this while retaining rights to the software and not 
ceding too much control or influence to a corporation. The corporation, on 
the other hand, will want to use the software for commercial purposes while 
also asking the community to develop certain features or fix certain bugs in the 
software. These interests may be mutually beneficial to the community and the 
corporation, especially as it concerns developing effective software. However, 
the relationship may break down if the community feels as though the corpo-
ration is attempting to influence their activities too much. The loss of creative 
autonomy would almost certainly violate the norms of the FLOSS community. 
The specific dynamics of these types of relationships will be borne out in the 
subsequent chapters.
2.3. Summary
This chapter framed the study of FLOSS production within a critical political 
economic framework. Such an approach focuses on the ways in which corpora-
tions wield power over communication resources. Drawing from Marx’s dia-
lectical understanding of labour and capital, critical political economy focuses 
attention on the struggle by labour for control over communicative resources 
in order to bring about a more just and democratic future. As it concerns digital 
technology, critical political economy rejects an interpretation of digital tech-
nology as purely innovative or revolutionary, and responds by refocusing our 
attention on the specific cultural practices and collective labour that make up 
both the technology and its attendant practices.
In addition, I positioned the collective labour – or commoning activities – 
of FLOSS communities as the primary source of their value. This is precisely 
what makes FLOSS projects an attractive option for corporations because they 
seek to harness this labour power to supplement their overall pursuit of profit. 
Given these two competing circuits of value – capital accumulation circuits and 
circuits of commons value – there exists a tension between capitalist firms, on 
the one hand, and FLOSS communities on the other. Therefore, how these two 
forces negotiate their relationship becomes a site of struggle and contention. 
At times, this relationship can be mutually beneficial and can help ensure the 
growth, sustainability, and attractiveness of FLOSS projects. However, at other 
times, this relationship can break down as capitalist firms attempt to encroach 
on the digital commons of FLOSS communities in various ways. The following 
chapters provide detailed descriptions of how these dynamics have taken shape 
over time. I begin with an historical discussion of the Microsoft Corporation 
and competing models of software production. Next, I demonstrate how Red 
Hat, Inc. successfully harnessed the power of the free software community to 
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build the largest and only publicly traded corporation whose business model is 
entirely dependent on free software. Finally, I focus on the Oracle Corporation’s 
acquisition of Sun Microsystems, and what happens when a corporation exerts 
unwanted influence in FLOSS projects. Furthermore, I explain how the FLOSS 
community coped with that unwanted influence.
Notes
 9 For a critique of ‘immaterial labour’ as an analytical concept, see Sayers, 
2007.
 10 This illustration and its description is adapted from DeAngelis, 2017: 
189–190.
 11 Certain portions of this section appeared in an earlier article: Birkinbine, 
Benjamin. 2018. Commons Praxis: Toward a Critical Political Economy of 




Shifting Toward the Commons : Microsoft 
and Competing Models of Software 
Production
The Microsoft Corporation (‘Microsoft’ hereafter) offers perhaps the most con-
tentious relationship with the open source community. Primarily, this is due to 
Microsoft’s core business model, which relies on the sale of proprietary soft-
ware. Through strategic partnerships, strong intellectual property protections, 
and a robust strategy for capturing the consumer market for personal computer 
(PC) sales, Microsoft grew to become one of the largest software companies 
in the world. At its peak, Microsoft enjoyed nearly 97% of the market share of 
all computing devices in the year 2000 (Tu, 2012). This was before the com-
pany was found to be in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the antitrust decision did little to curb 
Microsoft’s economic growth at the turn of the twenty-first century. Rather, 
the company’s profits continued to grow, and Microsoft still ranks as one of 
the largest and most dominant software companies in the world. What has 
changed, particularly after the antitrust ruling, is the company’s relationship to 
the broader free and open source software community.
As mentioned in the introduction to this book, Microsoft’s former Chief 
Executive Officer, Steve Ballmer, referred to Linux – the open source operating 
system – as ‘a cancer’ in 2001. Slightly more than eleven years later, the com-
pany opened an entire division devoted to the promotion and development of 
open source software. In this chapter, the history of Microsoft’s chequered rela-
tionship with free and open source software (FLOSS) is charted, focusing on 
three specific moments that illustrate this relationship. First, the company’s ini-
tial growth and its rise as one of the most dominant software companies in the 
world is described. During this time, the company took an adversarial approach 
to open source software. This includes Bill Gates’ ‘Open Letter to Hobbyists’ in 
How to cite this book chapter:
Birkinbine B. J. 2020. Incorporating the Digital Commons: Corporate Involvement in Free 
and Open Source Software. Pp. 49–72. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.16997/book39.c. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
50 Incorporating the Digital Commons
which he decried the widespread culture of freely sharing software in the hob-
byist community, as well as the leak of internal documents known as ‘The Hal-
loween Documents’ in 1998, which clearly outline the company’s views on open 
source software. The second section discusses the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
investigation and, ultimately, its conviction of Microsoft for violating the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. Findings from the investigation and the subsequent decrees 
issued to the company in the wake of the conviction are provided. The final 
section focuses on the most recent history of Microsoft, including its Shared 
Source program as well as its decision to create Microsoft Open Technologies, 
a wholly owned subsidiary dedicated solely to promoting and developing open 
source software, open standards, and open technologies.
The Microsoft case study exemplifies the clash between capital and the 
commons in a couple of ways. First, Microsoft’s relationship with the FLOSS 
community is indicative of the ways in which the processes involved in FLOSS 
production transformed from a seemingly antithetical means of commercial 
software production into an accepted form of industrial software production. 
Indeed, as was discussed in the Introduction and will be seen in subsequent 
chapters, open source software products and processes now pervade commer-
cial software production.
Second, the other tension between capital and the commons at the heart of 
the Microsoft case study can be seen in the company’s stance toward intellec-
tual property and industrial software production. On the one hand, Microsoft 
relies upon strong intellectual property protections to exclude others from 
making use of its products. Those products have been produced in-house as 
part of Microsoft’s core business model. Microsoft uses these intellectual prop-
erty rights not only to protect its own works, but to threaten FLOSS projects 
with infringement lawsuits. It is within this context that we can view Micro-
soft’s long history of railing against the lack of intellectual property within the 
FLOSS community, beginning with Bill Gates’ ‘Open Letter to Hobbyists’ in 
1976, through to Steve Ballmer’s ‘Linux is a cancer’ claim. What changed after 
the DOJ antitrust ruling is that Microsoft shifted its position toward FLOSS 
projects in general by submitting its own licences for approval by the Open 
Source Initiative (OSI). The shift in Microsoft’s stance toward FLOSS after the 
antitrust ruling represents an important moment for Microsoft, specifically, but 
also for the software industry in general. The shift can be understood as a hum-
ble admission that the business model upon which Microsoft relied for most 
of its history had been mostly usurped by a more efficient and effective model 
of software production – mainly, the commons-based peer production used by 
FLOSS developers. But it can also be understood within the broader context of 
the dot-com bubble burst that hit the economy at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, which coincided with many Internet-related companies’ failures but also 
the emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon. It was during this time after the 
DOJ ruling that Microsoft not only readjusted its positioning with respect to 
FLOSS projects, but also attempted to become more directly involved in FLOSS 
Shifting Toward the Commons 51
projects. The company’s reasons for doing so were primarily to comply with the 
consent decrees to which the company agreed as part of the antitrust ruling, but 
also because the commons-based peer production of FLOSS had proven to be 
a viable and effective model of software development.
As such, capital readjusted its relationship with the emergent practice of digi-
tal commons production and sought ways to harness that production for its 
own gains. Two bodies of theory can be used to understand Microsoft’s shift 
toward the commons. On the one hand, the emergent craft of FLOSS produc-
tion proved to be an effective and attractive model of software development, 
which directly contradicted the Microsoft claims that good software devel-
opment was only possible with strong intellectual property rights. In other 
words, the labour process involved in the production of software shifted with 
the growth of the smaller craft community of FLOSS development. This more 
generalised labour process led to a massive increase in the numbers of peo-
ple working on FLOSS projects. The production taking place in that commu-
nity proved capable of providing a model for industrial software production. 
Indeed, the processes of FLOSS production outpaced Microsoft’s in-house 
development specifically because production was open to others. On the 
other hand, however, this placed pressure on labour in a couple of ways. First, 
FLOSS production was not subject to the same limitations as corporate soft-
ware production, namely the number of working hours in a day, the number of 
employees working on the software, etc. This was very good for the efficiency of 
software production. Second, however, this feature of FLOSS production also 
placed downward pressure on the value of labour within the software industry.
In other words, this could be described as a mix of extracting greater degrees 
of absolute surplus value (i.e. extending the working day) as well as relative 
surplus value (i.e. technological change that decreases the value of labour). The 
process here was actually a way of extracting surplus value from software pro-
duction by effectively outsourcing software production to unwaged labour. The 
incorporation of this labour process into industrial software production also 
ushered in a shift in business strategies within the software and technology 
industries. Instead of paying workers directly for the development of software, 
corporations opt to invest in technologies or platforms (i.e. fixed capital) that 
support open source software production. This also explains some of Micro-
soft’s more recent ventures and acquisitions, which will be discussed toward 
the end of this chapter.
This chapter is structured in a way that illustrates these broader points. As 
such, the goal of the chapter is twofold: first, to argue that the antitrust convic-
tion in 2001 marks a critical moment in Microsoft’s history that, when paired 
with the bursting of the dot-com bubble and the emergence of the so-called 
Web 2.0 phenomenon, caused a shift in Microsoft’s business strategy whereby 
the company tried to find ways of harnessing the power of commons-based 
peer production or, in other words, the labour process of FLOSS production. 
Second, it demonstrates Microsoft’s own contradictory history in its stance 
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against the open sharing of ideas. In fact, many of Microsoft’s most successful 
products have incorporated or licensed design features that were developed by 
others. By making these two points, the chapter shows how Microsoft’s rela-
tionship with the FLOSS community can be understood as a strategic read-
justment that was undertaken in response to Microsoft’s declining market 
share while Linux-based systems were gaining market share. Although not a 
complete transformation of its initial stance, Microsoft’s shift in its relationship 
to the broader FLOSS community can be described as moving from capital 
toward the commons.
3.1. The Rise of Microsoft 1975–1990
Microsoft was founded in 1975 after Paul Allen and Bill Gates developed the 
Altair BASIC interpreter. An interpreter is a computer program that directly 
performs functions written in a programming language. In the case of Altair 
BASIC, the interpreter was designed to execute functions written in the BASIC 
(Beginner’s Allpurpose Symbolic Instruction Code) programming language so 
that they could be performed on the Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry 
Systems (MITS) Altair 8800 microcomputer. Altair BASIC became Microsoft’s 
first product, which was distributed by MITS under contract with the newly 
created company. From its very beginnings, Microsoft focused on providing 
software solutions that could be included on hardware devices. Microsoft’s 
business model relied on establishing contracts with hardware providers, which 
would allow Microsoft products to be included on hardware.
However, the company has consistently exhibited an antagonistic position 
toward alleged infringements on its intellectual property. The first example of 
such behaviour came from unauthorised copying of its original Altair BASIC 
interpreter. The Altair 8800 microcomputer has been credited as the device that 
ushered in the microcomputer revolution (Garland, 1977). It became widely 
popular after being featured on the cover of the January 1975 edition of Popu-
lar Electronics. From the magazine, readers could order kits for the computer, 
which could then be assembled by hobbyists interested in experimenting with 
the device. As part of the order, readers could purchase the Altair BASIC lan-
guage for a fixed price. Since the Altair BASIC language could be included with 
orders for the Altair 8800, Altair BASIC also became widely used. However, 
hobbyists often made copies for friends or others to allow them to experiment 
with the device as well. This made Altair BASIC subject to unauthorised copy-
ing, which prompted Bill Gates to publish an ‘Open Letter to Hobbyists’ on 3 
February 1976.12
In the letter, Gates noted that ‘hundreds of people who are … using BASIC’ 
have all provided positive feedback about the interpreter. However, he claims 
that ‘most of these ‘users’ never bought BASIC,’ as ‘less than 10% of all Altair 
owners have bought BASIC,’ and the ‘amount of royalties [Gates and Allen] 
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have received from sales to hobbyists makes the time spent of [sic] Altair BASIC 
worth less than $2 per hour’ (Gates, 1976: 2). Gates continued by decrying the 
fact that most hobbyists steal software, and asked whether this is a fair practice 
because it ultimately prevents good software from being written. In effect, Gates 
was arguing that the time, labour, and resources spent on developing software 
ought to be returned to him in the form of fair payment for use of the software.
Gates’ open letter signalled what would become a recurring theme through-
out Microsoft’s history: mainly, a contentious relationship with hobbyist com-
munities of programmers, which Gates and Microsoft viewed as infringing 
on intellectual property rights. The open sharing and collaboration among 
the hobbyist community represented a threat to Microsoft’s business model, 
which was founded on the need to protect its products by using strong intel-
lectual property protections. Indeed, some of the responses to Gates’ open 
letter focused more on the business strategy, especially the shortcomings of 
Microsoft’s contractual negotiations with the hardware vendor (Hayes, 1976). 
However, Gates’ letter is also historically significant because it was an early 
document in which some of the tensions between capital and the commons 
were spelled out. Specifically, it highlighted tensions around labour, ownership, 
intellectual property, and the commercialisation of software (Driscoll, 2015). 
In the years that followed the Altair BASIC beginnings, Microsoft pursued a 
course of action that sought to do exactly that. By ingratiating itself with large 
hardware manufacturers, Microsoft rapidly gained market share and became 
one of the most dominant software companies in the world.
3.1.1. MS-DOS
Microsoft’s business strategy during its early years focused primarily on provid-
ing BASIC interpreters, but the company shifted its focus to operating systems 
in the early 1980s. From the 1980s until the mid-1990s, Microsoft relied on the 
Microsoft Disk Operating System, or MS-DOS, as its core commodity. MS-
DOS originated in 1981 after IBM put out a request for an operating system 
to use on its IBM-PC line of personal computers (PC). Shortly after the initial 
request from IBM, Microsoft acquired the rights to 86-DOS, an operating sys-
tem from Seattle Computer Products, which it renamed MS-DOS.13 Microsoft 
customised the newly acquired operating system to the specifications required 
by IBM. In turn, Microsoft licensed use of the operating system to IBM, which 
IBM then included on its IBM PCs under the name PC-DOS.
Microsoft’s contract with IBM was not without controversy, however. The rise 
of the PC was made possible by advances in integrated circuit, or microchip, 
technology. Microchips for the consumer market were first used commercially 
in calculators, which were manufactured by companies like Hewlett– Packard 
and Texas Instruments. As demand for higher performance calculators 
increased, Intel was commissioned by Busicom, a Japanese firm, to produce 
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the first commercially available microprocessor that could receive digital data 
and process it according to its programmed functions. The new microprocessor 
was called the Intel 4004 (Nairn, 2002). However, these new chips still needed 
language capable of converting instructions into signals that the chip could 
process. This operating system came from Gary Kildall, who authored a lan-
guage capable of performing such functions. Eventually, Kildall’s language was 
transformed into the first operating system for personal computers, known as 
CP/M. The rights to CP/M were held by Kildall’s company, Digital Research, 
Inc., or DRI.
Throughout the late 1970s, CP/M became the industry leader in operating sys-
tems for personal computers. When IBM announced its initial line of personal 
computers, the company chose Intel as the provider for microprocessors, but it 
also needed a supplier for the operating system. Both Microsoft and DRI were 
consulted about providing an operating system. The exact details about what 
transpired during the negotiations are a bit murky,14 but we know that Micro-
soft eventually won the contract, which resulted in the acquisition of 86-DOS 
that was subsequently rebranded as MS-DOS. Kildall, however, would claim that 
MS-DOS infringed on his copyright for CP/M. Kildall confronted both Gates at 
Microsoft and IBM about the alleged infringement but, on advice from lawyers, 
decided not to sue. Instead, Kildall chose to licence CP/M to IBM for inclusion 
on their personal computers. When the IBM PCs were eventually released, IBM 
offered a choice of operating system: $240 for CP/M or $40 for DOS (Hamm and 
Greene, 2004). The upshot of the dramatic price difference was that Microsoft 
became the clear choice for consumers, and DRI was eventually purchased by 
Novell in 1991.
Microsoft’s contract with IBM was perhaps the biggest turning point on its 
path to becoming the largest software company in the world. As part of Micro-
soft’s contract, it reserved the right to sell its operating system to third-party ven-
dors as well, which allowed the company to exploit sales of its operating system 
to any hardware manufacturer. Employing this strategy, Microsoft grew tremen-
dously from 1981–1995, with an increase in annual revenues from $16 million 
in 1981 to more than $6 billion in 1995 (Campbell-Kelly, 2001). Although exact 
figures are not publicly available, some estimates suggest that MS-DOS held 
nearly a 90% share of the PC market (Gilbert, 1995). Although MS-DOS would 
continue to be produced until September 2000, Microsoft began focusing its 
efforts on developing an operating system with a graphical user interface (GUI). 
The product that it ultimately developed, Microsoft Windows, would continue 
Microsoft’s dominance of the personal computer software industry.
3.1.2. Microsoft Windows
Operating systems featuring a GUI did not start with Microsoft. Researchers 
working at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) first developed the GUI, 
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which was used on the Xerox Alto computer in 1973. However, Xerox did not 
successfully exploit the GUI commercially. Since the market for personal com-
puters and operating systems was already dominated by IBM and Microsoft, 
Xerox found it difficult to focus its efforts on commercially exploiting the GUI. 
Consequently, Xerox invited Steve Jobs and other representatives from Apple 
to its PARC for access to its prototypes in exchange for a $1 million investment 
in Apple prior to its initial public offering (Ward, 2013). During this visit, Jobs 
viewed prototypes of a computer mouse used for navigation as well as the abil-
ity to move text around on the screen. From this meeting, Jobs is said to have 
refocused efforts at Apple toward developing a GUI operating system. How-
ever, others have argued that assigning too much causality to Jobs’ single visit 
is an erroneous assumption, as other Apple engineers had ties to the PARC and 
Jobs himself made more than one visit (Pang and Marinaccio, 2000). What-
ever the inspiration, Apple worked on developing a GUI operating system for 
its Macintosh personal computers. However, Apple was still behind IBM and 
Microsoft in developing applications for its operating system.
Microsoft had established itself as a leader in the market for operating sys-
tems for PCs, and had previously worked with Apple by producing the Soft-
Card, a microprocessor designed to run programs designed for CP/M on the 
Apple II computer. As a result, Microsoft negotiated a licensing agreement 
for access to the Mac operating system in 1985. At this point, Microsoft was 
already working on Microsoft Windows, its GUI operating system, which was 
announced in 1983. The purpose of the licence with Apple was to allow Micro-
soft access to certain visual elements of the Mac operating system so Microsoft 
could develop applications for the Macintosh (The History of Computing Pro-
ject, 2014). To ensure that such a licence was granted, Microsoft used its pow-
erful position in the PC software market by threatening to ‘cease development 
work on important Mac applications unless such a license was granted’ (Nairn, 
2002: 375). Perhaps not coincidentally, Windows version 1.0 was released in 
1985, the same year that the licence was granted.
Both Microsoft and Apple then worked on GUI-based operating systems to 
provide easy-to-use solutions for consumers. Although neither the first Micro-
soft Windows release nor the Macintosh computer proved to be commercially 
successful, GUI-based operating systems soon allowed massive diffusion of 
PCs to the consumer market. Microsoft held its IPO in 1986, which earned $61 
million, which the company used to invest heavily in developing its Microsoft 
Windows operating system. Microsoft emerged as the clear winner during this 
period, and the company’s relationship with IBM ensured that its operating sys-
tem would be installed on IBM-compatible computers. Microsoft’s growth dur-
ing this period was immense, as evidenced by its growth in market share to 90% 
by some estimates (Gilbert, 1995). This growth in market share coincided with 
an increase in revenues, and the Windows operating system with its GUI was 
the key product that fuelled the growth. However, Apple challenged Microsoft’s 
claims to the GUI elements of Windows, claiming that Microsoft had infringed 
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its intellectual property. This ultimately led to a copyright infringement lawsuit 
between the two companies.
3.1.3. Apple Computer, Inc. vs. Microsoft Corporation
In 1988, Apple began a copyright infringement lawsuit against Microsoft. Apple 
claimed that Microsoft had infringed on 189 elements of its GUI, which, when 
taken together, constituted a ‘look and feel’ of its Macintosh operating system 
that was protected by copyright. Apple claimed that the infringements occurred 
in version 2.03 and, later, 3.0 of Microsoft Windows. The lawsuit stemmed from 
the initial licencing agreement that was negotiated between Apple and Microsoft 
when Apple granted Microsoft access to its GUI for developing applications for 
the Mac. The resulting litigation lasted four years, but the case was interrupted 
by Xerox bringing a suit against Apple, whereby Xerox claimed Apple had vio-
lated its copyrights by using some of the GUI elements originally featured in its 
PARC operations. Xerox further claimed that Apple was guilty of unfair busi-
ness practices because of its copyright claims on the GUI, which made it difficult 
for Xerox to license the technology to other customers. The case against Apple 
grew out of the meetings held between Xerox and Apple when Steve Jobs and 
other Apple representatives visited the Xerox PARC to see prototypes of the 
GUI in exchange for Xerox’s ability to acquire stock prior to Apple’s IPO.
Xerox’s claims against Apple were ultimately dismissed, as Apple claimed 
that, while it may have borrowed ideas from Xerox’s PARC, those ideas were 
not able to be protected by copyright, and Xerox ought to settle any remain-
ing dispute with the Copyright Office (Pollack, 1990). Similarly, Apple’s case 
against Microsoft was rejected. Of the 189 claims of copyright infringement, all 
but ten were dismissed. In the end, the District Court ruled in favour of Micro-
soft, claiming that the remaining ten claims were over ideas rather than expres-
sions that could be protected by copyright. Furthermore, the original licensing 
agreement signed between Microsoft and Apple granted Microsoft the ‘right to 
transfer individual elements or design features using its “Windows” program’ 
(Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 1994).
While the details of this 1994 case may not seem directly related to corporate 
involvement in FLOSS, it does illustrate several things about software devel-
opment, intellectual property, and Microsoft. First, the case demonstrates that 
early software development, particularly of those features that we may take for 
granted today like the GUI, was not the result of rugged individuals developing 
the technology alone – Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron (1995) devel-
oped a similar critique in The Californian Ideology. Rather, technological devel-
opment is a collective and collaborative process in which the ideas of others can 
influence the direction of development.
Second, the case is instructive for the exploitation of intellectual property, 
specifically because it illustrates how original authorship can be separated from 
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ownership (Bettig, 1992). While the idea and design for the GUI may have 
originated in Xerox’s PARC, Xerox had not commercially exploited its designs. 
Through a series of licensing agreements – first between Apple and Xerox, and 
later, between Apple and Microsoft – the rights to the individual elements of the 
GUI became diffused as they were shared among peers. Microsoft was already 
in a strong market position to exploit the GUI through its Microsoft Windows 
operating system, whereas Apple relied on assistance from Microsoft for devel-
oping applications for its emerging Macintosh computer. By doing so, however, 
Apple gave access to its GUI operating system to Microsoft. In turn, Microsoft 
honoured the stipulations of its original licensing agreement with Apple, but it 
would later continue development of its Windows operating system by using 
some of the same elements that Apple had been using. Furthermore, Micro-
soft’s alliance with major technology manufacturers ensured that its operating 
system would be rapidly adopted, which further solidified its market power 
during the 1990s.
Third, there is a great contradiction at the heart of this case when compared 
with the history of Microsoft. Although the company benefited from sharing 
ideas to develop its Windows operating system, the company relied heavily on 
strong intellectual property protections to exclude others from its software as 
it ruthlessly defended its position atop the software industry throughout the 
1990s. As we will see, however, this ruthlessness is ultimately what led to inves-
tigations for antitrust violations.
3.2. Microsoft in the 1990s
Microsoft’s partnership with IBM was what ultimately allowed the company 
to solidify its strategic position at the apex of the computer software industry. 
Sales of the IBM PC and its clones reached nearly 16 million by 1990, which 
represented nearly 84% of the market share for personal computers (Reimer, 
2005). Originally, Microsoft teamed with IBM to produce the OS/2 operating 
system, which IBM intended to include on its PCs, but Microsoft was busy 
working on its Windows operating system. When Windows 3.0 was released 
in 1990, the relationship between IBM and Microsoft became strained to the 
point that the companies decided to terminate their Joint Development Agree-
ment,15 which specified the partnership between the two firms for working 
on OS/2 (TechInsider.org, 2016). Because the Windows operating system was 
more developed when the companies ended their relationship, Microsoft rap-
idly picked up market share as its operating system was included on sales of 
IBM-compatible PCs. In fact, it was the relationship between IBM and Micro-
soft that initially drew attention from the United States Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) in 1990.
The investigation by the FTC was initiated because of a joint news release 
by IBM and Microsoft during the Comdex trade show in Las Vegas, NV, on 13 
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November 1989 (Wallace and Erickson, 1992). In the press release, the com-
panies claimed that ‘Microsoft would hold back features for Windows in order 
to help industry acceptance of the OS/2 operating system’ (Wallace and Erick-
son, 1992: 373). The FTC was concerned that the companies were colluding 
to control the market for operating systems. Ultimately, the FTC investigation 
ended in 1993 when the commissioners were split 2–2 on whether to bring an 
administrative action against Microsoft. In the same year, however, the Anti-
trust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) picked up the 
investigation, which would eventually lead to Microsoft’s conviction for anti-
trust violations. The main issues in that case, however, did not centre around 
Microsoft’s control of the operating system market but its business practices 
associated primarily with its Internet browser, Internet Explorer. Around the 
same time that Microsoft was seeking to solidify its position atop the computer 
software industry, at least three concurrent technological developments and 
their attendant cultural practices were emerging as challengers to the produc-
tion model used by Microsoft in its rise to power. These developments were the 
emergence of the World Wide Web, the development of graphical web browsers, 
and the creation of Linux. Some of the early history of Linux has already been 
discussed in the introduction to this book, but some key moments in the rise of 
the World Wide Web and web browsers are also instructive for understanding 
competing models of software production. Specifically, the Browser Wars mark 
an important moment in the competition between Microsoft’s model of soft-
ware production and the emergent free and open source software movement.
3.2.1. The Browser Wars
To provide some brief historical context for the Browser Wars, earlier Tim 
Berners-Lee and Robert Caillau authored a proposal in November of 1990 for 
a hypertext project called the World Wide Web, which would provide ‘a way 
to link and access information of various kinds as a web of nodes in which the 
user can browse at will’ (Berners-Lee and Caillau, 1990). The creation of such 
a project relied on server-level applications to manage the nodes stored on the 
server and to facilitate the display and access of those nodes with a browser. 
Browsers served as the application running on a user’s machine that could 
request access to the nodes stored on the server and display those nodes to the 
user. Web pages would need to be created that could store textual, graphical, 
or other types of information that could be accessed by users. By the end of the 
year in 1990, models of all these components had been created, and companies 
began developing browsers that would allow users to access the burgeoning 
technology of the World Wide Web.
In 1993, the Mosaic web browser was developed by a team of researchers 
at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The browser could display graphical 
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content on the web and, although it was not the first browser to do so, Mosaic 
dramatically increased the popularity of browsing the web. Prior to its crea-
tion, most of the pages on the World Wide Web had been primarily text-based. 
However, Mosaic’s place in the history of web browsers is perhaps best illus-
trated by tracing the history of its ownership and, ultimately, its transformation 
into the open-source web browser, Mozilla Firefox.
From its beginnings at the NCSA at the University of Illinois, the Mosaic 
browser spawned at least two primary companies that sought to commercially 
exploit the browser’s technology. One company was called Mosaic Commu-
nications, and the other was Spyglass. The code base for the Mosaic browser 
was handled by Spyglass after an agreement was signed between the com-
pany and the University of Illinois, whereby Spyglass would retain the rights 
to commercially exploit the code. The other company, Mosaic Communica-
tions, created the Mosaic Netscape browser. In fact, many of the employees at 
Mosaic Communications had worked previously on the Mosaic browser at the 
NCSA, although the Netscape browser was built entirely by the team at Mosaic 
Communications. What was truly novel about the Netscape browser, however, 
was that it was made freely available to the public for personal use, which was 
unprecedented up to that point. Moody (2001) describes the significance of 
this strategy:
Along with a beta-testing program on a scale that was unprecedented, 
the decision to allow anyone to download copies of Netscape free had 
another key effect: It introduced the idea of capturing market share by 
giving away free software, and then generating profits in other ways 
from the resulting installed base. In other words, the Mosaic Netscape 
release signaled the first instance of the new Internet economics that 
have since come to dominate the software world and beyond. (187).
Indeed, the Netscape browser began to pick up market share, and the Univer-
sity of Illinois noticed. To resolve any additional trademark disputes with the 
university, Mosaic Communications changed its name to Netscape Communi-
cations and reissued its browser under the name Netscape Navigator (Moody, 
2001).
Netscape Navigator quickly picked up market share from 1994–1996, reach-
ing its peak at nearly 90% in April 1996, according to some sources (Cusumano 
and Yoffie, 1998). Riding this extraordinary wave of enthusiasm for Netscape, 
the company held its IPO in August 1995. On the day of its IPO, shares of the 
company began selling at $28 and reached $58.25 by the end of the day, valuing 
the company at nearly $3 billion after only 18 months of operation (Moody, 
2001). At that point, Netscape’s IPO was the largest in history. The success of 
Netscape was not lost on Microsoft, and the company began to focus its efforts 
on developing a browser to rival Netscape. This was the beginning of the first 
browser war.
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Since Microsoft had not devoted any significant amount of time and resources 
to developing a web browser of its own, the company decided not to build its 
browser from scratch. Rather, Microsoft approached Spyglass, which held the 
rights to the code of the original Mosaic browser. Spyglass had been developing 
its own version of Mosaic, known as Spyglass Mosaic. Microsoft negotiated a 
licence to use the Spyglass Mosaic code base in exchange for royalty payments 
for each copy of the browser issued, with an annual cap of $5 million (Elstrom, 
1997).16 The resulting browser was called Internet Explorer (IE), which was 
based on the same foundation as Netscape. As evidence of how aggressively 
Microsoft pursued its new Internet strategy, Page and Lopatka (2007) note that 
the company only had five or six employees working in the browser depart-
ment in 1995 but had more than 1,000 by 1999.
In addition to assigning more employees to the browser division, Micro-
soft began packaging IE with distribution of its Windows operating system. 
As Microsoft had nearly 90% of the market for operating systems because of 
its contractual relationships with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), 
the company was able to quickly make gains in the market for web browsers. 
In effect, Microsoft was giving away copies of IE for free by bundling it with 
its Windows operating system. To do so, the company began distributing ver-
sions of IE to OEMs by sending discs to the manufacturers, and eventually 
required the OEMs to install IE with Windows 95. OEMs were prohibited from 
‘modifying or deleting any part of Windows 95, including Internet Explorer, 
prior to shipment’ because of a non-negotiable licensing restriction that Micro-
soft placed on OEMs (United States vs. Microsoft, 1999, see Finding 158). This 
restriction did not allow OEMs to ship new PCs without IE installed. The effect 
on the market for web browsers was almost immediate. Figure 3.1 shows the 
Figure 3.1: Netscape Navigator Usage Data 1994–2006 (image is in the public 
domain and available via Wikimedia Commons at http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Netscape-navigator-usage-data.svg)
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sharp rise in market share for the Netscape browser, and its eventual sharp 
decline.
Because of these tactics, Microsoft and its Internet Explorer emerged victori-
ous in the first of the Browser Wars. Microsoft was simply too big and had too 
much power to influence the market for Netscape to compete. However, the 
novelty of distributing software freely for personal use was not lost on Micro-
soft. Netscape’s Navigator browser rapidly picked up market share by using 
such a tactic, and Microsoft effectively gave away its IE browser by bundling 
it with its Windows operating system. Just as Microsoft was reaching its most 
dominant market position and using tactics that eventually led to its conviction 
for antitrust violations, Linux and the open-source model of production was 
beginning to grow as a potential threat. Indeed, after Netscape Navigator had 
lost significant market share to Microsoft, Netscape released the source code 
publicly in 1998 to attract development for a new browser. That new browser 
would eventually become Mozilla Firefox, which was first released in 2002. 
Microsoft took notice of this general trend toward open source as well and, 
in 1998, a series of leaked documents demonstrated exactly how Microsoft 
viewed this emerging threat. The Halloween Documents17 were made publicly 
available and their authenticity was later confirmed by Microsoft (Harmon and 
Markoff, 1998). They will be discussed later in this chapter. Before doing so, 
however, Microsoft’s conviction for antitrust violations needs to be discussed. 
In many ways, the antitrust conviction marks an important turning point, not 
just in Microsoft’s history but in the broader history of the software industry.
3.3. The United States vs. Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft’s activities during the Browser Wars ultimately led to its conviction 
for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act prohibits ‘every contract, combination …, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce...’ (15 U.S.C. §1). Section 2 states it is unlawful for any 
person or firm to ‘monopolize … any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations. … ’ (15 U.S.C. §2). The court ultimately 
found Microsoft to be in violation of both sections of the Act. Microsoft vio-
lated Section 1 by unlawfully tying its web browser – Internet Explorer – to its 
operating system. Furthermore, the company violated Section 2 by maintain-
ing its monopoly power by anticompetitive means and attempting to monopo-
lise the web browser market.
These convictions rested upon the fact that Microsoft engaged in anticom-
petitive behaviours in its contractual relationships with Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs). Specifically, Microsoft used ‘contractual and, later, 
technological shackles in order to ensure the prominent (and ultimately per-
manent) presence of Internet Explorer on every Windows user’s PC system, 
and to increase the costs attendant to installing and using [Netscape] Navigator 
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on any PCs running Windows’ (United States, 2000: 11). In addition, Microsoft 
restricted OEMs from reconfiguring Windows 95 and Windows 98 in ways that 
could lead to greater use of Netscape Navigator. Finally, Microsoft ‘used incen-
tives and threats to induce’ certain OEMs to design ‘distributional, promotional 
and technical efforts’ that would favour Internet Explorer instead of Navigator 
(United States vs. Microsoft, 2000: 11).
The final judgment in the antitrust case found that Microsoft had violated 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as more than 35 state law provi-
sions in 19 states plus the District of Columbia. Considering these violations, 
the U.S. District Court Judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, ordered Microsoft to 
divest its operating systems business operations from its applications business 
operations. In addition, all the intellectual property rights previously held by 
the two businesses were to be transferred to the Applications Division, which 
was required to grant a perpetual, royalty-free licence to the operating systems 
business so that it could license, develop, and distribute modified or deriva-
tive versions of the intellectual property. However, the Operating Systems Divi-
sion was prohibited from doing this with the intellectual property related to 
the Internet browser (Internet Explorer). Aside from divesting the operations 
of these two businesses, Microsoft was ordered to transfer all the assets from 
either one of the divisions into a newly formed company, for which the transfer 
of ownership was to be accomplished by a distribution of stock to sharehold-
ers not connected with Microsoft. The intent of these decrees was to separate 
Microsoft’s operating system business from the business operations that han-
dled its web browser development. These actions would prevent Microsoft 
from engaging in the same types of anticompetitive behaviour that it had used 
during the Browser Wars.
3.3.1. Effects of the Decision
In 2001, District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson recused himself from a related 
case – that went to appeal –  because of some public comments that he made, 
which gave the impression that he had a personal bias or prejudice against Micro-
soft (Wilcox, 2001). In his place, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly took 
over the case and, in late 2001, approved a settlement between the parties. The 
approved settlement would no longer seek the breakup of Microsoft’s Operat-
ing Systems and Applications Divisions. Instead, Microsoft agreed to a series of 
consent decrees in November 2002, whereby the company would be prohibited 
from retaliating against any OEM that develops, distributes, promotes, uses, 
sells, or licenses any non-Microsoft products (United States vs. Microsoft, 2002). 
In addition, Microsoft would need to establish a clearly documented schedule 
of all royalties that would be received from OEMs for its Windows Operating 
System. These provisions were aimed at prohibiting Microsoft from engaging 
in any anticompetitive behaviours, but most importantly for the purposes of 
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this analysis, Microsoft would also be forced to promote interoperability for 
its products. This would ensure that other companies could develop products 
that would operate smoothly with Microsoft’s products. As such, Microsoft 
was ordered to disclose its Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which 
would specify how software components should interact with one another. 
By releasing its APIs to independent hardware vendors (IHV), independent 
software vendors (ISV), OEMs, Internet Access Providers (IAPs), and Internet 
Content Providers (ICP), Microsoft would ensure those parties could develop 
software that could operate on and interact with Microsoft’s operating systems 
and other software. Microsoft would also need to make any communications 
protocol available to third parties for the same purposes. The consent decrees 
to which Microsoft agreed were supposed to last five years from the decision in 
2002. However, these decrees were renewed twice – once in 2006 and again in 
2009 – and finally expired 12 May 2011 (Chan, 2011).
In effect, the antitrust ruling against Microsoft did not seek a breakup of the 
company into distinct operating units, but focused more specifically on Micro-
soft’s intellectual property practices. The decrees forced Microsoft to disclose its 
APIs to third parties to encourage and support interoperability with its prod-
ucts. The logic was that doing so would curb the anticompetitive behaviour 
Microsoft had displayed during the Browser Wars and in its contract bargain-
ing with OEMs, while promoting competition within the software industry. It 
is within this context that Microsoft’s shift toward (but not completely to) open 
source can be viewed.
Nevertheless, the consent decrees had little effect on the economic perfor-
mance of the company. The company experienced a dip in profits in 2001, but 
still maintained nearly $7 billion in profits during this time with a substantial 
jump in the 2005–2006 fiscal year. However, along with broader shifts occur-
ring in the software industry at the time, they did have the effect of changing 
some of Microsoft’s practices associated with open source. The date of the con-
sent decrees perfectly coincides with Microsoft’s creation of the Shared Source 
program. Furthermore, the end of the consent decrees in May 2011 coincides 
with the creation of the Microsoft Open Technologies Division in 2012. To 
understand more fully Microsoft’s relationship with FLOSS, the remainder of 
the chapter charts the company’s history with FLOSS, beginning with the Hal-
loween Documents, then discusses the Shared Source program and Microsoft 
Open Technologies. The previous discussion in this chapter provides an impor-
tant context within which Microsoft’s shift toward FLOSS can be interpreted.
3.4. The Halloween Documents
In October 1998, Eric Raymond, a well-known member of the free and open 
source software community and author of The Cathedral and the Bazaar, 
received a series of internal documents from a confidential source that outlined 
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Microsoft’s strategy against Linux and open source software. These documents 
were subsequently released to the public by Raymond and their authenticity was 
later verified by Microsoft. These documents became known as ‘The Halloween 
Documents’ because many were released near the end of October over differ-
ent years. The Halloween Documents focus on Microsoft’s assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of open source software, including Linux, and how 
the company could combat the growing popularity of the movement. What is 
clear from the documents is that Microsoft viewed free software products as a 
genuine threat to its own products, especially because the free software projects 
had ‘acquired the depth and complexity traditionally associated with commer-
cial projects’ (Raymond, 1998a). As such, the Halloween Documents contain 
information about how Microsoft planned to combat open source software.
In Halloween Document I,18 Vinod Valloppillil discusses open source soft-
ware as a potential threat to Microsoft. Rather than focusing on a specific open 
source project or organisation, however, Valloppillil focuses on the process 
used in open-source software development. Valloppillil writes, ‘to understand 
how to compete against OSS [open source software], we must target a pro-
cess rather than a company’ (Raymond, 1998a). He goes on to assess possible 
strategies for combating open source software, and gives special attention to 
‘FUD tactics,’ an acronym for Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt. FUD is a tactic used 
in sales, marketing, public relations, and propaganda, whereby one attempts to 
instil those feelings in consumers about the quality of a competitor’s products. 
For example, in an advertisement for Microsoft Server 2003, Microsoft claimed 
that research demonstrated ‘Linux was found to be over 10 times more expen-
sive than Windows Server 2003’ (BBC News, 2004). Microsoft was asked to 
change the advertisement by the Advertising Standards Authority in the United 
Kingdom because the results of the study were deemed to be misleading to 
consumers. In effect, the advertisement was meant to instil FUD in consumers 
about the total cost of Linux.
Halloween Document II19 largely contains a much more detailed technical 
analysis of Linux’s functionality when compared to other products. The author 
also describes his personal experience with installing the DHCP Client Dae-
mon and ultimately claims that, even though he was a poorly skilled UNIX 
programmer, he could easily figure out how to extend the DHCP client code 
and ‘the feeling was exhilarating and addictive’ (Raymond, 1998b). Impor-
tantly, however, the conclusion of the document suggests possible strategies for 
competing against Linux. The author admits that Linux was the greatest threat 
to Microsoft in the server market, and he also claims that a possible strategy for 
fighting Linux could be patent and copyright litigation.
Halloween Document III20 is a document from Microsoft Netherlands in 
which Aurelia van den Berg, a Press and Public Relations Manager for the com-
pany, responds to the leak of the two internal documents in 1998. Her response 
downplays the significance of the leaked documents, claiming that all compa-
nies conduct assessments of their competitors, and the leaked documents do 
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not represent official Microsoft positions. At the end of the document, how-
ever, van den Berg still manages to criticise FLOSS in general for its inability to 
be a long-term solution. Alluding to the need for strong intellectual property 
protections, van den Berg claims, ‘unless Linux violates IP rights, it will fail to 
deliver innovation over the long run’ (Raymond, 1998c).
Documents VII, VIII, and X are the other documents directly leaked from 
Microsoft. The remaining documents are commentaries, satires, and criticisms 
of Microsoft created by others in response to the leaked documents. Hallow-
een Document VII21 provides the results of an internal survey conducted by 
Microsoft in 2002 about attitudes and opinions on FLOSS in general, Linux 
specifically, and familiarity with Microsoft’s newly created Shared Source pro-
gram. The results of Microsoft’s internal survey showed that FLOSS in gen-
eral and Linux specifically were viewed favourably by those included in the 
survey, which mainly included policymakers, decision makers, and corporate 
executives selectively chosen by Microsoft. The survey also showed that mes-
saging designed to criticise or question the quality of FLOSS, Linux, or the GPL 
was not effective (Raymond, 2002a). Considering these findings, the authors 
recommend that Microsoft could more effectively compete with FLOSS by 
focusing on the total cost of ownership (TCO) of Microsoft products when 
compared with Linux. In addition, the authors recommend Microsoft focus on 
the benefits of its newly created Shared Source program.
Halloween Document VIII22 was an internal email sent by Orlando Ayala, 
Group Vice President of Microsoft’s Worldwide Sales, Marketing, and Services 
Group, to the heads of Microsoft’s subsidiaries in 2002. The message was sent 
as a reaction to many governments and other large institutions beginning to 
transition to Linux. As such, Ayala suggests that Microsoft and its subsidiar-
ies need to be better prepared to respond to those types of announcements 
by communicating those announcements internally so the company can try to 
respond to these cases directly. In short, the document suggests that Microsoft’s 
internal communication needed to be more fully integrated to respond to their 
declining market share, particularly among large institutions.
Finally, Halloween Document X23 was leaked in 2004 and features an internal 
email from the SCO Group in which the author discusses, albeit somewhat 
vaguely, the relationship between the SCO Group and Microsoft. The email 
appears to disclose the amount of money paid to SCO on behalf of Micro-
soft. Although not discussed at length here, the SCO Group was a software 
company that became infamous for engaging in legal battles over alleged intel-
lectual property infringement in Linux related software. The SCO Group went 
bankrupt in 2007, but between 2003 and 2011 the company alleged that various 
Linux vendors had infringed copyrights belonging to it. These vendors 
notably included IBM, Novell, and Red Hat, but also Daimler-Chrysler and 
AutoZone. Particularly relevant for this discussion is the suggestion in Docu-
ment X that Microsoft was contributing large amounts of money to the SCO 
Group to fuel intellectual property litigation against Linux and its vendors. This 
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would be consistent with some of the suggestions in the previous documents 
that possible strategies for combatting Linux would be copyright and patent 
litigation.
In sum, the Halloween Documents allowed direct access to Microsoft’s 
assessment of FLOSS in general and Linux specifically. What becomes clear 
from the documents is that Microsoft believed Linux was a legitimate threat to 
its own products. However, Microsoft correctly placed the true value of FLOSS 
projects within the process of production. To compete against the percep-
tion that FLOSS projects provided at least the same level of quality as those of 
proprietary companies, Microsoft used FUD tactics to suggest that the open-
source model of production was inherently unstable or not secure. Ironically, 
Microsoft’s own survey data suggested that these tactics were not effective, nor 
were any attempts to criticise the FLOSS development model. Instead, Micro-
soft needed to shift its strategy to focus more on the quality of its own products, 
including its newly developed Shared Source program. The Halloween Docu-
ments provide an illuminating perspective on the internal culture of Microsoft 
during the critical years from 1998–2004 when it underwent somewhat of a 
transformation. The antitrust suit against the company began in 1998 and was 
ultimately decided in 2001, and the company developed its Shared Source pro-
gram in 2001.
3.5. Shifting Toward the Commons
The preceding sections of this chapter described in detail some of the important 
historical moments that exemplify competing models of software production 
and the specific tactics used by Microsoft to solidify its dominance of the soft-
ware market. Three concurrent factors ultimately led to Microsoft’s change of 
position regarding FLOSS. First, the company was convicted of antitrust activi-
ties in 2001 and agreed to a series of consent decrees in 2002 that sought to curb 
the company’s anticompetitive practices by requiring Microsoft to disclose its 
APIs to third parties. Second, the dot-com bubble burst, which marked the end 
of the massive speculative investment in web-based companies. Third, the rise 
of Linux and Linux-related businesses had demonstrated the commercial via-
bility of FLOSS-based business models. Those business models – and the effec-
tiveness of Linux – each relied on the processes involved in FLOSS production. 
In other words, the true source of value for FLOSS technologies and businesses 
was the labour performed by the FLOSS community, which provided a critical 
challenge to the existing models of industrial software production exemplified 
by Microsoft. Microsoft responded to these challenges by initiating a couple of 
different projects that claimed to be dedicated to FLOSS principles, although 
these initiatives were met with different levels of acceptance by the broader 
FLOSS community. The next sections chart the rise of two such projects: the 
Shared Source Initiative and the Microsoft Open Technologies Division.
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3.5.1. Microsoft Shared Source
The Shared Source Initiative (SSI) began at Microsoft in 2001 to provide access 
to certain source code for debugging and reference purposes. While Microsoft 
had been releasing portions of its Windows source code to academic institutions 
and OEMs as early as 1991, the SSI expanded the range of code that was made 
available in 2001. The code made available under this program was protected 
by different licences, including the Research Source Licensing Program, Enter-
prise Source Licensing Program, ISV Source Licensing, OEM Source Licensing, 
Windows CE source code access, and others. While a detailed description of the 
specific rights granted by these licences and programs is beyond the scope of 
this analysis, these licences are mentioned here to demonstrate that the sharing 
of source code by Microsoft was not entirely new at the time of the antitrust rul-
ing. However, these licences were not considered free software or open source 
in their true sense, because Microsoft still claimed copyright protection on the 
underlying source code. Under most of these licences, code was made available 
for academic and reference purposes, but the company prohibited redistribu-
tion of the code or limited distribution to those working on Microsoft software. 
In effect, these licences allowed others to view the source code, but they could 
modify it unless they adhered to the limitations set forth in the licences.
What was novel about the SSI in 2001 was the expansion of Microsoft’s 
Shared Source program by the release of more types of source code as well 
as the creation of new licences that were designed to grant different types of 
rights to users. Most notable for the purpose of this project are the two licences 
that were submitted to the Open Source Initiative (OSI) for official registra-
tion as open source licences: the Microsoft Public License and the Microsoft 
Reciprocal License. Both were approved by the OSI in October of 2007 (Open 
Source Initiative, 2007). This marked the first time that Microsoft officially had 
a licence approved by the open source community, even though these licences 
were still not fully compatible with the GPL.
Indeed, some within the broader community viewed Microsoft’s Shared 
Source Initiative and its new licences as simply a marketing ploy. Even Michael 
Tiemann, the president of OSI, the organisation that approved the licences, 
claimed:
Shared source is a marketing term created and controlled by Microsoft. 
Shared source is not open source by another name. Shared source is an 
insurgent term that distracts and dilutes the Open Source message by 
using similar-sounding terms and offering similar-sounding promises. 
And to date, ‘shared source’ has been a marketing dud as far as Open 
Source is concerned. (Tiemann, 2007).
Microsoft’s views differed from Tiemann’s claim. In a speech in 2001, Micro-
soft Senior Vice President Scott Mundie noted that Microsoft’s expansion of its 
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Shared Source Initiative may be viewed by some as a failed attempt at becom-
ing an open source company. Mundie claimed this assertion would be false 
because, ‘Shared Source is Open Source’ (Mundie, 2001). Mundie continued 
by saying Microsoft would be incorporating many of the positive aspects of 
the FLOSS development, while continuing to preserve the company’s strong 
intellectual property protections. Mundie went on to claim that FLOSS produc-
tion was unstable as a business model in the long run because it was unsecure 
and subject to ‘unhealthy “forking”’ (Mundie, 2001). Chapter 4 will demon-
strate how Mundie was incorrect in his assessment, and Chapter 5 will provide 
greater detail on ‘forking’.
These vastly different assessments of the SSI are indicative of the contentious 
relationship between Microsoft and the FLOSS community. Although Microsoft 
had shifted its position toward FLOSS, the community still maintained a healthy 
scepticism about Microsoft’s involvement in FLOSS projects. After all, Microsoft 
had a history of threatening intellectual property infringement suits against firms 
using Linux, even if Microsoft’s stance began to thaw around the same time that 
Microsoft’s Shared Source licences were approved by the OSI. In 2006, Microsoft 
agreed not to sue Novell’s Linux users in exchange for a share of Novell’s open 
source revenue, as Microsoft claimed that Novell was infringing its intellectual 
property. By reaching such an agreement, Novell reported that its Linux business 
had increased 243% through the first three quarters of the 2007 fiscal year (Lai, 
2007). This agreement, as well as other similar agreements between companies 
using Linux and Microsoft, caused somewhat of a split within the FLOSS commu-
nity as to whether companies should be signing such agreements. While the split 
existed in 2007, the lines of this split have blurred significantly in the years since 
these types of agreements began. Indeed, Microsoft opened an entire division of 
its company dedicated to open source, called Microsoft Open Technologies.
3.5.2. Microsoft Open Technologies and GitHub
Microsoft Open Technologies opened in 2012 to ‘advance Microsoft’s investment 
in openness including interoperability, open standards, and open source’ (Foley, 
2015). The creation of an entire subsidiary dedicated to open source signalled a 
shift in Microsoft’s relationship to the broader open source community. Through-
out Microsoft’s history, isolated individuals or smaller working groups advocated 
for greater involvement in open source projects, but the creation of an entirely 
new subsidiary marked the first concerted institutional effort at direct involve-
ment. Notably, the creation of the new subsidiary coincided with two major 
events at Microsoft. The first was the expiration of the consent decrees in 2011, 
and the second was the resignation of Steve Ballmer as Chief Executive Officer.
The consent decrees required Microsoft to make its APIs more openly avail-
able so that developers could create technologies that could easily interact with 
Microsoft’s own. In other words, the consent decrees provided an impetus for 
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forcing the promotion of greater interoperability between Microsoft and non-
Microsoft technologies. In addition, Microsoft expanded its Shared Source 
Initiative to make its code more openly available to the broader community. 
However, this move was met with some scepticism by the FLOSS community, 
particularly because most of the licences that protected the code did not com-
ply with open source standards. This changed in 2007 when the OSI approved 
two Microsoft licences as open source.
In addition to the changes brought about by the consent decrees, Microsoft 
experienced a change in leadership shortly after Microsoft Open Technologies 
opened. CEO Steve Ballmer, who is credited with the ‘Linux is a cancer’ indict-
ment, announced his resignation on 23 August 2013. He ultimately resigned in 
2014, and Bill Gates stepped down as Chairman of the company. However, Gates 
was invited to serve as technology adviser to the newly appointed CEO, Satya 
Nadella. Nadella adopted a new approach to open source for the company, as indi-
cated by the actions that the company took in the years following his appointment.
In 2015, Microsoft shut down its Microsoft Open Technologies subsidiary. 
Microsoft did not characterise the move as closing the subsidiary but rather as 
Microsoft Open Technologies ‘rejoining’ Microsoft (Foley, 2015). The claim was 
that a separate subsidiary was no longer necessary, as support for open source 
was now mainstream within Microsoft. Indeed, a little more than a year later in 
2016 Microsoft officially joined the Linux Foundation as a platinum member 
(The Linux Foundation, 2016). The general trend toward Microsoft’s increas-
ing support of open source was also demonstrated by the company being the 
top contributor to open source code projects hosted on the web-based devel-
opment platform GitHub in 2017 (Hoffa, 2017). The following year, in 2018, 
Microsoft acquired GitHub for $7.5 billion (Microsoft, 2018).
3.6. Why Open Source? Why Now?
Microsoft’s relationship with open source provides a few instructive lessons for 
understanding the dynamics between capital and the commons. The company’s 
initial strategy of relying on strong intellectual property rights and enforcing 
them ruthlessly while simultaneously framing open source as an adversary ulti-
mately led to an antitrust ruling shortly after the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Microsoft’s closed-source strategy and 
partnerships with hardware manufacturers led to its tremendous growth within 
the software market. The findings of the antitrust case, however, revealed the 
darker side of this growth. The case highlighted the company’s monopolistic 
practices in using its dominance in the market for personal computer operating 
systems to distribute copies of its Internet Explorer web browser. This marked 
an historical turning point not just for Microsoft, but of a more general trend 
that saw the end of the dot-com bubble in 2001 as well as a shift away from 
‘Web 1.0’ business tactics.
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In the years after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, a host of new web-based 
companies arose that promised interactivity and a focus on the consumer. 
This era, which marks the rise of so-called ‘Web 2.0’ companies, was charac-
terised by companies providing services rather than packaged software, con-
trolling robust data sets that expand as more people use them, trusting users 
as co-developers of companies’ products and services, harnessing collective 
intelligence, relying on customer self-service, providing software across mul-
tiple devices, and featuring lightweight user interfaces, development models 
and business models (O’Reilly, 2005). These technological features functioned 
ideologically insofar as they gave the illusion of participation, collaboration, 
and egalitarianism when, in fact, they merely justified the provision of personal 
data to corporate Internet Service Providers (ISPs), who, in turn, harvested and 
sold that data to advertisers (see Fuchs, 2011b).
This suggests that the antitrust ruling cannot be viewed as the sole factor that 
affected Microsoft’s business model. Rather, the antitrust decision combined 
with the other emerging historical forces within the technology field – Web 2.0, 
the commercial viability of Linux, and the ideology of romantic individual-
ism within start-up culture – to effect a change in Microsoft’s business strategy. 
In 2002, only a year after the antitrust ruling, Microsoft launched its ‘shared 
source’ program, which provided greater access to some of its source code, but 
still placed restrictions on its modification and redistribution. Consequently, 
the program was widely viewed as somewhat of a marketing ploy and a strategy 
to gain a better reputation with the open source community.
When viewed in this way, Microsoft needed to embrace open source – not 
only because the consent decrees required a more open approach, but because 
the industry in general was trending toward collaboration, and Linux (or, more 
accurately, the processes involved in FLOSS production, which made technolo-
gies like Linux possible) was proving to be commercially viable. In part, Micro-
soft has an interest in promoting interoperability and open standards, which 
enable it to keep up with the always-changing technological landscape. But the 
company’s turn to open source may also be viewed as a humble recognition 
that the commons-based peer production taking place within the FLOSS com-
munity was an efficient and effective model of industrial software production 
that could supplement its own business practices. Finally, Microsoft’s foray fur-
ther into open source by its acquisition of GitHub can be understood within 
this broader context as well. Not only does its ownership of GitHub make the 
company appear as a supporter of the FLOSS community more generally, but 
it is also indicative of a broader trend within the information services industry 
of providing platforms for software production rather than directly produc-
ing software. To be sure, Microsoft does still produce proprietary software in-
house, but providing platforms for software production also places Microsoft in 
a strategic position that makes other forms of software production dependent 
on the company to a certain degree.
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Microsoft remains the largest software company in the world, and it provides 
an example of how a corporation that was widely viewed as the antithesis to the 
FLOSS ethos eventually transitioned toward embracing open-source software. 
In effect, Microsoft is now seeking to incorporate elements of FLOSS produc-
tion within its broader corporate structure. While Microsoft has not fully trans-
formed into an open-source business, the company has shifted its position even 
while maintaining strong intellectual property protections over some of its core 
software. What is apparent, however, is that Microsoft’s embracing of open 
source is indicative of many other large firms who are seeking to incorporate 
open source projects and processes into their corporate structures. Primarily, 
this move seems to be generated by a more general move toward cloud-based 
services (see Mosco, 2014). Indeed, this is further exemplified by IBM’s acquisi-
tion of Red Hat, which is the largest and only publicly traded company whose 
business model is based entirely on free software. Exactly how the company is 
able to do this is the subject of the following chapter.
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 22 Halloween Document VIII, along with Eric Raymond’s commentary, can 
be accessed at http://www.catb.org/esr/halloween/halloween8.html (last 
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 23 Halloween Document X, along with Eric Raymond’s commentary, can 
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CHAPTER 4
From the Commons to Capital :  
Red Hat, Inc. and the Incorporation of 
Free Software
The previous chapter focused on Microsoft’s long and complicated history with 
free and open source software and the attendant cultural practices of open 
collaboration associated with FLOSS communities.24 Microsoft underwent a 
transformation in its stance toward open source software. What was originally 
an antagonistic stance eventually transformed into an embrace of open source 
processes and products. In part, this was driven by the growing acceptance 
of free and open source software as an effective, efficient model of industrial 
software production, but it was also driven by the emergence of commercially 
viable business models that were built around FLOSS communities. Perhaps 
the most significant of these emergent companies was Red Hat, Inc., which 
became the largest and only publicly traded company whose business model 
was built entirely around free software.
This chapter focuses specifically on how Red Hat built its business and how 
it negotiated its relationship with the community of free software developers 
upon which its business model depends. In effect, Red Hat transformed the 
commons of free software production into a capitalist enterprise by trans-
forming FLOSS products into commodities that could be customised, sold, 
and serviced for its customers. I understand commodification simply as the 
transformation of use values into exchange values, which stems from Marx’s 
analysis of the commodity form. However, some scholars like Meretz (2014) 
argue that free software is not a commodity and cannot be since this is prohib-
ited by the GNU General Public License (GPL). Meretz’s point is that the GPL 
promotes direct reciprocity between people because the licence stipulates that 
anyone using GPL-protected works must make their subsequent work available 
under the same licence. On this point, I agree with Meretz. However, as I will 
How to cite this book chapter:
Birkinbine B. J. 2020. Incorporating the Digital Commons: Corporate Involvement in Free 
and Open Source Software. Pp. 73–88. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.16997/book39.d. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
74 Incorporating the Digital Commons
demonstrate in this chapter, Red Hat transforms the use values of free software 
projects into exchange value through trademark law, thereby maintaining the 
reciprocity of its free software projects as stipulated by the GPL while simulta-
neously circumventing some of those provisions by embedding its trademark 
into customised free software packages. In effect, this contains the hallmarks 
of classic commodification (i.e. the transformation of use values into exchange 
values) while also some elements of knowledge rent extraction when Red Hat 
serves as the de facto ‘owner’ of the free software commons for the purpose of 
market exchange.
More than any other case study, this chapter illustrates the complex ways in 
which a FLOSS community and its software projects can be dialectically situ-
ated between the commons and capital. After all, there are processes of com-
modification taking place in this example, as will be demonstrated during a 
discussion of Red Hat’s core commodities. However, there are certain unique 
characteristics of those software projects that allow their code to be commodi-
fied by Red Hat, while the community continues to have access to and a certain 
degree of ‘ownership’ of the code. This relationship is mediated through the 
specific intellectual property licences assigned to the code in question, which 
will also be explored in this chapter. This is particularly notable because Red 
Hat continues to enjoy a favourable reputation within free software commu-
nities, and it also found a way to commodify software without enclosing or 
dispossessing the commons from them. Rather, the relationship between Red 
Hat and the free software projects that it sponsors is negotiated through what 
O’Mahony and Bechky (2008) call ‘boundary organisations’. Such organisations 
are created to negotiate and establish boundaries between two parties who may 
have both shared and disparate interests. On the one hand, FLOSS communities 
want to ensure the survival of their software projects and attract other devel-
opers to work on them, which can be achieved through securing corporate 
sponsorship of a project. However, the community also wants to preserve its 
creative autonomy by not ceding too much influence or power to the corpora-
tion. Negotiating these boundaries can effectively be achieved by establishing a 
boundary organisation, which serves as a forum for negotiating these interests 
while simultaneously serving as an intermediary between FLOSS communities 
and corporate sponsors.
To illustrate the specific dynamics at work in the relationship between Red 
Hat and free software communities, this chapter first explains the history of 
Red Hat as well as how the company developed a way to transform the digital 
commons of free software into a capitalist enterprise. The specific focus is on 
its core commodities – previously Red Hat Linux and now Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux, both of which rely on collaborative commons-based peer production 
from within the FLOSS community. Then, the chapter focuses on the ways in 
which Red Hat negotiates relationships with the FLOSS community through 
the boundary organisation of the Fedora Project Council as well as the Con-
tributor Licensing Agreements (CLAs). These agreements protect Red Hat 
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against any claims to ownership by community members. Since the intellectual 
property rights of user contributions are centralised within Red Hat, the com-
pany then embeds its trademarked corporate logo into the distributions it sells, 
which gives it the ability to restrict access to and redistribution of its commodi-
ties. Finally, the chapter concludes with reflections about the Red Hat business 
model and what it means for the broader FLOSS community.
4.1. The Political Economy of Red Hat, Inc.
Red Hat Software, Inc. was founded in 1995 when open source software was 
still an emerging but rapidly growing phenomenon. In 1991, Linus Torvalds 
released the code for his Linux kernel project. At that time, the market for soft-
ware and, more specifically, the market for operating systems was still domi-
nated by large firms, most notably Microsoft and its Windows operating system 
as discussed in the previous chapter. In 1993, Bob Young formed a company, 
the ACC Corporation, which primarily sold Unix- and Linux-related accesso-
ries and books, and Mark Ewing created his own distribution of Linux, called 
Red Hat Linux, in 1994. One year later, Red Hat Software, Inc. (simply referred 
to as ‘Red Hat’ from here onwards) was founded after Bob Young’s ACC Cor-
poration merged with Mark Ewing’s company. Red Hat was founded with the 
purpose of developing a commercially viable business model for open source 
by lending credibility to the emerging open source phenomenon. The creation 
of Red Hat was intended to bring the power of open source to businesses by 
providing packaged solutions to customers, while funnelling their earnings 
back into the open-source community by supporting free software projects. As 
Bob Young declared in 1999:
We recognised the value of giving customers control of their software, 
and sought to bring brand reliability to the Linux product. We would 
offer support to customers and accelerate development of the operating 
system by investing our own R&D [research and development] dollars 
in new Linux technology that would then be given back for free to the 
community, for any Linux programmer or distributor to use. We had no 
intention of ever ‘owning’ the intellectual property we created. Instead, 
our business model was based on quickly expanding the market, and 
earning a small amount of revenue from a large number of customers 
who would buy a product that was better quality than that being offered 
by the industry leader, Microsoft. (Young and Rohm, 1999: 10)
The ‘better quality’ product that Young is referring to is the Linux-based oper-
ating system, which is created by open collaborative development, as opposed 
to closed proprietary development used by Microsoft. Red Hat found a way to 
offer an operating system that could be easily adapted to the unique needs of 
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different customers. This was particularly important in a time when hardware 
vendors were reliant on large, proprietary firms such as Microsoft to develop 
operating systems that could run on their hardware. The speed at which new 
versions of proprietary operating systems could be developed was much slower 
compared to the open source options. Consequently, Red Hat negotiated – and 
continues to rely on – strategic partnerships with hardware manufacturing 
companies, such as Intel, IBM, Dell, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, Sony and others.
These partnerships are beneficial to Red Hat and its partners for several 
reasons. First, Red Hat can pursue its original goal of bringing commercial 
credibility to free and open source software by gaining the support of major 
information technology firms. Second, Red Hat positions itself as a leading 
company dealing solely in free software. Third, Red Hat supports free software 
projects financially to support the developer communities that work on these 
projects. In effect, Red Hat serves as an intermediary between large informa-
tion technology firms and the FLOSS community.
However, in the early years of Red Hat, the company benefited from ven-
ture capital investment, particularly at a time when the ‘dot-com’ investment 
bubble was on the rise. Frank Batten, Jr., through Landmark Communication, 
was an early investor in Red Hat and committed $2 million to the company 
in 1997 (Young and Rohm, 1999). Landmark Communication was famous 
for investing in the Weather Channel, and the company remains a privately 
held investment firm that now operates under the name Landmark Media 
Enterprises. Red Hat also received investment capital from Greylock Limited 
Partnership and Benchmark Capital, a company based in Menlo Park, CA, 
and known for its investment in, and support of, the open-source community. 
All three of these entities – Landmark Communication, Greylock and Bench-
mark Capital – became major shareholders in Red Hat after its initial public 
offering (IPO).
Red Hat held its IPO in August 1999. The investment from venture capital 
firms, as well as the company’s partnerships with major information technol-
ogy companies, led to rapid growth in the firm’s value. In September 1999, Red 
Hat’s stock price rose to more than $122 per share, up from its original price 
of $14 per share. At the time, Frank Batten, Jr, owned 15 million shares in the 
company, while Greylock Limited Partnership owned 8.7 million shares, and 
Benchmark Capital owned 5.8 million shares (Kanellos, 2002). However, in the 
interest of giving back to the FLOSS community, the company tried to compile 
a list of all FLOSS developers who contributed to Linux and other FLOSS pro-
jects. While arriving at a fully comprehensive list was not possible, the company 
managed to develop a list of approximately 5,000 developers. The intention was 
to make these developers stockholders in the company so they could benefit 
from the company’s growth. While the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission regulations prevented a large portion of these developers from 
becoming investors,25 more than 1,000 of the eligible 1,300 developers became 
early shareholders in the company (Young and Rohm, 1999). Making the effort 
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to include members of the FLOSS community as early shareholders in the com-
pany demonstrated Red Hat’s commitment to supporting the community.
In the years following the IPO, Red Hat continued to enjoy growth in reve-
nue. What is particularly striking about Red Hat’s growth was that the company 
was not significantly affected by the dot-com bubble crash between 1999–2001. 
Rather, Red Hat emerged from this period and continued to grow. One reason 
for the company’s steady growth during this period may be the strategic part-
nerships that Red Hat negotiated with large information technology firms in 
the lead up to the dot-com crash. Those firms – Intel, Cisco, IBM, Dell, etc. – 
also survived the crash and many have solidified their position as leaders in the 
market for information and communication technologies. Even though Red 
Hat was a start-up company, the partnerships that the company formed with 
these larger firms ensured that Red Hat would be supported by these businesses 
into the future.
While the company continued to enjoy growing revenues, its net profits exhib-
ited a noticeable decrease during the dot-com bubble crash. Red Hat’s profits 
dipped from 1998 until 2002, but rose again in 2003. This performance almost 
perfectly coincides with changes in management, and can also be explained by 
a shift in Red Hat’s business strategy. In 1999, the original co-founders, Bob 
Young and Mark Ewing, left the company. In 2001, Paul Cormier joined Red 
Hat and began to lobby in favour of shifting the company’s business model. 
Specifically, Cormier wanted to provide FLOSS solutions at the enterprise level 
rather than in the consumer market. To more fully explain the nuances of this 
shift, the following section contains an in-depth discussion of Red Hat’s core 
products, how those commodities shifted focus over time, and how Red Hat 
centralised intellectual property within its corporate structure.
4.2. Red Hat’s Core Commodities and Intellectual Property
Red Hat’s business model relies primarily on its ability to provide an easy-to-
use and accessible version of Linux by producing packaged distributions of the 
operating system, while also providing services and customer support that cater 
to its products. Red Hat’s revenue comes from these two streams. The major-
ity of Red Hat’s revenue is derived from a subscription-based model, whereby 
clients get both products and support from Red Hat, in exchange for a fee. The 
types of products and services provided depend on the level of subscription. 
The effectiveness of this subscription model is based, to a large degree, on two 
interrelated factors: Red Hat’s recognition as a trustworthy provider of FLOSS 
products and services, as well as Red Hat’s position as a legally-recognised 
institution, which can be held liable for the products and services it provides.26
Most importantly for its customers, Red Hat provides a way to outsource 
services that may otherwise be too expensive to perform within a company. 
Indeed, any one of Red Hat’s customers could perform the work done by Red 
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Hat, especially because the underlying code on which Red Hat relies is free 
software. Red Hat does not own the intellectual property rights for the free soft-
ware that its services are based upon, and the company is not necessarily trying 
to exclude others from this intellectual property. Rather, Red Hat has built its 
business model on free software that is protected by the GNU General Public 
License (GPL), as well as other FLOSS licences. As such, any of its customers 
could, in theory, produce the same software that is sold by Red Hat, but they 
would need to perform the work themselves. However, Red Hat is liable for the 
products and services it supplies, which reduces the risk of in-house software 
development. This means that its customers can presumably be reassured that 
support will be available when they sign a contract with Red Hat. In effect, this 
is how Red Hat has become the market leader providing FLOSS distributions 
and services to earn revenues. Prior to Red Hat’s founding, FLOSS projects had 
differing degrees of trustworthiness. By forming a corporate entity that could 
be held liable for the products and services it provided, Red Hat provided a 
certain degree of legitimacy to a system of production that was massively dis-
tributed and not necessarily driven by market forces. Such a system engendered 
projects that varied in their attractiveness to developers, which threatened the 
ability of certain projects to survive.
In what follows, I explain exactly how Red Hat has been able to profit from 
free software. I begin with a discussion of Red Hat Linux, which was the origi-
nal operating system sold to customers from 1994–2004. Then, the company 
shifted its strategy to focus more on providing business solutions with Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux. Most importantly, I address the relationship between 
Red Hat’s core commodities and the Fedora Project, which is one of the major 
FLOSS projects supported by Red Hat.
4.2.1. Red Hat Linux
When Red Hat first began offering products and services in the early 1990s, it 
sold a compact disc (for approximately $50) that contained a Linux distribu-
tion called Red Hat Linux, some additional applications and documentation. 
Red Hat Linux was based purely on computer code that was protected by the 
GPL and other FLOSS licences – that is, code that must remain freely avail-
able for distribution, modification, adaptation, etc. Red Hat Linux provided 
the principal source of revenue for Red Hat during its early years. Revenue 
came primarily from sales of Red Hat Linux to distributors and original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs) for inclusion on their hardware. These companies 
are some of those which invested directly in Red Hat during its early years: 
Dell, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Intel. Because Red Hat had a poten-
tially very large and distributed labour force to draw on – namely, the FLOSS 
 community – its business model was highly scalable. That is, Red Hat had the 
ability to quickly expand its market share to service many customers without 
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incurring increased investment costs. This was precisely Red Hat’s strategy: 
to rapidly increase the market, deriving a small amount of revenue from 
many transactions, while reinvesting part of its earnings back into the FLOSS 
community.
While Red Hat Linux constituted the primary commodity for Red Hat dur-
ing its early years, the bulk of its work was coming from the support it provided 
for this software. Red Hat’s employees provided customer support, education, 
training and technical support to its clients. This strategy, along with Red Hat’s 
strategic partnerships, allowed the company to pick up market share during 
its early years. While the company’s revenues were still growing up until 2004, 
it had not yet become a profitable business. This was in part due to a spate of 
acquisitions of other software firms before the dot-com bubble crash, but also 
because the company had not yet found a way to substantially increase sub-
scription sales at the enterprise level. This is precisely the change that occurred 
when the company shifted its focus to Red Hat Enterprise Linux, which became 
its core commodity and continues to be today. The final stable version of Red 
Hat Linux was released in 2003, which was the same year that Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux was released.
4.2.2. Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project
In 2003, Red Hat split its Red Hat Linux project into two separate projects: Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project. Red Hat Enterprise Linux con-
tinued as a core commodity for Red Hat in the same way that Red Hat Linux 
had been before. The Fedora project, however, became a community-based 
FLOSS project. Red Hat Enterprise Linux relied on the same model as Red Hat 
Linux in terms of providing packaged distributions of a free operating system 
but, rather than selling individual compact discs containing the software, Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux was made available solely through a subscription model. 
Depending on the level of subscription, customers could get access to custom-
ised versions of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system, plus different 
levels of support services for it. In effect, Red Hat Enterprise Linux was a simi-
lar product to Red Hat Linux with a different customer distribution model. Red 
Hat then used the revenues from sales of Red Hat Enterprise Linux to support 
the Fedora Project. The relationship between these two projects provides per-
haps the most interesting insight into how Red Hat incorporates the commons.
The split into Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Fedora Project in 2003 was 
made with the intention of finding a mutually beneficial way for the FLOSS 
community and Red Hat to collaborate on developing software. Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux continues to serve as one of Red Hat’s core commodities, and the 
company profits from subscription sales to its customers. The Fedora Project 
was meant to be a community-sponsored project that would provide an incu-
bator for innovation. In return, the innovation that occurred within the Fedora 
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Project could then be implemented into Red Hat’s commercial offerings, which 
could be customised to its clients’ needs. This was possible because of the own-
ership and governance structure of the Fedora Project, as well as the worker 
contracts established with contributors to the project.
4.2.3. Ownership, Governance and Intellectual Property in Fedora
Red Hat, Inc. exercises ultimate control of the Fedora Project. However, the 
Fedora Project Council leads the Fedora Project.27 The Council, in effect, func-
tions as a boundary organisation for negotiating the boundaries between Red 
Hat and the Fedora project. However, a detailed examination of the Council 
is instructive for illuminating the ways in which these relationships are struc-
tured. The Fedora Project Council is comprised of six members with full vot-
ing powers: two members appointed by the community for engineering and 
outreach, two members elected by the community, and two members who are 
employees of Red Hat and are appointed by the company. The Council may 
also have two to four additional community members at any given time who 
are appointed to take the lead on specific project objectives. These members 
are considered auxiliary Council members with binding votes only in the areas 
specified by their appointment. In addition, the Council also has two additional 
auxiliary seats: the Diversity Advisor, who is appointed by the Council, and the 
Fedora Program Manager, who is appointed by Red Hat with the approval of 
the Council.
While the governance structure of the Fedora Project has changed over time, 
perhaps the most interesting factors in this structure pertain to the members 
appointed by Red Hat: the Fedora Project Leader and the Fedora Community 
Action and Impact Coordinator. The Fedora Project Leader serves as Chair 
of the Council, while the Action and Impact Coordinator is responsible for 
coordinating decision making with budgetary concerns. Previously, the Project 
Leader was also given veto power over any decision made by the Fedora Project 
Board, but now all voting members can block decisions ‘with a valid reason’ 
(The Fedora Project, 2019). However, the Project Leader does have ‘a limited 
power to ‘unstick’ things if consensus genuinely can’t be reached and a decision 
needs to be made’ (The Fedora Project, 2019). The language used here is vague, 
but it does suggest that the Fedora Project Leader may still maintain ultimate 
control over the project, although he or she would presumably expend consid-
erable political capital in making decisions that conflicted with the interests of 
the community.
Red Hat supports the community by sponsoring the project and directing 
funds to Fedora through one of its appointed employees, but it then uses the 
work performed by the community in its commercial offering, Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux. The reason Red Hat can appropriate the labour performed within 
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the community is because all contributors to the Fedora Project have signed a 
contributor’s agreement. These agreements have changed throughout the his-
tory of the Fedora Project, but all have similar effects. Originally, contributors 
needed to sign the Individual Contributor Licensing Agreement (ICLA), which 
effectively assigned the contributors’ copyright to the Fedora Project.28 How-
ever, the ICLA was later abandoned in favour of the Fedora Project Contributor 
Agreement (FPCA), which no longer assigned copyright to Red Hat, but speci-
fied the types of licences that could be included in the Fedora Project.29 This 
shift made it possible for code that had already been licensed under a previous 
licensing scheme to be included in the Fedora Project, as long as the licences 
were compatible with the guidelines established by Fedora.
Both the ICLA and the FPCA provide the mechanism that allows Red Hat to 
commercially exploit the labour that occurs within the commons-based peer 
production of free software projects. In this sense, the agreements allow Red 
Hat to incorporate these projects into its corporate offerings by having the right 
to use these projects transferred to the company. In the case of the ICLA, it pro-
vided a direct assignment of a contributor’s copyright to Red Hat, whereas the 
FPCA does not necessarily assign copyright to Red Hat. In this sense, the FPCA 
can be viewed as less restrictive because it allows contributors to assign licenses 
to their work prior to submitting the work to the Fedora Project. However, 
those licences must be compatible with the goals of the Fedora Project, and the 
Fedora Project wiki maintains a Software License List that identifies the accept-
able and unacceptable licences that can and cannot be included in Fedora.30 
Importantly, Red Hat does this because it becomes legally responsible for the 
products that it offers to customers. If content other than code is included in 
the submission (text, images, logos, etc.), the contributor must waive his or 
her moral rights to the content. This ensures that Red Hat will not be subject 
to infringement claims. In effect, these licensing agreements provide a way for 
Red Hat to control what is included in the commons-based project (Fedora) 
so that when that material is included in their commercial offering (Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux or other software), the company will not be subject to intel-
lectual property infringement claims by the contributors.
By taking these preventative measures to control what is included in Fedora, 
Red Hat can provide its customers with a guarantee that they will not need to 
fear a potential claim against intellectual property infringement. Red Hat does 
this through its Open Source Assurance Program. As the Open Source Assur-
ance Agreement31 contract states, if a third party alleges infringement of intel-
lectual property in the software provided to the client by Red Hat, the company 
will:
(i) defend Client against the Claim and (ii) pay costs, damages and/
or attorney’s fees that are included in a final judgement against Client 
(without right of appeal) or in a settlement approved by Red Hat that 
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are attributable to Client’s use of the Covered Software; (Red Hat, Inc., 
2016)
Furthermore, if the Client’s use of Red Hat’s software is found to infringe the 
third party’s intellectual property rights, then Red Hat will:
(i) obtain the rights necessary for Client to continue to use the Cov-
ered Software consistent with the Support Agreement(s); (ii) modify 
the Covered Software so that it is non-infringing; or (iii) replace the 
infringing portion of the Covered Software with non-infringing code 
of similar functionality (subsections (i), (ii) and (iii) are the ‘IP Resolu-
tions’); provided that if none of the IP Resolutions is available on a basis 
that Red Hat finds commercially reasonable, then Red Hat may termi-
nate the Support Agreement(s) without further liability under this para-
graph, and, if Client then returns the Covered Software that is subject to 
the Claim, Red Hat will refund any prepaid subscription fees related to 
Covered Software. (Red Hat, Inc., 2016)
From Red Hat’s perspective, then, this is the legal-juridical benefit of control-
ling what is included in the Fedora Project, as well as centralising control of 
the intellectual property rights within its corporate structure. Red Hat relies 
on the FLOSS community to perform the cooperative labour of develop-
ing new features, fixing bugs or otherwise improving the Fedora Project so 
that these features can be included in its commercial offerings. To assure its 
customers that they will not be subject to intellectual property infringement 
claims from third parties, Red Hat requires contributors to assign licences 
to their work that will allow Red Hat to continue providing its services. In 
effect, Red Hat is separating authorship from ownership, which is one of the 
primary critiques of intellectual property laws (see Bettig, 1992). However, 
Red Hat does not use copyright to prevent authors or anyone else from using 
the code in other ways. Rather, Red Hat is trying to ensure that the rights to 
use the code in Fedora have been legally transferred to the company, which 
allows the company to provide assurances to its customers. Red Hat’s method 
for protecting its core intellectual property does not come from copyright, 
but the company still prevents exact redistributions of its property through 
trademark law.
4.2.4. Red Hat, Trademark and CentOS
As stated earlier, Red Hat does not own the intellectual property that makes up 
its core commodities. Most of the code in these core commodities is covered 
by the GPL, which allows others to freely copy, modify and redistribute it. 
Therefore, rather than relying on copyright to protect its core commodities, 
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Red Hat relies on trademark law to protect its properties. The details of this 
strategy can be found in the Red Hat Trademark Guidelines32 document (Red 
Hat, Inc., 2006). Hypothetically, anyone could make an exact copy of Red Hat’s 
open source software and begin selling it, but they would be prevented from 
including any registered trademarks. These trademarks include the logos and 
names of software, which means that exact copies of Red Hat’s open source 
software would need to be given a different name. Red Hat’s trademarks also 
prevent products from having names that are sufficiently similar, like ‘Green 
Hat’ or ‘Red Cap’ or ‘Redd Hatte’. While these restrictions exist, CentOS pro-
vides an example of a project that served as an exact replacement for Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux.
CentOS began in 2004, and served as a functionally compatible version of 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Indeed, CentOS was based on the publicly avail-
able code for Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Rather than competing with CentOS 
or trying to prevent them from using code included in Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux, Red Hat was largely ambivalent about CentOS. This was, in part, due 
to the perception that customers who wanted to use CentOS would probably 
continue to use it, but also because those customers could switch to Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux at any time because the two operating systems were basically 
the same. However, whatever tension may have existed between the two oper-
ating systems became a moot point in 2014, when Red Hat officially became 
a sponsor of the CentOS project. The move was perceived as a way to meet 
users’ demands across the three major versions of Red Hat’s software – Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux, Fedora and CentOS – by giving users access to features 
that may not be included across all versions of the operating system (Vaughan-
Nichols, 2014). As part of Red Hat’s new sponsorship of the CentOS project, all 
CentOS trademarks were transferred to Red Hat.
Red Hat’s use of trademark law to protect its market position is deployed in 
conjunction with its ability to control the intellectual property included in its 
commercial offerings. By sponsoring the CentOS project, Red Hat can increase 
its intellectual property holdings, while also eliminating a rival form of free 
software that was offering a functional equivalent of its commercial software. In 
this sense, Red Hat’s sponsorship of the CentOS project functions similarly to a 
corporate acquisition or an instance of horizontal integration.
4.2.5. Core Commodity Conclusions
Red Hat, as an institution, may be viewed in at least two different ways. On 
the one hand, Red Hat can be viewed as a pragmatic way to centralise com-
mons-based peer production within capitalism. In this way, Red Hat serves 
as an intermediary institution for providing commercial access to commons-
based peer production. In other words, Red Hat is situated between capital 
and the commons. Importantly, however, Red Hat is clear about its intentions 
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and involvement in FLOSS projects, and it is one of the largest contributors to 
other FLOSS projects; furthermore, the company is actively paying its employ-
ees to contribute to other FLOSS projects. For these reasons, Red Hat main-
tains a relatively good relationship with its FLOSS communities. Indeed, Red 
Hat’s entire business model was founded on finding a way to bring the power 
of FLOSS production to other businesses. In return, Red Hat reinvests in the 
FLOSS community by supporting FLOSS projects, acquiring new businesses 
and then releasing source code to the community. The relationship between 
Red Hat and the FLOSS community is one of mutual benefit: Red Hat’s finan-
cial success benefits the FLOSS community, more revenue for Red Hat means 
more investment in FLOSS projects, and more investment in FLOSS pro-
jects means higher quality products and services that Red Hat can offer to its 
customers.
On the other hand, Red Hat can also be viewed as an institution that operates 
no differently to other corporations within a market-driven capitalist economy. 
Red Hat relies on centralising production within its corporate structure, sepa-
rating authorship from ownership through worker agreements, and protecting 
intellectual property through trademark laws for making a profit. The differ-
ence is that Red Hat cannot prevent some actions that are commonly copyright 
violations because of the rights granted by free software projects. In this sense, 
Meretz (2014) or others who claim that free software cannot be a commodity 
because this is prevented by the GPL are correct, but the Red Hat case study 
illustrates how a company can circumvent traditional copyright law and rely 
on other forms of intellectual property like trademarks to become the de facto 
‘owner’ of the free software commons for the purpose of market exchange. The 
term ‘owner’ is placed in quotes here because Red Hat of course is not the 
actual ‘owner’ of the commons in the traditional sense of property. However, its 
embedding of its trademark does allow Red Hat to, in effect, extract knowledge 
rent from selling customised versions of free software to its customers.
Furthermore, Red Hat does not directly employ its entire labour force, which 
exempts the company from directly compensating all its labourers through 
wages and benefits. Aside from those members of the Fedora Council that it 
directly employs, it relies on other informal ways of compensating those pro-
grammers who contribute to Fedora. So there is a mix of both waged and 
unwaged labour occurring in the production of Red Hat and the Fedora Pro-
ject. In other terms, there is someting of the formal subsumption of labour 
(i.e. introduction of waged labour into FLOSS production), but there is also a 
broader point to be made about the real subsumption of labour here, because 
the survival of the Fedora Project is in part based upon its dependence on Red 
Hat. However, Red Hat relies on the development of an active Fedora com-
munity, and it is in the company’s best interest to maintain a good relationship 
with that community. If the company were to exercise unwanted influence in 
the Fedora Project, those who contribute to the project may choose to aban-
don the project, thus ceasing development of new and innovative features that 
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could potentially be included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Indeed, the follow-
ing chapter illustrates what can happen when such a relationship breaks down.
4.3. From the Commons to Capital
In weighing these two interpretations, at the very least, Red Hat provides an 
exemplary case for understanding how the boundaries of a firm can become 
blurred as it orients itself toward commons-based peer production. In this 
sense, Red Hat demonstrates the ambiguity of commons, particularly as it per-
tains to the potential for radical change. Furthermore, Red Hat demonstrates 
how a distributed system of commons-based peer production can be central-
ised or incorporated into a corporation’s broader strategy and turned into a 
profitable business. As demonstrated throughout this chapter, Red Hat accom-
plished this through both formal and informal mechanisms.
Red Hat was one of the earliest companies to position itself as the leading 
company providing services for FLOSS. As such, Red Hat sought to lend an 
element of professionalism to the emerging FLOSS phenomenon by establish-
ing the formally recognised institution of a publicly traded corporation that 
could be legally liable for the services provided. Consequently, Red Hat needed 
a formalised way to control the commons-based peer production that it incor-
porated into its core commodities. The company accomplished this through 
the Individual Contributor License Agreement (ICLA) and later the Fedora 
Contributor License Agreement (FCLA) that granted the company rights to 
use the production that was performed by developers.
The contributor licensing agreements constitute a formal mechanism for 
controlling the informal production that takes place in commons-based 
peer production. These agreements are essential to Red Hat’s business model 
because they allow Red Hat to be legally liable for the products it sells, par-
ticularly when it comes to allegations of intellectual property infringement. 
Red Hat is certainly not alone in using these types of agreements. The issu-
ing of contributor licensing agreements is common practice in FLOSS pro-
jects, although the terms of the agreements may differ from organisation to 
organisation. Some CLAs, like the ICLA formerly used by Red Hat, represent 
the most striking examples of how institutions, whether for-profit or non-
profit corporations, or any other type of legally recognisable organisation, 
formally control commons-based peer production by separating authorship 
from ownership. However, other CLAs like the FPCA now used by Red Hat 
do not require full copyright transfer. Nonetheless, CLAs in general provide a 
mechanism for transferring rights from commons-based peer production to 
commercial firms like Red Hat.
While this may be viewed as a pragmatic solution for monetising FLOSS 
production and products, it also illustrates the limits of Benkler’s claim that 
the boundaries of the firm will become porous. Indeed, despite the seemingly 
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revolutionary potential of this new modality of production, it still maintains 
the hallmarks of capitalist production: centralisation, control, and appropria-
tion of surplus value. Insofar as one claims FLOSS production to be exemplary 
of commons-based peer production or ‘non-market production’, the labour 
performed under these conditions can still be appropriated for corporate gain. 
In the case of Red Hat, the company has been able to benefit from the creative 
input of the FLOSS community contributing to the Fedora Project. However, in 
the same way that Red Hat relies on both formal and informal degrees of con-
trolling production within the Fedora Project, the company similarly relies on 
both formal and informal mechanisms for compensating those who contribute 
to its FLOSS projects.
Red Hat provides direct compensation to those members of the Fedora 
Council who are employed by and appointed to the Council by the company. 
Red Hat also directs funding back to the Fedora Project through the Open 
Source and Standards group, which provides funding for one of the full-time 
employees who serves on the Fedora Council. For those contributors who are 
not directly employed or paid by Red Hat, their compensation comes to them 
informally. Typically, community members do not have access to the budgetary 
funding provided by Red Hat, although community members may be elected 
or appointed to the Council, in which case they will at least have a say in how 
funds are directed. Aside from this, they may also attend public events or trade 
shows where institutions like Red Hat provide sponsorship or other goods and 
services for the community. However, this informal economy is only sustain-
able for as long as the institutions supporting FLOSS projects remain transpar-
ent about their intentions for the products of FLOSS developers’ labour and 
continue to support the community through the provision of paid employment, 
sponsorship of additional FLOSS projects and events, and informally through 
gifts given to the community.
In sum, Red Hat complicates binary distinctions between market-driven pro-
duction and commons-based peer production by illustrating the way that one firm 
has been able to implement a hybridised model of commons-based market pro-
duction. Furthermore, the case study of Red Hat illuminates the contours of the 
ways in which the boundaries of a firm can become more porous, as was claimed 
by Benkler (2006). However, those boundaries are still discernible, and the pro-
duction within Red Hat’s corporate structure is still largely market-driven. But 
Red Hat, through its sponsorship of, and relationship with the Fedora Project, has 
found a way to move somewhat informal production from the commons to capital.
4.4. The Future of Red Hat
The preceding discussion offered a description of the way that Red Hat was able 
to harness free software production and transform it into a profitable business. 
Red Hat’s attempts to include free software developers in its original IPO, as 
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well as its ongoing contributions to FLOSS communities, earned the company 
a favourable reputation within programmer communities. Red Hat’s ability to 
preserve this good reputation will be dependent, in part, on maintaining a good 
relationship with the Fedora Project community and not attempting to exert 
unwanted influence in the community.
The need for preserving this relationship has become even more urgent 
because Red Hat has been acquired by IBM (Red Hat, 2018). This news was 
announced shortly before this manuscript was submitted to the publisher. 
While it is still too early to tell the consequences of the acquisition, especially 
for the Fedora Project, I wanted to add a coda to this chapter to address the 
acquisition. While any prognostications for what will become of Fedora are 
purely speculative, there are certain factors that suggest the Fedora Project 
is likely to survive, even if the institutional arrangements between Fedora 
and IBM are altered slightly from the institutional arrangements between 
Fedora and Red Hat. First, and perhaps most significant, is the fact that IBM 
has also been supporting various FLOSS projects throughout its history, and 
the company is likely to respect the boundaries of the Fedora Project and its 
creative autonomy. Second, we have already seen examples of what can hap-
pen when a company exerts unwanted influence over FLOSS projects, which 
is precisely the subject of the following chapter. In that case, Oracle acquired 
Sun Microsystems, which had been supporting various FLOSS projects. After 
Oracle interfered in those projects, the communities abandoned them, leaving 
Oracle without any developers working on the projects. This is one of the risks 
that IBM will take if it decides to meddle in the Fedora Project in the wake of 
its acquisition of Red Hat.
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CHAPTER 5
Resisting Incorporation and Reclaiming 
the Commons : The Case of Oracle and 
Sun Microsystems
The previous two chapters focused on case studies of Microsoft and Red Hat, 
and discussed the ways in which the processes and products of FLOSS produc-
tion became incorporated into capitalist production.33 The chapter on Micro-
soft demonstrated how the company initially built its business model on strong 
protection of its intellectual property and fended off challenges from the emer-
gent open-source models that proved to be an effective and efficient model of 
software production. Microsoft eventually shifted to embrace open source, 
albeit only in certain limited ways. The chapter on Red Hat demonstrated how 
free software could be transformed into a profitable business model by har-
nessing the labour power of the free software community and transforming 
its productive activity into commodities that could be customised, sold, and 
serviced for its customers. Furthermore, the chapter focused on the specific 
ways in which Red Hat negotiated its relationship with its free software pro-
ject, Fedora, through the boundary organisation of the Fedora Project Council. 
This chapter will look at how a community of FLOSS developers deals with 
unwanted corporate encroachment into its community governance model. In 
other words, this chapter focuses on the politics involved in negotiating the 
boundaries between FLOSS communities and corporations. The focus on pol-
itics here is not only concerned with the governance structures in place for 
negotiating boundaries between the corporation and the FLOSS community, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, the focus on politics here also 
specifically investigates the ways in which FLOSS communities can assert their 
interests against unwanted corporate attempts to influence production within 
the community. As such, politics here has the dual meaning of collective action 
as well as an ethical horizon toward which collective action can be directed. 
How to cite this book chapter:
Birkinbine B. J. 2020. Incorporating the Digital Commons: Corporate Involvement in Free 
and Open Source Software. Pp. 89–100. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.16997/book39.e. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
90 Incorporating the Digital Commons
This framing of politics, then, focuses on both the moral economy (Thompson, 
1971) of the FLOSS community but also the specific tactics used in resisting 
unwanted corporate influence.
To do so, I focus on one of the largest software companies in the world, 
the Oracle Corporation (simply ‘Oracle’ hereafter), and its acquisition of Sun 
Microsystems (simply ‘Sun’ hereafter). Whereas Sun maintained a good rela-
tionship with the open source community by sponsoring various projects and 
allowing those projects to enjoy relative creative autonomy, those relations 
became strained after Oracle acquired Sun in 2010. After the acquisition, Ora-
cle used a different strategy toward Sun’s open source projects. In certain cases, 
Oracle ended open source activities, in others it tried to influence open source 
development to meet its own goals, and in others again it altered the way that 
the project was governed. In response, the community employed different 
strategies to protect their commons-based resources.
In this chapter, I focus on the histories of three such projects: the OpenSola-
ris operating system, the MySQL relational database management system, and 
the OpenOffice productivity software that was designed as an alternative to 
Microsoft Office. Throughout the chapter, I focus on the ways that the FLOSS 
community maintains a unique ability to leverage its collective labour power 
against corporate encroachment into its projects by using technical, legal, and 
governance strategies that allow them to abandon a project without losing the 
products of their labour. This has a similar effect to a factory walk-out, whereby 
workers halt the productive process by abandoning the site of production. 
When dealing with software, however, production is not reliant on a particu-
lar space. Rather, productive activity can simply be moved to a new location. 
And, because of the unique legal institutions and technical features of open 
source software, a project can be ‘forked’ whereby the project can be copied and 
production can continue under a new name without violating the intellectual 
property protections of the original project. As we will see, this is one of the 
primary ways that the FLOSS community leverages its collective labour power 
against undue corporate influence.
5.1. The Oracle Corporation and Sun Microsystems
Oracle Corporation is one of the largest software companies in the world. The 
company has three main operating segments: cloud and licence business, hard-
ware, and services.34 From these Oracle earns approximately 82% of its total 
revenue from the cloud and licence business segment. In 2018 alone, the com-
pany earned more than $39 billion in total revenues and employed approxi-
mately 137,000 people. If calculated by total revenues, Oracle is the third largest 
company in the global software market behind only IBM and Microsoft. Oracle 
has remained competitive within the global software market, in part, because of 
its strategic acquisitions. One of the company’s largest acquisitions took place 
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when it acquired Sun Microsystems in 2010. While the company’s net profits 
dipped in 2001 after the dot-com bubble burst, the company has enjoyed a 
steady rise in profits since that time, with a noticeable spike in profits between 
2010 and 2013. As such, the company’s profitability can be directly tied to its 
acquisition of Sun Microsystems.
Prior to its acquisition by Oracle in 2010, Sun Microsystems provided network 
computing infrastructure solutions, which included software, systems, storage, 
and microelectronics. In 2009, the final year of its independent operation, Sun 
reported approximately $11.45 billion in revenues and employed approximately 
29,000 employees in more than 100 different countries. The lion’s share of the 
company’s revenues (42%) came from its Systems operating segment, which 
included the sale of servers that provide computing and storage power to cus-
tomers as a key part of Internet infrastructure. The other core brands owned by 
Sun Microsystems were the Java technology platform, the Solaris Operating Sys-
tem, MySQL database management software, Sun StorageTek storage solutions 
and the UltraSPARC processor. Because the company relied on the provision of 
infrastructure-based services and products, the company was a large supporter 
of interoperability. Interoperability, here, is simply defined as the ability for dif-
ferent programs to exchange data with one another by using common formats. 
To facilitate innovation and interoperability, Sun made its key intellectual prop-
erties freely available as a strategy to support open standards, open interfaces, 
and open source software. By making a commitment to open source, Sun was 
viewed favourably by the open source community and maintained a relatively 
good relationship with the community because it was transparent about its 
corporate goals. To better understand the reasons for Sun open-sourcing some 
of their key intellectual properties, we need to consider some of the historical 
development for corporate involvement in FLOSS projects.
5.1.1. A Brief History of the Market for Operating Systems
Throughout the 1980s, the market for operating systems was dominated by 
proprietary versions of Unix-based operating systems. For example, Hewl-
ett Packard offered HPUX, IBM offered AIX, and Sun Microsystems offered 
SunOS. These operating systems dominated high computing, or infrastruc-
tural level computing, while the consumer market was dominated by Micro-
soft DOS, which was not based on Unix but developed entirely by Microsoft. 
Importantly, the proprietary Unix-based systems were source-incompatible. 
In effect, although these systems were all based on Unix, the development of 
separate proprietary versions had caused the code to diverge in such a way 
that programmers could no longer assume interoperability between the sys-
tems. As a result, programmers had to maintain separate code bases for each 
system, and companies could sell entire stacks of software to their customers 
who had to accept the entire stack. This resulted in an inefficient system that 
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was dominated by proprietary software vendors, while simultaneously increas-
ing the workload for programmers. During the mid-1980s, however, the Free 
Software Foundation began as a response to the overly protective intellectual 
property restrictions placed on software. This, in turn, led to the development 
of free and open source software, which was collaboratively developed as a 
commons-based resource for others to study, use, adapt, or modify in any way.
Because this model of development was so successful, by the mid-1990s 
Linux, an open source operating system, had become the dominant Unix-like 
operating system. Linux undercut the competition by offering a comparable 
product at a significantly lower cost. Furthermore, because Linux is distributed 
under the GNU General Public License (GPL), an alternative form of intellec-
tual property (‘copyleft’), improvements to Linux could be shared by everyone, 
which improved its quality and stability. The proprietary companies could not 
compete with Linux because the commons-based peer production driving it 
constituted a larger labour force than any of the individual companies could 
employ. Rather than competing directly with Linux, certain proprietary com-
panies began to open source their products as a way of joining forces with the 
free and open source software community. Sun Microsystems was one of those 
companies. Although Sun supported many different open source projects, 
I will focus on just three here. Sun open-sourced their Solaris operating sys-
tem, which became OpenSolaris. They also open-sourced the MySQL database 
management software, as well as StarOffice, which became OpenOffice. As I 
mentioned earlier, Sun maintained a good relationship with the broader FLOSS 
community because of their commitment to and support for FLOSS projects. 
After the company was acquired by Oracle, this relationship was strained in 
certain ways. In what follows, I will discuss how the developers working on the 
three projects mentioned above – OpenSolaris, MySQL, and OpenOffice – stra-
tegically resisted the corporate acquisition.
5.1.2. OpenSolaris
In 1987, Sun Microsystems and AT&T announced that they were going to 
merge some of the most popular Unix-based operating systems into a single 
project. This project eventually became Solaris, which was a proprietary oper-
ating system held by Sun that contained both open-source and closed-source 
components. To attract interest in the project and build a community of users 
and developers around it, Sun Microsystems created OpenSolaris. OpenSolaris 
was an open-source version of the Solaris operating system, although it did 
contain some elements in its code that were not open source. After attracting 
a larger community of interest to the project, a Community Advisory Board 
(CAB) was created to direct it. The CAB served as a boundary organisation 
for negotiating boundaries between the OpenSolaris community and Sun. The 
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CAB was comprised of two Sun employees, two members who were elected by 
the broader community, and one member who was appointed by Sun from the 
broader free software community. In effect, most of the CAB members were 
connected with or appointed by Sun, and Sun made clear what its intentions 
were for the OpenSolaris project.
Sun’s strategy for the OpenSolaris project was to incorporate some of the 
developments from OpenSolaris into their proprietary Solaris operating sys-
tem. In turn, Sun could sell the proprietary version of Solaris to other enter-
prises. The money earned from sales of the Solaris project could then be used 
to support the developers and community involved in the OpenSolaris project. 
To facilitate this type of strategy, Sun protected OpenSolaris under a free soft-
ware license created by the company called the Common Development and 
Distribution License (CDDL). This license enabled Sun to include proprietary, 
free software, or software protected under any other license in their Solaris and 
OpenSolaris operating systems. Consequently, Sun could use the OpenSola-
ris community as a way to drive development, quality control, or innovation 
that could be included in their proprietary Solaris offering. Importantly, how-
ever, Sun made this strategy very clear to the OpenSolaris community and was 
supportive of the broader FLOSS community, which gave it a good reputation 
within the community. Once they acquired Sun, Oracle took a very different 
approach to this strategy.
After Oracle acquired Sun, they announced plans to discontinue the regular 
distribution and development model of OpenSolaris (Laishram, 2010). Instead, 
Oracle would focus its development strategy on a new proprietary version of 
Solaris called Solaris Express. In effect, the new strategy from Oracle would not 
allow the community of developers that supported OpenSolaris to continue 
their work. In response, the Community Advisory Board directing the Open-
Solaris project decided to fork the project. When a project is forked, develop-
ers take a copy of the source code and begin to develop it as a distinct form 
of software. The resulting fork of the OpenSolaris project is called OpenIndi-
ana, which was created to continue the development and distribution of the 
OpenSolaris project. Currently, Oracle still continues development on the pro-
prietary Solaris Express operating system, while the community of develop-
ers supporting OpenSolaris have left Oracle to work on the forked version of 
OpenSolaris called OpenIndiana.
In the case of the OpenSolaris operating system, Oracle’s strategy was simply 
to discontinue the open source project and focus development on a proprietary 
version of Solaris under the new name Solaris Express. This represents the most 
direct strategy for ending open development. Oracle announced that the open 
source project would be discontinued and, in response, the community had to 
fork the project to continue development under a new name. This also illus-
trates how a FLOSS community can also continue working on a project even 
after production on a corporate-sponsored project was abandoned. This is a 
94 Incorporating the Digital Commons
similar fate to that of MySQL and OpenOffice, but Oracle’s strategy for ending 
development took different forms in each case.
5.1.3. MySQL
In 2008, Sun Microsystems acquired MySQL AB for approximately $1 billion 
(PC World, 2008). At the time, MySQL was growing in the market for relational 
database management software (RDBMS), and Sun’s acquisition of MySQL 
would allow the company to compete directly with Oracle in that particular 
market. Only one year later, however, Oracle acquired Sun, and MySQL was one 
of the key properties that drew Oracle’s interest. Indeed, the Sun-Oracle merger 
was originally approved by regulators in the United States, but the European 
Union (EU) did not immediately approve the deal specifically because of con-
cerns that Oracle’s acquisition of the MySQL property would lead to an anti-
competitive market for RDBMS in Europe (Bloomberg, 2013). Consequently, 
the EU pressured Oracle to divest itself of the MySQL property as a condition 
for approval of the merger. As leaked documents provided to the whistleblow-
ing site WikiLeaks have since shown, the United States Department of Justice 
communicated directly with the European Commission’s Directorate General 
for Competition in support of the merger in October of 2009 (United States 
Mission to European Union, 2009). Less than three months later, in December 
of 2009, the merger was approved without the divestiture conditions sought by 
the EU.
MySQL relied on a dual licensing approach that was similar to the licens-
ing of OpenSolaris. The dual licence model for MySQL would allow the code 
base for MySQL to be protected by the GNU GPL copyleft licence, but propri-
etary versions could be created for enterprises that wanted customised instal-
lations. When the Sun-Oracle merger was approved, employees working for 
MySQL had reservations about Oracle’s intentions for the GPL-protected code 
base of MySQL. Most notable among them was Michael ‘Monty’ Widenius who 
authored the original version of MySQL and co-founded MySQL AB, which 
was the original owner of MySQL. Widenius later sold MySQL AB to Sun 
before Sun was acquired by Oracle. Widenius along with other MySQL devel-
opers were concerned that Oracle would try to discontinue MySQL or make 
it a closed-source program by using the same strategy it had with OpenSola-
ris. In response, Widenius urged MySQL users to ‘Help MySQL’ by starting an 
online petition. Leading up to the acquisition of Sun, however, Oracle pledged 
to keep the same licensing strategies in place that had been negotiated with cur-
rent customers for an additional five years (Whitney, 2009). That commitment 
expired in December of 2014.
Fuelled by the concerns about Oracle’s intentions for MySQL, the developers 
forked the project to create MariaDB.35 The code base for MariaDB is protected 
by the GNU GPL, and is designed to be a drop-in replacement for MySQL. 
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As a forked project of MySQL, MariaDB allows its community of developers 
and users to ensure that the code will continue to be protected by the GNU 
GPL regardless of what Oracle decides to do with MySQL. Furthermore, 
although MySQL remains dominant in the RDBMS market with an approxi-
mately 58% market share, MariaDB grew to claim approximately 18% of the 
market (Fydorenchyk, 2014). MariaDB has experienced increased growth in 
the database market in part because of some notable companies switching from 
MySQL to MariaDB, including Google and the Wikimedia Foundation.
MariaDB once again illustrates how the community of developers and users 
of open source software can protect their projects from unwanted corporate 
encroachment. In the case of MariaDB, the project has gained additional atten-
tion from some of Oracle’s competitors who have invested directly in it. Most 
notably, SkySQL recently invested nearly $20 million to support the growth of 
MariaDB. Backed by capital from Intel and from other venture capital firms, 
SkySQL is directed by some of the founding members of MySQL as well as 
former Sun executives who left the company after Oracle acquired the project. 
SkySQL announced a merger with The Monty Program AB, which is led by 
Monty Widenius, the original author of MySQL. The merger reunites the origi-
nal members of MySQL and transfers ownership of the MariaDB trademark to 
SkySQL. The resulting partnership will focus on developing MariaDB to com-
pete with MySQL.
Furthermore, both the Monty Program AB and SkySQL belong to the Mari-
aDB Foundation. The MariaDB Foundation is a non-stock, non-profit corpo-
ration, which was established to provide legal and technical support for the 
MariaDB project and to provide a platform for supporters to contribute money 
to the project. For example, the MariaDB Foundation sells corporate member-
ships ranging from $5,000 to $100,000. According to the Foundation’s web site, 
corporate memberships allow for the ‘best opportunity to influence the future 
and present a point of view’, although no further details are provided about 
exactly what that entails (MariaDB Foundation, 2018).
In sum, MariaDB represents another example of how FLOSS communities 
maintain the ability to protect their commons-based resource against unwanted 
corporate influence. In this case, however, Oracle’s strategy was not to dis-
continue the open source project, per se. Rather, Oracle’s acquisition of Sun 
allowed the company to gain a greater share of the RDBMS market, and Sun’s 
ownership of MySQL was one of the primary properties that attracted Oracle 
to acquire Sun. Although development of MySQL still continues under Oracle, 
many of the community members resigned from Sun, and Oracle’s commit-
ment to maintain the same licensing agreements for MySQL expired at the end 
of 2014. To resist what could ultimately have been a similar fate to that of Open-
Solaris, the MySQL community forked the project to develop MariaDB. In this 
case, Oracle seemed to violate the moral economy of the FLOSS community, 
but the community coped with that unwanted influence by forking the pro-
ject to continue development under better conditions. Again, this represents a 
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moment when the FLOSS community asserted a specific politics in protecting 
their working conditions; the community abandoned development on MySQL 
and moved to MariaDB. Furthermore, MariaDB has the additional benefit of 
having received investment capital from some of Oracle’s competitors, which 
ensures the survival of the project for at least the foreseeable future. By estab-
lishing the MariaDB Foundation, the community has a legally recognisable 
organisation to provide technical and legal support for the project, while also 
collecting additional donations to the project. In the third and final example 
provided in this chapter, I focus on a series of office productivity software that 
eventually led to another forked project.
5.1.4. StarOffice, OpenOffice, LibreOffice
During the dot-com bubble in the mid- to late-1990s, Sun Microsystems 
experienced dramatic growth that allowed the company to make some key 
acquisitions. In 1999, Sun acquired the German company, StarDivision which 
developed StarOffice. StarOffice was designed as proprietary office software 
featuring word processing, spreadsheet, presentation, drawing, database, and 
formula programs. When Sun acquired StarDivision, the company continued 
to develop StarOffice as proprietary software. However, Sun forked the project 
and relicensed the software so that the source code could be made open source 
under a free and open source licence. Once again, Sun’s strategy was to use 
the newly open-sourced software, known as OpenOffice, to develop new fea-
tures and fix bugs in the software. Then, the changes made to OpenOffice could 
be integrated into StarOffice, which contained certain proprietary elements. 
OpenOffice could continue to remain free to consumers, while Sun would try 
to monetise StarOffice by selling the software and services to customers who 
wanted the additional features. The upshot for Sun was the maintenance and 
support for essentially two different versions of the same software: OpenOffice 
1.0 was a forked version of StarOffice 6.0, and Sun maintained the legal rights to 
both properties, although they were protected by different licences.
The early versions of OpenOffice were protected by the Sun Industry Stand-
ards Source License (SISSL) and the GNU Lesser General Public License (GNU 
LGPL). Later versions were protected by an updated version of the LGPL after 
Sun discontinued the SISSL. The LGPL was chosen because it had less restric-
tive requirements for integrating free and open source software components 
into proprietary versions of the software. Although a full discussion of the dis-
tinctions between free and open source software licences is beyond the scope 
of this chapter, the basic differences between the GNU General Public License 
(GPL) and the GNU LGPL can be summarised quickly. The GPL requires that 
any modified or derivative software produced using GPL-protected software 
as its base must be redistributed under the same licensing requirements. This 
ensures that free software remains free software rather than being exploited 
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by commercial companies. The LGPL is a more permissive licence that allows 
free software elements to be incorporated into proprietary software. The only 
restriction on using LGPL-protected software is that the end-user must have 
the ability to modify the source code. By protecting OpenOffice in this way, 
Sun could ensure that developments in OpenOffice could be used in their pro-
prietary StarOffice.
Thus, the symbiotic relationship between StarOffice and OpenOffice contin-
ued under Sun because Sun was transparent about what its intentions were for 
the two properties. Importantly, however, OpenOffice was governed by a Com-
munity Council comprised primarily of members from the broader Open-
Office community but also including a Sun employee as well. The Community 
Council effectively served as a boundary organisation (O’Mahony and Bechky, 
2008) between the community and the corporation. The Sun member on the 
Community Council was responsible for communicating Sun’s intentions to 
the community. Once again, however, this relationship was strained when Ora-
cle acquired Sun in 2010.
Since Oracle had discontinued the OpenSolaris operating system, mem-
bers of the OpenOffice Community Council decided to create The Document 
Foundation and fork the OpenOffice project under the name LibreOffice until 
Oracle made its intentions clear for the OpenOffice project. Both The Docu-
ment Foundation and LibreOffice were established with the intention of being 
temporary projects until Oracle made its intentions clear. In the event that Ora-
cle ultimately decided to discontinue OpenOffice, however, the Community 
Council would be able to move development to the newly created LibreOf-
fice. Furthermore, The Document Foundation was established as a non-profit 
organisation to manage the LibreOffice project and promote the use of open 
source document software more broadly. The initial governance of The Docu-
ment Foundation was directed by a temporary steering council featuring some 
of the same members of the OpenOffice Community Council. Oracle viewed 
the Community Council members’ positions on two governing boards as a con-
flict of interest and asked members on the Community Council to step down 
from their positions (OpenOffice Community Council, 2010). This move effec-
tively ended community support for OpenOffice and the project was renamed 
Oracle OpenOffice. Oracle OpenOffice became the proprietary software offer-
ing from Oracle that was meant to replace Sun’s StarOffice.
While the official position of Oracle was to cite a conflict of interest, mem-
bers of the broader open source community viewed Oracle’s broader strategy 
as simply wanting to discontinue open source projects that existed under Sun 
because they did not provide any real value to the company. In effect, not only 
did the governance structure change under Oracle’s ownership, but Oracle also 
seemed to have violated the moral economy (Thompson, 1971) of the FLOSS 
community. In response to this, however, The Document Foundation contin-
ued its development of LibreOffice. Since LibreOffice had strong community 
support, LibreOffice essentially surpassed OpenOffice within one release. In 
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effect, all of the collective labour behind the development of OpenOffice aban-
doned the project but continued to work on LibreOffice. Because OpenOffice 
had been abandoned, Oracle announced that it would end development on 
the project entirely and fire the majority of OpenOffice developers. Ultimately, 
Oracle donated the code base for OpenOffice to The Apache Software Founda-
tion, which has resumed development on the project under the name Apache 
OpenOffice.
To summarise this somewhat confusing history of a software that has been 
forked numerous times, Figure 5.1 illustrates the development history of 
StarOffice, its transition to OpenOffice (OOo) under Sun, the dual develop-
ment of StarOffice (SO) alongside OpenOffice, the forks into LibreOffice (LO) 
and Oracle OpenOffice after Oracle acquired Sun in 2010, and the donation 
of OpenOffice back to The Apache Software Foundation to be developed as 
Apache OpenOffice (AOO). Figure 5.1 also includes additional forked projects 
that have not been discussed in this chapter, which include IBM Lotus Sym-
phony (Symphony) and Go Open Office (Go-oo). As illustrated in the figure, 
the developments offer examples of how the FLOSS community uses legal, 
technical, and governance strategies to protect their commons-based resources.
5.2. Protecting the Commons
Throughout this chapter, I have demonstrated how the FLOSS community 
maintains the ability to leverage its collective labour power against undue cor-
porate influence by employing technical, legal, and governance strategies to 
protect its commons-based resources. On the one hand, FLOSS has unique 
technical characteristics that allow it to be reproduced and distributed widely 
without any significant cost. This allows FLOSS projects to be forked so that 
development can occur collaboratively, simultaneously, and continuously 
throughout the life of the project. Although dispersed development occurs, 
however, the community employs certain governance strategies for effectively 
Figure 5.1: Major StarOffice Derivatives (image has been released to the public 
domain and is available from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StarOffice#/media/
File:StarOffice_major_derivatives.svg)
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coordinating development and protection of the project. These governance 
strategies include the establishment of non-profit organisations, which hold 
the intellectual properties for projects. These organisations provide a legally 
recognisable entity that can more effectively defend the intellectual property 
and licensing requirements of the project. Furthermore, more direct govern-
ance of the development project can occur through governing councils that are 
democratically elected or appointed by the community.
The legal strategies for defending FLOSS projects rely on alternative intellec-
tual property protections like copyleft or other free and open source software 
licences. These licences free the software from overly protective copyright and 
allow the community to fork the project in the event of undue corporate influ-
ence. On the other hand, corporations can also use licensing strategies to their 
benefit as well. In the case of Sun, the company used licensing that allowed 
for free and open source software development but that was less restrictive to 
the corporation. These licences allowed the company to incorporate some of 
the commons-based peer production of FLOSS projects into their proprietary 
offerings. This strategy was understood and accepted by the FLOSS commu-
nity because Sun was clear about its strategies but also because Sun supported 
FLOSS development projects. In a sense, then, licensing a project becomes a 
site of struggle, especially because a single project may contain code that is pro-
tected by different licences. These licences may have competing or conflicting 
terms that need to be resolved or the project becomes susceptible to intellec-
tual property litigation. As was the case during Oracle’s acquisition of Sun, the 
licences can be changed as a way to direct development toward different ends. 
Sun was transparent about its licensing strategies as a part of its broader com-
mercial strategies, while Oracle made either temporary commitments to use 
existing licensing strategies (e.g. MySQL) or sought to change those licensing 
requirements altogether (e.g. OpenSolaris).
However, the dynamics that exist between FLOSS communities and corpora-
tions are comprised of a combination of technical, legal, and governance strate-
gies. The particular forms that these strategies take will vary depending on the 
individual project, but the FLOSS community’s ability to defend its commons-
based resources depends, in part, on a shared consciousness of what is permis-
sible within the community. In a sense, this shared consciousness constitutes 
a sort of moral economy (Thompson, 1971). The FLOSS community leverages 
its collective labour power against corporate power by protecting its commons-
based resources. When a corporation infringes on the moral economy of the 
community, the community rebels by forking the project and abandoning the 
project that has been overly influenced by the corporation. This moral econ-
omy has foundations in the shared ideals of peer-to-peer relationship building, 
collaborative development, transparency, and community.
Even though the FLOSS community maintains the ability to leverage its 
power against undue corporate influence, community members are still in a 
somewhat precarious position as digital labourers. One definition of success 
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in open source projects is to receive backing from a company, which at least 
ensures the project’s survival if not its overall attractiveness. However, the 
FLOSS community depends on keeping projects protected under free soft-
ware licences, albeit of many different types, so that the community maintains 
the ability to keep the code for the program open. This is particularly true in 
cases where hybrid models of proprietary and free software are used in FLOSS 
projects. Throughout this paper, I have demonstrated how such struggles can 
occur, particularly after corporate mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers.
In the face of growing corporate involvement in FLOSS projects, the broader 
FLOSS community must maintain its ability to protect its commons-based 
resources. At the same time, however, the protection of these resources depends, 
at least in part, on a shared collective understanding of how the community can 
leverage its collective labour power against increasing corporate involvement. 
The lessons to be learned from Oracle’s acquisition of Sun Microsystems need 
to remain salient if similar strategies are to be effective. Most important, how-
ever, is the recognition that the struggles taking place within the FLOSS com-
munity are just one part of a broader social struggle. As Christian Fuchs (2008) 
has observed, commons-based production is not truly possible until we have 
a commons-based society. Until that time, commons-based movements like 
FLOSS will be subjected to increasing corporate encroachment that threatens 
to abate, assimilate, or altogether annihilate progress toward alternative eco-
nomic configurations.
Notes
 33 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Benjamin Birkinbine 2016b. 
Conflict in the Commons: Toward a Political Economy of Corporate 
Involvement in Free and Open Source Software. The Political Economy of 
Communication 2(2): 3–19.
 34 Unless otherwise noted, all of this information was derived from Oracle’s 
annual filings (Form 10-K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) of the United States, which is available here: https://investor.oracle.
com/financial-reporting/sec-filings/default.aspx (last accessed 2 January 
2019)
 35 MariaDB is just one fork of the MySQL project. Percona Server is another 
that is still actively developed as of the time of writing.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion: From Capital to Commoning
‘...the new technology is itself a product of a particular social system, and 
will be developed as an apparently autonomous process of innovation only 
to the extent that we fail to identify and challenge its real agencies. But it is 
not only a question of identity and defence. There are contradictory factors, 
in the whole social development, that may make it possible to use some or all 
of the new technology for purposes quite different from those of the existing 
social order: certainly locally and perhaps more generally. The choices and 
uses actually made will in any case be part of a more general process of social 
development, social growth and social struggle.’
(Williams, 1975: 135–136)
The quote from Raymond Williams above emphasises the contradictions 
inherent in the ways in which new technologies are put to use. On the one 
hand, new technological developments may usher in a period of optimism or 
utopian thinking when assessing the potential uses of the technology. On the 
other hand, new technologies are also susceptible to co-optation by existing 
power structures. In this sense, all technology is dialectically situated within ‘a 
general process of social development, social growth, and social struggle.’ The 
goal of this struggle, especially for those interested in finding alternatives to 
the prevailing system, is to find ways of changing existing power structures to 
advance the cause of human dignity, mutual aid, trust, and conviviality.
The purpose of this book was to demonstrate how one such technology – 
free and open source software – is dialectically situated between the commons 
and capital. To illuminate the ways in which these forces struggle over free and 
open source software, my task was to ‘identify and challenge’ the ‘real agen-
cies’ of free and open source software as commons under capitalism. In doing 
so, I identified the specific ways in which capital incorporated the forces of 
commons-based peer production into capitalist enterprises, the motivations 
for doing so, and the ways in which communities of free and open source 
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software developers cope with unwanted interference in their projects. Moreo-
ver, I approached this study historically, paying close attention to the historical 
forces that enabled both the rise of commons-based peer production as well as 
the incorporation of those forces into capitalist production. In this conclud-
ing chapter, I summarise some of the main findings from the case studies and 
reflect on their significance for advancing the commons under capitalism.
6.1. Major Findings
This study complicates and extends theorisations of commons-based peer pro-
duction by investigating sites where the idealism of FLOSS production meets with 
the material realities of capitalism. These contested sites make up the case studies 
in this research project, for they are where commons-based peer production has 
been incorporated into the corporate structures of capitalist firms. By employing 
a critical political economic approach, this study focused on the power relations 
that exist between corporations that rely on capitalist, market-driven production, 
and the broader FLOSS communities that rely on non-market, commons-based 
peer production. An important part of this focus was to position the commons 
and capitalism as operating according to different systems of value. At times, 
these two systems are capable of working together by coupling through the com-
modity form. The processes of commodification were demonstrated in those case 
studies that illustrated how FLOSS projects have been incorporated into com-
mercial offerings. However, at other times, these systems diverge, which can lead 
to an antagonistic relationship between capital and the commons.
In previous literature, major projects like the Linux kernel or Wikipedia have 
been lauded as examples of effective and productive commons-based peer pro-
duction (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 2006; Weber, 2004). Significantly less studied, 
however, is how capitalist firms can use commons-based peer production to 
supplement their commercial offerings. The case studies for this project, par-
ticularly the discussion of Red Hat and Sun Microsystems, provided an in-depth 
look at how capitalist firms rely on the innovations and bug fixes from within 
the FLOSS community for implementation in their commercial products. That 
said, however, these case studies should not necessarily be viewed as generalisa-
ble across all FLOSS projects. The broader ecosystem of FLOSS projects features 
certain projects that are completely supported by their community of develop-
ers and do not rely on investment or sponsorship from corporate firms.
By selecting cases in which capitalist firms are incorporating commons-
based peer production, this study was able to yield a novel insight into how 
intellectual property is used both within the FLOSS community and corpora-
tions. Specifically, the case of Red Hat demonstrated how a firm is able to profit 
from intellectual property that is covered by the GPL and, therefore, not ame-
nable to enclosure by traditional copyright. Because Red Hat cannot exclude 
others from using its source code by relying on copyright, the company uses its 
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trademarks to prohibit competitors from making a direct use of its products. 
However, Red Hat’s trademarks cannot prevent someone from using the under-
lying source code, which is protected by copyleft. Indeed, this was the case with 
CentOS, which was designed as a functionally equivalent operating system to 
that offered by Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Red Hat’s core commercial prod-
uct. Similarly, Red Hat controls the types of licences that can be included in its 
Fedora Project, which is the FLOSS project that generates the code included 
in its commercial offerings. The ways in which Red Hat controls the intellec-
tual property included in its commercial offerings complicates the claims made 
about the productive autonomy within FLOSS communities.
In the vast majority of work on FLOSS, one of the defining features of its 
novelty is often traced back to its protection under more permissive copyright 
licences, or copyleft licences (Lessig, 2001; Stallman, 2002; Benkler, 2006). In 
addition, the software industry has been broadly plagued by a surge in patent 
infringement claims. However, the issue of trademark is an often-overlooked 
feature of software development. Red Hat uses trademark protections to cir-
cumvent the permissive nature of the GPL and the other licences that do not 
allow it to claim exclusive ownership of the code used in its core products. 
Although Red Hat is just one example and, perhaps, an exceptional one, the 
case serves as a contradictory example to the overarching claims made about 
the degrees of freedom, democracy, and autonomy within FLOSS production.
Further complicating these claims are the often-overlooked Contributor 
Licensing Agreements within FLOSS production, particularly when a project 
has a corporate or other institutional sponsor. While these agreements are not 
uniform across all FLOSS projects, the organisations that issue them rely on 
these agreements to maintain control over their projects. However, control is 
achieved in at least a couple of different ways. The CLAs may ask contributors 
to surrender the rights to their submissions so that the organisation can defend 
itself from intellectual property claims. Similarly, the CLAs may be used to con-
trol the types of licences that are allowed into the code base. This was seen in 
the Red Hat case study, whereby Red Hat wanted to guarantee to its customers 
that they would not be in danger of intellectual property infringement suits. 
A common theme running throughout the Red Hat chapter was the extent to 
which copyright separates authorship from ownership. In this sense, the cur-
rent project contributes to this critical understanding of copyright by demon-
strating how FLOSS labourers are forced to abandon claims to ownership of 
their work in order to contribute directly to certain FLOSS projects.
6.2. Case Studies
Each of the case studies presented here provides lessons for understanding the 
relationship between capitalism and the commons. The cases chosen were pur-
posely selected because of their prominence within both corporate and FLOSS 
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communities. Red Hat, Microsoft, and Oracle represent some of the largest and 
most publicly visible software companies in the world. This is primarily the rea-
son for selecting these companies, but also means that the findings from each 
case study may not be applicable to a broader range of corporations or FLOSS 
projects. Furthermore, not all FLOSS projects have corporate sponsors. In this 
sense, the study provides a snapshot of the ways in which corporations incor-
porate the FLOSS commons. When considered together, however, these case 
studies illuminate some of the general dynamics occurring at the intersection 
of corporations and the commons. In what follows, I discuss the more specific 
implications of each case study for understanding this phenomenon.
6.2.1. Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft has a long history of opposition to FLOSS. This stance began as early 
as 1976 when Bill Gates authored the ‘Open Letter to Hobbyists’, in which he 
railed against the culture of sharing software within the community. He argued 
that this practice harmed the ability of others to produce software and be com-
pensated for their work. However, this stance contradicts some of Microsoft’s 
own history, as it relied on others’ designs to produce some of its most suc-
cessful software. This was particularly the case for the MS-DOS operating sys-
tem and the graphical user interface of Windows, which were built on top of 
previously existing technologies developed in Gary Kildall’s CP/M operating 
system and Apple’s graphical user interface. Both of these technologies were 
instrumental to Microsoft’s success throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially 
when paired with its strategic partnerships with IBM and other OEMs, which 
allowed the company to gain widespread adoption of its software. The same 
can be said of its Internet Explorer web browser, which the company packaged 
with distribution of its Windows operating system. This practice ensured that 
the company’s web browser would win the first of the Browser Wars, but it also 
was one of the primary business practices that led to its conviction for antitrust 
violations by the Department of Justice.
Microsoft’s ascent to the top of the personal computer software market cul-
minated around the same time that it was being investigated for antitrust viola-
tions. When the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its decree in 
2001, Microsoft was forced to divest its operating system and applications oper-
ations. However, after the original District Court judge recused himself from 
the case after making some public comments that gave the impression of bias 
against Microsoft, the subsequent judge no longer sought divestment. Rather, 
Microsoft needed to agree to a series of consent decrees that were designed to 
prevent the type of predatory and non-competitive behaviours that led to its 
conviction. The consent decrees were intended to last for five years, but they 
were renewed twice and finally came to an end in 2011. However, the decrees 
did little to affect Microsoft’s economic performance, as the company’s annual 
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revenues and profits continued to climb in the wake of the DOJ’s decision. Nev-
ertheless, as argued in Chapter 3, the antitrust suit marks a major historical 
moment both for Microsoft and the software industry more generally. Most 
notably, the antitrust suit forced Microsoft to make its APIs more openly avail-
able to other developers so they could design software that could interact with 
Microsoft’s technologies. The antitrust decision also coincided with the burst-
ing of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the emergence of Linux as a commercially 
viable business model, and the emergence of the so-called Web 2.0 era, which 
shifted the business focus of many high-tech companies during that period.
The antitrust conviction also signalled to Microsoft that it needed to find new 
ways of doing business. Because Linux was becoming more widespread, Micro-
soft could no longer take an antagonistic stance toward open source. Instead, 
it needed to find ways to ensure that its products could function on devices 
that use Linux. To facilitate greater interoperability between Microsoft and 
non-Microsoft technologies, Microsoft expanded its Shared Source program 
and, in 2012, opened an entire division of the company dedicated to promoting 
and supporting open source, open standards, and open platforms. The trend 
toward embracing open source software continued even after Microsoft closed 
its Microsoft Open Technologies division, as the company now claims that it is 
unnecessary to have a separate division devoted to open source. Rather, they 
argue that open source has become instrumental to everything they do. Indeed, 
Microsoft also purchased GitHub, the world’s leading software development 
platform, which is used primarily to host open source software projects. This 
shift in Microsoft’s stance toward open source is indicative of the fact that 
FLOSS, by many measures, has proven to be an effective and commercially 
viable production model. The shift in supporting open source projects suggests 
that Microsoft is trying to accomplish two primary goals: harnessing the power 
of commons-based peer production to supplement its own commercial goals as 
well as promoting interoperability between its technologies and other systems.
The Microsoft case study is indicative of a company undergoing a transfor-
mation in its stance toward FLOSS. In part, this shift was driven by the antitrust 
conviction in 2001, but the leaked Halloween Documents suggest that the com-
pany was already concerned with the FLOSS phenomenon and how to combat 
it in 1998. Perhaps not coincidentally, this is the same year that the antitrust 
investigation began. The Microsoft case study is useful for understanding the 
relationship between FLOSS and corporations because of Microsoft’s domi-
nance of the software market. As such, it is instructive to trace its history of 
software development, especially since the company spans both the ‘Web 1.0’ 
and ‘Web 2.0’ eras. During this time, its business practices and overall strategy 
shifted to take advantage of the emerging threat of FLOSS development. The 
company sought ways to incorporate the commons into its existing business 
operations in part because of the antitrust convictions but also because FLOSS 
development was proving to be a successful competitor to the company’s own 
development practices.
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6.2.2. Red Hat, Inc.
In the case of Red Hat, which still maintains a relatively good relationship with 
the FLOSS community, the company was able to harness (which is to say, cen-
tralise) the collective labour power of the FLOSS community and transform it 
into a profitable business strategy. Red Hat was created with the intention of 
providing a formalised institution that could bring the power of free software 
to the market. However, since the underlying source code for free software was 
protected by the GNU General Public License (GPL), Red Hat was unable to 
rely on using copyright protection to exclude others from providing similar 
software and services. As a result, the company began offering customised ver-
sions of free software that could be packaged and protected under the Red Hat 
corporate logo. As such, the company’s products could be protected by trade-
mark. The software that the company provides, then, is protected by the Red 
Hat trademark, and the company sells customised subscriptions for its soft-
ware and services. However, Red Hat still needed a way to protect its custom-
ers against potential intellectual property infringement claims. Consequently, 
the company needed a way to control the types of licences allowed in its soft-
ware offerings. To accomplish this, Red Hat first required all contributors to its 
software to sign an Individual Contributor License Agreement (ICLA), which 
would assign the rights to protect the code to the company. The ICLA later 
changed to the Fedora Project Contributor Agreement (FPCA), which served 
as a mechanism to control the range of possible licences that could be included 
in contributions to its Fedora project. Nonetheless, the consequence of control-
ling the commons was the same.
From one point of view, Red Hat might be viewed as a pragmatic solution 
to the problem of organising commons-based peer production so that it can 
become conducive to the establishment of a capitalist enterprise. In effect, Red 
Hat serves as a formal organisation that can accept liability for the products 
and services it provides to other businesses. In other words, the problem of 
organising commons-based peer production under capitalism was solved by 
establishing a legally recognisable and formal institution that serves as a media-
tor between corporations and the commons. To accomplish this, however, Red 
Hat needed to find a way to control what types of code – or at least the types 
of intellectual property licences – were included in its software so that it could 
protect itself and its clients against intellectual property infringement claims.
In this sense, Red Hat functions as a curator of the commons. Just as a curator 
is responsible for collecting, organising, and interpreting artefacts for the pur-
pose of public display, Red Hat performs a similar function for its subscribers. 
In each case, the curator charges a fee to the public for entrance to a purpose-
fully organised and constructed display of artefacts that has been interpreted 
in a particular way. The key difference, however, is that Red Hat does not rely 
on the collection of artefacts exactly as they existed previously. Rather, Red Hat 
relies on commons-based peer production from its FLOSS project, Fedora, for 
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inclusion into its customised distributions of Red Hat Enterprise Linux. More-
over, the contributions to Fedora are controlled by worker agreements that all 
contributors to the Fedora Project must sign. Importantly, however, because 
Red Hat is transparent about its intentions, the company has been able to enjoy 
a relatively good relationship with the broader FLOSS community throughout 
its history.
Whereas Red Hat is situated as a mediator between corporations and the 
commons of free software production, the Fedora Project Board also serves as a 
boundary organisation (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008) between the community 
of programmers who contribute to the Fedora Project and Red Hat. As such, 
it is here where the boundaries between Red Hat and the Fedora Project com-
munity are negotiated. Similar organisations exist in other FLOSS projects and 
serve as a useful mechanism for negotiating the boundaries between capital 
and the commons. Through these processes, as well as the mechanisms used 
by Red Hat to use FLOSS production as part of its business model, the Red Hat 
case study represents the ways in which the value of FLOSS production can 
move from the commons to capital.
6.2.3. Oracle’s Acquisition of Sun Microsystems
The third case study, Oracle’s acquisition of Sun Microsystems, most directly 
addresses the question of what happens when a corporation exerts unwanted 
influence on a FLOSS project as well as how a FLOSS community can cope with 
the unwanted influence. The chapter illustrated how the FLOSS community 
has coped with undue corporate influence into its projects by focusing on three 
different FLOSS projects that were supported by Sun Microsystems prior to its 
acquisition by Oracle: the OpenSolaris operating system, the MySQL relational 
database management system, and the OpenOffice office productivity suite of 
software. What becomes clear from the case study is that FLOSS projects may 
not be able to avoid corporate influence altogether, especially when those pro-
jects are sponsored or supported by a particular company. However, given the 
nature of FLOSS code, the FLOSS community maintains the ability to abandon 
production on a particular FLOSS project by forking the project and continu-
ing development under a new name. This is precisely what happened in each of 
the three cases discussed in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, the case study also provides evidence that FLOSS projects are 
not immune from the corporate manoeuvering – acquisitions, integration, 
takeovers, buyouts etc. – that is commonplace in a capitalist system. That is, 
although the projects may find a corporation willing to provide support through 
sponsorship, financing, or partnerships, those relations can become strained in 
the wake of an acquisition in which the acquiring company is unwilling to pro-
vide the same level of support as the previous company. If this is the case, the 
community of developers who contribute to the FLOSS project have technical, 
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legal, and governance strategies at their disposal to resist undue corporate influ-
ence in the project. Technically, code can be reproduced ad infinitum without 
any substantial reinvestment costs. Legally, most code that is used in FLOSS 
projects is protected by permissive licences that allow the community to fork 
their project and begin development under a new name. Coinciding with the 
process of forking the project is the transitioning of the governing board mem-
bers to oversee the new project.
The Oracle Corporation’s acquisition of Sun Microsystems illustrates how the 
power dynamics existing between FLOSS communities and the corporations that 
rely on their projects are complex and varied. While the community still retains 
the power to abandon production on a project in the face of undue corporate 
influence, this still places the community in a precarious position with respect to 
the long-term survivability of their projects. The community retains the ability to 
fork the project and begin new development, but it cannot rely on the same level 
of support it received from its corporate sponsor unless it can find new investors. 
For instance, the OpenIndiana, MariaDB, and LibreOffice projects were able to 
find additional investment capital, although to varying degrees. In other words, 
the ability to fork a project is just one step in assuring productive autonomy. 
However, the productive autonomy of those who contribute to projects that are 
sponsored by other organisations may always be at risk of undue influence. In 
those situations, the community can take steps to try to reduce such influence.
6.3. On the Benefit of the Commons Paradigm
In extrapolating from the lessons learned in these three case studies, we can also 
draw some lessons for the commons more generally, especially the commons 
paradigm that has been used to understand FLOSS production and reproduc-
tion. The benefits of the commons paradigm can be summarised in three differ-
ent ways that are all interconnected. The commons paradigm is simultaneously 
universal, adaptable, and teleological.
It is universal in the sense that it establishes a framework for understand-
ing how collective resources ought to be governed to ensure their survival 
and reproduction over time. This framework can be used by any commons-
based movement regardless of the unique conditions within any local context. 
Indeed, various commons movements can learn from what other commons-
based movements are doing, then make a decision as to whether such a change 
should be implemented within their own governance structures.
In this sense, the commons framework is also adaptable in that it provides 
a flexible framework that can be applied across a variety of social struggles. 
In other words, it is not normative in that it does not posit only one way of 
accomplishing collective governance. This is perhaps why it has found currency 
within autonomist Marxism. The autonomous approach focuses on workers’ 
ability to define themselves independently from capital, while focusing on the 
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different strategies for resistance that are possible in all aspects of social life. 
The specific dynamics of each community’s struggle, however, are determined 
by a couple of different factors. First, these struggles are confronted with local, 
national, regional, international, or global forces that shape the institutional 
or  political–economic arrangements within which each community is situated. 
These forces are not mutually exclusive categories; rather, the struggles may be 
shaped by some combination of these broader forces. Second, these struggles 
are also shaped by the unique historical, social, and cultural dynamics of each 
community. Within FLOSS production, the primary concern is creative auton-
omy, but other communities connect the survival of commons-based resources 
with the survival of an entire way of living within ecological contexts. Regard-
less of the particular struggle, commons-based movements generally want to 
preserve their shared resources from exploitation or destruction.
Finally, the commons paradigm is teleological in that it helps us imagine a 
post-capitalist future that is on the horizon. As was discussed in Chapter 2, 
commons movements and the activity of commoning can be understood as 
‘ways of becoming,’ denoting a process by which social change is possible. As 
such, they serve the purpose of demonstrating the ways in which an alternative 
future is possible. Commons movements rely on the shared values of mutual 
aid, trust, conviviality, cooperation, and solidarity. Moreover, these values are 
also intertwined with the complex histories, cultures, and ecologies of the 
communities within which they are situated. These values are antithetical to 
capitalism, which values profit maximisation, self-interest, and competition. 
The question remains, however, as to how we can continue to build commons-
based movements, as well as linking them together so their collective power no 
longer remains fragmented.
6.4. Political Organisation from Below
There is a contradiction that exists today for organising political resistance.36 
On the one hand, the spread of digital technologies has assisted diverse and 
fragmented publics in linking with others to form networked communities of 
interest. Such communities, like those involved in free software projects, rely 
on inputs from a distributed community of contributors who can collabora-
tively produce goods, services, or create new meanings for cultural texts. On 
the other hand, these communities continue to operate from within existing 
institutions, which operate according to liberal-democratic logics. These net-
worked publics have challenged previously held assumptions.37 As just two 
examples of this, consider the challenge to assumptions about ownership (i.e. 
the rise of copyleft licences to challenge traditional copyright protection), and 
to production bounded to a specific nation-state and its regulatory policies (i.e. 
globalised commodity supply chains and the question of whether a product is 
‘Made in the USA’ or any other single country).
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This raises the question of what organisational form political resistance 
should take from within this context. On the one hand, we want to preserve the 
relative autonomy of local communities to organise in ways that make the most 
sense for the community. On the other hand, we are confronted with exist-
ing institutions that require the coordination of diverse movements to effect 
change within those institutions. As it concerns the digital commons, Dulong 
de Rosnay and Musiani (2016) have developed a typology of centralised ver-
sus decentralised peer production that is instructive here. The typology can be 
seen below in Table 6.1. The goal for the digital commons would be to move 
increasingly toward the decentralised models presented in the table. Doing so 
would allow local communities to respond to unique needs and simultaneously 
preserve the highest degree of autonomy for the community.
DuLong de Rosnay and Musiani (2016) are not the only scholars wrestling 
with how to advance decentralised peer production forward to mount a chal-
lenge to capitalism. One such debate took place in a series of articles pub-
lished in tripleC: Communication, Capitalism, and Critique in 2014. The debate 
stemmed from a proposal made by Bauwens and Kostakis (2014). Noting the 
contradictions of commons-based peer production being co-opted by capital-
ist firms, as well as the growing co-operative movement and worker-owned 
enterprises, Bauwens and Kostakis (2014) propose a convergence that they call 
‘open co-operativism’ that would ‘combine Commons-oriented open peer pro-
duction models with common ownership and governance models such as those 
of the co-operatives and the solidarity economic models’ (356). To facilitate 
such a movement, the authors suggest the creation of an alternative intellec-
tual property licence that would require reciprocity to benefit the commons. 
They frame this as a shift from a ‘communist’ licence like the GNU General 
Public License (GPL), which allows anyone – including capitalist firms – to use 
the commons-based resource, toward a ‘socialist’ commons-based reciprocal 
licence which, they argue, is exemplified by the Peer Production License (PPL) 
as proposed by Kleiner (2010). Such a licence would allow for commercial use 
Table 6.1: Centralised Versus Decentralised Peer Production (Dulong de Rosnay 
and Musiani, 2016: 196).
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of the licenced resource, but would require reciprocity to the community. This 
means that licensing fees would be charged to for-profit companies that use the 
resource. This, then, would allow the community to establish a co-operative, 
which could receive the licensing fees as income that could then be used to 
maintain the commons. In effect, the goal is for the community to retain the 
surplus value of their production. The authors further argue that the goal of this 
project is to transform the mode of production toward the commons. Further-
more, they claim that without such a transition commons-based peer produc-
tion ‘would remain a parasitic modality dependent on the self-reproduction 
through capital’ (Bauwens and Kostakis, 2014: 360).
Meretz (2014) critiqued Bauwens and Kostakis’s proposal on a couple of 
fronts. First, Meretz critiques the ‘logic of exclusion’ embedded within the pro-
posal for licensing. He argues that free software is not a commodity; it can 
be appropriated and used by everyone, but the GPL prevents its transforma-
tion into a commodity. Second, he critiques the authors’ use of ‘reciprocity’ 
by claiming that licences are never reciprocal. Rather, licences grant or deny 
access or use. Reciprocity must involve people who are reciprocal in a social 
relationship.
Meretz’s own view is that social transformation is not possible by building 
a counter-economy for progressive social movements. In his words, ‘it is not 
possible to out-compete capitalism … to be better than capitalism on its own 
terrain in order to finally get rid of it’ (Meretz, 2014: 364). Rather, we need a 
new social logic of producing our livelihood, which will not be built upon exist-
ing logics of exclusion that mark commodity production. Indeed, capitalism 
must constantly open up spaces for new logics to emerge so that they can be 
exploited. In the end, Meretz views the proposal for a new socialist licence 
as a mechanism for accessing the economy rather than a means for societal 
transformation.
Rigi (2014) offers his own views on these proposals by revisiting some foun-
dational concepts from Marx’s work (i.e. value, profit, surplus value, and rent), 
then demonstrating how Bauwens and Kostakis fall short in their application of 
these concepts. His point is not to impose Marx’s own views on Bauwens and 
Kostakis, but rather to suggest that they offer concrete definitions for how they 
use these terms, which would aid in the development of a theory. In addition, 
Rigi agrees with Meretz’s claim that further engagement in the market economy 
on behalf of peer production communities would only lead to those practices 
being assimilated into capitalism. However, he also critiques Meretz for under-
estimating the communist nature of the GPL. Rigi’s point is that the GPL already 
requires reciprocity by stipulating that any derivative work produced with GPL-
licenced code must also be made available under the same licence. In this regard, 
Rigi argues that the GPL abolishes knowledge rent, as there is no ‘owner’ of the 
commons who can charge rent for using the commons. Furthermore, Rigi points 
to companies like IBM who decided to release their proprietary code to the com-
mons so that it could be integrated with Linux. In so doing, the scope of available 
commons-based code expanded through the specific mechanism of the GPL.
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In the final section of his article, Rigi (2014) outlines his own vision for how 
radical social transformation is possible. His goal is to examine how it would be 
possible to use the principles and lessons from the production of digital com-
mons to revolutionise material production. Rigi identifies two fundamental 
problems that must be overcome for this to be possible: territorialisation and 
automation. First, the production of Linux can occur regardless of geographic 
location, and contributions to the digital commons can be shared easily across 
space in very little time. This is because anyone with access to a computer (and 
the necessary coding skills) is able to contribute to Linux or another FLOSS 
project. The same cannot be said of material production. Noting both the 
transportation and ecological costs associated with moving material produc-
tion across space, Rigi concludes that any attempt at applying commons-based 
peer production to material production must be geographically bounded so 
that the production site is in close proximity to the consumption site. Second, 
material production is increasingly automated, and the human contribution in 
this sphere is increasingly relegated to science, design, and software. Therefore, 
‘a combination of a Linux mode of cooperation with automation will general-
ise peer production to all branches of production’ (Rigi, 2014: 400). However, 
certain spheres of social life will remain untouched by automation: symbolic 
activities (like artistic expression, knowledge, etc.), and care for humans and 
nature (education, ensuring ecological survival, etc.). Rigi concludes his article 
with some speculative proposals for how we might bring about some of these 
changes by specifically arguing for something he calls ‘revolutionary peer pro-
ducing cooperatives’. I will revisit this proposal later in the conclusion, as it 
dovetails nicely with some of my own proposals.
In the meantime, however, one can begin to imagine how a set of diverse and 
distributed communities could begin to implement practices associated with 
commons-based peer production. Indeed, we have already seen examples of 
this around the world, but these communities still need to be linked through 
common interests to mount a significant challenge to existing institutions. This 
is where De Angelis’s (2017) use of ‘boundary commoning’ becomes useful. In 
this final section, I outline how a commons praxis might overcome these two 
difficulties. First, I discuss the problem of organisational form by building upon 
lessons from recent critical scholarship. Second, I discuss ‘subversive common-
ing’, which would address the need for a progressive political project for mov-
ing the commons forward.
6.5. Boundary Commoning
De Angelis’s (2017) formulation of circuits of commons value, which was dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 2, provides a useful analytical tool for understand-
ing how value is produced and reproduced by commons-based movements. 
However, these movements still intersect with capital accumulation circuits in 
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the course of their commoning activities. Therefore, the coupling of commons 
circuits of value with capital accumulation circuits, whether willingly or out of 
necessity, still does not overcome many of the contradictions of the commons. 
De Angelis’s formulation, then, seems to leave us with a picture of a ‘long social 
revolution’, which would proceed primarily through the autonomous develop-
ment of an emergent alternative value system from within capitalism. Such a 
value system would privilege commons value rather than capital accumulation. 
But there is another element in De Angelis’s work that he draws from systems 
theory and cellular biology, which seems to contain the possibility of linking 
diverse commons movements. That is the concept of ‘boundary commoning’, 
which is defined as:
the commoning that exists at the boundaries of the commons systems 
and that creates social forms of any scale, opens up the boundaries, es-
tablishes connections, and sustains commons ecologies, or that could 
reshape existing institutions from the ground up through commonalisa-
tion and create new ones. (De Angelis 2017: 24)
Boundary commoning has the potential to provide an organisational model for 
how diverse and distributed commons-based movements can work together 
toward a common goal. Through the multiplication of commoning activity and 
the interweaving of commons-based communities through boundary com-
moning, a commons movement could potentially lead to a tipping point at 
which social transformation is possible. In addition, De Angelis claims that 
commons movements could link with social movements to form a hybrid 
movement with the combined power to bring about social revolution. As he 
explains, these ‘are not movements of fragmented subjectivities sharing a par-
ticular passion, but movements of connected subjectivities whose connection 
is further increased by their social movement’ (Ibid., 387). Therefore, bound-
ary commoning allows specific communities to retain their autonomy, while 
also linking with other organisations through common interests. While simi-
lar organisational structures have been used in the past – namely, the feder-
ated approach taken by Indymedia (see Pickard, 2006) – the commons offer a 
framework that is widely applicable and capable of linking diverse movements 
under a common framework. Importantly, however, such a movement ought to 
be based on an antagonistic understanding of the commons’ relation to capital-
ism. In short, we continue to need a form of commons praxis for advancing the 
cause of the commons.
6.6. Commons Praxis
The task for a commons-based praxis is to overcome at least two hurdles. 
First is the task of determining an organisational form that would incorporate 
114 Incorporating the Digital Commons
the lessons of critical scholarship on the commons. Critical scholarship has 
exposed some of the limitations of liberal-democratic or reformist approaches 
that seek to transition to a commons-based society from within existing 
institutions. While this is undoubtedly necessary to bring about change, we 
are still left with the limitation of radically transforming the organisation of 
society and social relations from within existing institutions, which are based 
on hierarchical organisational structures that tend to privilege political and 
economic elites with the requisite capital necessary to exercise influence by 
shaping policy agendas. These institutions cannot account for the multitude 
of distributed, diverse, and unique needs of local communities, and yet their 
existence will continue unless commons-based movements provide alterna-
tives. This problem has become even more acute now that local publics can 
network with other communities of interest across national and international 
geographic boundaries. Second, a commons praxis needs to overcome the 
persistent problem of growing and sustaining commons-based movements 
over time. In this sense, a commons praxis needs to move beyond a politics of 
subsistence and institute a more progressive politics that would actively seek 
to grow the commonwealth available to commoners. I refer to this political 
project as ‘subversive commoning’.
6.6.1. Subversive Commoning
The unique characteristics of the digital commons – low rivalry and low exclud-
ability – make it possible for the products of peer production to be appropri-
ated by the state and capital. Similar arguments have been made within critical 
scholarship on the commons, more generally. Indeed, this book demonstrated 
how capital incorporates FLOSS production into commercial offerings in vari-
ous ways. To actively promote the growth of both the subjective and objective 
qualities of the commons, commons-based movements will actively need to 
work to subvert capital logics by positioning their activities in an antagonistic 
relationship to capital.
By seeking reformist agendas from within existing institutions, such move-
ments risk remaining small-scale, fragmented, and only capable of temporary 
subsistence rather than formulating a coordinated alternative to prevailing log-
ics. Therefore, commons-based movements need to move beyond a politics of 
provision (based on the granting of individual rights, open access, etc.). Such 
a politics would not only provide rights of access to community members, but 
the sources of their commonwealth would also continue to be susceptible to 
capital and state appropriation. To be sure, the inroads made by movements 
informed by liberal–democratic political economy have led to the widespread 
adoption of particular commons-based resources (see especially Linux and the 
technologies of free and open source software). But insofar as these resources 
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are available to capital, they only exacerbate or accelerate the inequities involved 
in circuits of capital accumulation.
One of the most well-developed proposals for reforming existing institutions 
to bring about a commons-based society comes from the P2P Foundation 
(2019) and its Commons Transition Plan. The plan outlines policy prescriptions 
toward a commons-based society where citizens are treated as commoners. As 
I have outlined throughout this paper, however, the dilemma of how to ensure 
that the value created by commons-based movements remains within the com-
mons persists. Bauwens and Niaros (2017) explore this dilemma through an 
analysis of value within the commons economy. The authors argue that eco-
nomic theory is experiencing a ‘value crisis’ in light of the emergent practices 
of commons-based communities. They argue that whereas value within capi-
talism is extractive, a shift to a generative value model would enrich the com-
munities and resources directly involved in production. The open cooperative 
and platform cooperative (Scholz, 2014) are organisational forms that have 
been developed as a means for directly enriching those involved in produc-
tion. However, the specific tactics used by open cooperatives to ensure that the 
value created by their contributors stays within the commons varies. Bauwens 
and Niaros (2017) provide case studies that illustrate these differences. Most 
important for the purpose of my argument, however, is the question of how 
value can be actively re-appropriated from capital and placed into the com-
mons value circuit.
My argument is that we need a form of ‘subversive commoning’, which would 
actively seek to incorporate resources into commons value circuits. Just as 
capital operates according to a logic of capital accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey, 2004), so too can commons-based movements reverse this logic to 
establish a site of social struggle. This could be framed as commons pooling by 
capital dispossession, although there are a couple of caveats to such an expres-
sion. First, I use the term ‘pooling’ here to signal an opposition to the private 
accumulation of capital. However, commons-based movements need to find 
ways of actively growing their commoning capacity over time. Doing so could 
accelerate the pace of the social revolution described by Marx, as well as more 
recently by De Angelis. Second, ‘dispossession’ is not necessarily an entirely 
accurate term when applied to the digital commons. Rather, digital resources 
could be appropriated by commons-based movements to serve their own needs.
Bauwens and Niaros (2017) use the term ‘reverse co-optation’ to describe the 
ways in which commons-based movements can ‘use capital from the capitalist 
or state system, and subsume capital to the new logic’ of the commons (3). The 
example given by the authors is the open cooperative, Enspiral, which uses a 
policy of ‘capped returns’ to protect its operations from the perpetual returns 
that investors often seek when investing in a company. In essence, shares in a 
new company are offered to investors along with an option for the company to 
repurchase those shares at an agreed upon price in the future. The idea is that 
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the interests of the investor and the cooperative become aligned; both have 
an interest in seeing the cooperative succeed. The investor will be guaranteed 
some return on the initial investment, and the cooperative will have full control 
of its finances. In the case of Enspiral, once the capped return contract has been 
fulfilled, all resources are then given to the commons. In this sense, Enspiral 
provides an example of how an open cooperative can actively grow common-
pool resources.
While Enspiral provides one example of how the commons can grow, my 
idea for ‘subversive commoning’ would include many other examples. At a 
general level, we can think of movements to reclaim farming, housing, forests, 
and other natural resources by either occupying abandoned space or actively 
resisting the enclosure of ancestral lands. These activities are directly subver-
sive to capital because they actively re-appropriate sites of capitalist production 
into cooperative or commons-based movements. But we also have examples 
from within the digital commons. For example, organisations like RiseUp or 
Saravá provide ‘online communication tools for people and groups working 
on liberatory social change’ (RiseUp, 2019). In addition, FemHack provides a 
space for feminist and queer hackers to ‘hack patriarchy, capitalism, and other 
systems of oppression’, and the group actively works to encode non-hierarchical 
values into their technologies and networked infrastructures (foufem, 2016). 
These organisations, which have been effectively built from nothing, have the 
subversion of the logic of capital at the core of their foundational principles. 
Apart from within organisations that provide digital infrastructures, tools, and 
services to assist in the project of bringing about social change, subversive com-
moning can also be seen in attempts to release knowledge and information 
that has been closed off from public access. Aaron Schwartz’s downloading and 
release of academic articles held in the JSTOR database provides an example of 
commoning knowledge that was enclosed by the capitalist logic of publishing 
companies. What all these examples have in common is the subversive nature 
of their activities in attempting to undermine prevailing capitalist logics that 
either enclose knowledge and information behind paywalls or institute hier-
archical systems of management, surveillance, and control over information 
resources. Any attempt to subvert these logics could provide an example of sub-
versive commoning. Subversive commoning responds by appropriating these 
resources and re-encoding them within the logics of commons value circuits as 
well as within subjectivities that emphasise care, trust, mutual aid, and convivi-
ality, while recognising the social value in social production.
By incorporating a critique of capitalism within commons-based move-
ments, we can move closer to truly anti-capitalist commons. Caffentzis and 
Federici (2014) describe anti-capitalist commons in the following way:
Anti-capitalist commons, then, should be conceived as both autono-
mous spaces from which to reclaim control over the conditions of our 
reproduction, and as bases from which to counter the processes of 
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enclosure and increasingly disentangle our lives from the market and 
the state. Thus they differ from those advocated by the Ostrom School, 
where commons are imagined in a relation of coexistence with the pub-
lic and with the private. Ideally, they embody the vision that Marxists 
and anarchists have aspired to but failed to realize: that of a society 
made of ‘free associations of producers’, self-governed and organized to 
ensure not an abstract equality but the satisfaction of people’s needs and 
desires. (Caffentzis & Federici, 2014: 101)
Rigi’s (2014) proposals for ‘revolutionary peer producing cooperatives’ have 
some of these hallmarks as well. His criteria for such cooperatives are two-
fold: 1) ‘the cooperatives must be revolutionary’, and 2) ‘they must break with 
the market as much as they can’ (401). In visualising how material production 
would pair with knowledge commons, Rigi claims that each cooperative would 
produce its own food on its commons of land, but the material commons (land, 
food, etc.) would only belong to the members rather than be open for all like 
the knowledge commons. He also claims that the cooperative must be open to 
new members, but there would be a cap on the total number of people who are 
allowed to join, which would be determined by the number of people who can 
be supported by the land. Rigi also suggests that any surplus of material goods 
could be made available to other cooperatives through a networked system 
of exchange between other revolutionary cooperatives. Therefore, these com-
munities should try to develop their own communication and transportation 
networks to the greatest extent possible. To reduce the distances between such 
communities, Rigi envisions such cooperatives to be a series of smaller com-
munities (approximately 200,000), which would require massive movements 
of people out of urban centers and back to the countryside. The goal here is 
to reduce the strain on urban environments and ecologies, while revitalising 
some of the areas that have been left behind as now more than half the world’s 
population resides in urban areas.
Undoubtedly, there will be disagreements on how to most effectively accom-
plish such a mass mobilisation. The end goal, however, is to design a more equi-
table and sustainable future for the planet and people. While this may seem like 
an unobjectionable goal, too often progressive social movements become mired 
in debates about the appropriate means to achieve these goals, as if there were 
one singular means for achieving social change. My own view is that we ought 
not to be entirely dismissive of any effort at bringing about change, especially if 
that change is aimed at combatting the injustices of global capitalism. Rather, 
to truly mount a substantive challenge to the tendencies of global capital, we 
will require a multifaceted approach that accounts for the unique specificities 
within local contexts. The point is not to provide a general prescription for how 
things ought to be done. Rather, as Marx reminds us, the point is to change the 
world. And change requires that we remain open to the unique histories, chal-
lenges, and opportunities with which we are presented.
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6.7. Concluding Thoughts on Capital and the Commons
As the quote from Raymond Williams at the beginning of this chapter reminds 
us, technologies are just one part of a more general social struggle. Commons-
based peer production, such as the type occurring within FLOSS communi-
ties, should not be viewed as a comprehensive solution to the unequal social 
relations of a capitalist system. Rather, commons-based peer production may 
be viewed as one part of a broader social struggle against global capital. More 
specifically, commons-based peer production can be viewed within the context 
of a broader resistance movement that seeks to reclaim commons of all types, 
whether they be tangible goods like land, water, and air, or the intangible goods 
of data, information, or knowledge that provide the infrastructure for social 
relations.
When Karl Polanyi authored The Great Transformation, he critiqued the 
then-emerging market fundamentalism of the Austrian School of economics, 
exemplified by Friedrich Hayek and inspired by the work of Ludwig von Mises, 
for its dis-embedding of market relations from social relations. For Polanyi, the 
market and market relations had historically been embedded within social rela-
tions, such that the social bonds connecting communities of people together 
were not subjected to a market logic. Rather, the market existed within and as 
a part of social relations. This, however, transformed after the market became 
elevated to a degree whereby all other relations became moulded according to 
its logic. This dis-embedding of the market from social relations has the nor-
mative effect of creating certain ‘fictitious commodities,’ like land, labour, and 
money that had all previously been important infrastructural elements of social 
life. In other words, when land becomes a commodity, concerns about its long-
term sustainability become subsumed under a market logic that seeks profit 
from its exploitation. The same applies to labour, which is to say, human beings, 
who become exploited and valued according to a market logic. Finally, money 
becomes something to be hoarded for its intrinsic or future value rather than its 
function as a universal equivalent for exchanging different goods.
Polanyi’s critique could, perhaps, be expanded to include information as a 
fictitious commodity. This would offer a framework for situating information 
dialectically between the market and social relations, as well as the increasing 
tendency to extract information out of its social function and treat it as a com-
modity. Indeed, Schiller (2007) draws this distinction between information as 
a commodity and information as a resource. When treated as a commodity and 
enclosed by intellectual property protections, information becomes highly val-
ued as a privileged resource that can only be accessed by those who are willing 
to pay for access. When treated as a resource and made freely available for all, 
information can be studied, modified, adapted, and redistributed to others who 
can also benefit from access to it. Thus, we arrive at two conceptualisations of 
information: as a privatised resource transformed into a commodity, and as a 
commonly held resource available for all.
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Corporations, like Microsoft, have sought to transform information into a 
privatised resource that can be protected by copyright. The FLOSS commu-
nity has sought ways to preserve information as a commonly held resource for 
all to use, most notably through copyleft licences like the GPL. By doing so, 
the community has been able to establish a knowledge commons that resists 
enclosure. However, the knowledge commons under capitalism may be fac-
ing a similar fate to the commons of the past, although with certain careful 
distinctions. This project has demonstrated how capital has readjusted its rela-
tively inflexible position in relation to commons-based production. It needed 
to reorient its strategies to incorporate without enclosing the commons. By 
doing so, capitalist firms pursue profits while finding a variety of ways to give 
back to the community, whether by making code freely available under free 
software or open source licensing, or by supporting the informal institutions 
that govern various open source projects. While this may provide ad hoc sup-
port for commons-based production, it may not provide a long-term solution 
to commons-based labour. Instead, commons-based peer labour may be placed 
in an ever-more-precarious position of depressed or non-existent wages while 
corporations make commercial use of their contributions. What will be needed 
as this type of involvement continues is a sustainable way to protect the com-
mons, but also a way to ensure investment in commons-based peer labour. In 
other words, not just investment in institutions, organisations, technologies, 
or innovations, but long-term and sustainable investment in the true source of 
their value, which is to say, people.
Notes
 36 The ideas in this section originally appeared in Benjamin Birkinbine. 2018. 
Commons Praxis: Toward a Critical Political Economy of the Digital Com-
mons. tripleC 16(1): 290–305.
 37 For more on these contradictions and a critical call for media and com-
munication scholars to formulate a newly emergent politics of the left, see 
Fenton, Natalie. 2016. Digital, Political, Radical. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
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Corporate Involvement in Free 




The concept of ‘the commons’ has been used as a framework to understand resources shared by a community rather than a private entity, and it has also inspired social movements working against 
the enclosure of public goods and resources. One such resource is free 
(libre) and open source software (FLOSS). FLOSS emerged as an alternative 
to proprietary software in the 1980s. However, both the products and 
production processes of FLOSS have become incorporated into capitalist 
production. For example, Red Hat, Inc. is a large publicly traded company 
whose business model relies entirely on free software, and IBM, Intel, 
Cisco, Samsung, Google are some of the largest contributors to Linux, the 
open-source operating system. This book explores the ways in which FLOSS 
has been incorporated into digital capitalism. Just as the commons have 
been used as a motivational frame for radical social movements, it has also 
served the interests of free-marketeers, corporate libertarians, and states 
to expand their reach by dragging the shared resources of social life onto 
digital platforms so they can be integrated into the global capitalist system.
The book concludes by asserting the need for a critical political economic 
understanding of the commons that foregrounds (digital) labour, class 
struggle, and uneven power distribution within the digital commons as well 
as between FLOSS communities and their corporate sponsors.
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